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Summary 
Cultural materialism has become an influential discipline in recent 
years, particularly so in `Renaissance' studies, but also more generally in 
`English', as well as departments defined as practising `cultural' or 
`communications' studies. The phrase is usually linked with the name of 
Raymond Williams, but a cursory examination of Williams's own work 
quickly establishes that it is a phrase he rarely uses, and only schematically 
attempts to define. The thesis therefore takes the form of an investigation into 
the way cultural materialism has come to be understood, by examining in 
detail the trajectory of Raymond Williams's theoretical development, and how 
his own engagement with various theoretical positions has helped to set 
`limits' on the meaning of cultural materialism. 
Chapters 1 and 2 deal with some of Williams's earliest work, 
particularly Reading and Criticism, as a way of investigating how reasonable 
it is to tag him as a `Left-Leavisite', arguing that Leavis's undoubted 
influence is resisted (though not entirely rejected) from a very early stage. The 
first chapter considers in detail Leavis's work at Cambridge, the influence of 
Eliot, and the significance of the `Organic Community'. Chapter 2, which is 
based around a comparative analysis of Williams's and Leavis's readings of 
Dickens, argues that Williams rejects the `organic community' in favour of his 
`knowable community'. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with specific `theoretical' 
issues: the first, based around a reading of Terry Eagleton's critique of 
Williams's use of the Marxist metaphor of `base and superstructure', shows 
some of the problems which arise from Williams's cultural model, as well as 
suggesting refinements; the second deals with the influence of Volosinov's 
theories on Williams. Chapter 6 comes out of Williams's readings of the 
`Country-House' poems in The Country and the City, showing how his 
practice of literary criticism relies on an acceptance of `ideology' apparently 
denied in his more `theoretical' writings. This analysis is extended as a result 
of investigations into the `De L'Isle' manuscripts relating to the Penshurst 
estate. Chapter 7 argues that it is possible to see the work of Fredric Jameson 
as developing Williams's cultural materialism into Jameson's debates on 
postmodernism. 
In the Introduction and Conclusion, I have taken the opportunity to 
look briefly at the activity of cultural materialism as it has developed since 
Raymond Williams's death in 1988. The Introduction emphasizes what I see 
to be important methodological differences between `cultural materialism' 
and `new historicism'; the Conclusion deals with the continuing debate over 
the value of a cultural materialist approach by considering the `appropriation' 
of Shakespeare. 
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I looked myself up once in the Anatomy of Britain and found myself 
described as `the Marxist Professor of Communications' and I thought: `well, 
I'm not a professor, I don't teach communications; I don't know whether the 
first term of the description would be more or less accurate than the others. ' 
Raymond Williams, 1975 
On a visit to the United States in 1988 I was surprised to discover that I was 
a Cultural Materialist. 
Catherine Belsey, 1989 
After all most of the work I was doing was in an area which people called 
`culture', even in the narrower sense, so that the term had a certain 
obviousness. But you know the number of times I've wished that I had never 
heard of the damned word. 




Why link the practice of `cultural materialism' with the name of 
Raymond Williams? The question is not such a strange one as it might first 
appear. Cultural materialism has not disappeared with the death of Raymond 
Williams in 1989, on the contrary, as I hope to show here and in the 
conclusion, it appears to be thriving. Further, despite Williams generally being 
acknowledged as the `founder' of cultural materialism, as a term it is 
conspicuous by its absence rather than its presence in his comprehensive 
oeuvre. Briefly mentioned in one essay', it receives its main attention in 
Williams's most `theoretical' work, Marxism and Literature: 
[I] am concerned [... ] to develop a position which, as a matter of 
theory, I have arrived at over the years. This differs, at several key 
points, from what is known as Marxist theory, and even from many of 
its variants. It is a position which can be briefly described as cultural 
materialism: a theory of the specificities of material cultural and 
literary production within historical materialism. Its details belong to 
the argument as a whole, but I must say, at this point, that it is, in my 
view, a Marxist theory, and indeed that in its specific fields it is, in 
spite of and even because of the relative unfamiliarity of some of its 
elements, part of what I at least see as the central thinking of 
Marxism. 2 
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Much of this, in particular the relationship of Williams's cultural 
materialism to Marxism, will be the subject of specific discussion in the body 
of the thesis. My reason for mentioning it here is to emphasize rather the 
minimalist nature of the `definition' given by Williams. Anyone assuming that 
they will be able to define the `limits' of the practice of cultural materialism by 
casually referring to one or two of Williams's `key' works will very soon 
realise the impossibility of satisfying such a desire. Instead, and this is more 
like the approach I have followed, it becomes necessary to analyse in detail 
some of those works, and deduce from there at least the outline of a `unified' 
theory. But I want to stress also that this is far from being a disadvantage, 
because it opens up the possibility of recognizing the faintly-defined `borders' 
of Williams's complex and at times contradictory approach to `cultural 
analysis'. 3 The trajectory of the thesis therefore is roughly chronological, 
starting with some of Williams's earliest writings, and ending with his 
relationship to the postmodern, 
But such a `teleological' approach does not mean that it is possible to 
discover a gradually evolving theoretical position, or that elusive 
`epistemological' break in his thinking (between perhaps his `pre' and `post' 
Marxist incarnations). Rather, it helps to identify a generally steady attitude 
towards `cultural production', while at the same time recognizing that 
Williams does revise and rethink his ideas in the light of new theories 
elsewhere. This brings me to an important point about the thesis as a whole. 
This is not a sort of `intellectual biography' of Raymond Williams, although 
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that is something which I believe is overdue. 4 Although Williams's name and 
work is prominent, the thesis is more about cultural materialism, considered 
from the point of view of Williams's relationship with various 
theories/theorists, so that at times it is their work which becomes central. 
Also, I have attempted to display both the theory of cultural materialism and 
its practical value, by considering in detail specific work in literary and 
cultural analysis. This helps to emphasize the limitations of the discipline, or, 
more generously, how the work of Williams and others is not the end of a 
cultural materialist interpretation, but part of a continuing cultural and 
historical investigation. 
Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to emphasize just what the 
thesis is not. It is not an in-depth investigation into the work of those who call 
themselves `cultural materialists'. Originally, this would have been `Part two' 
of the thesis, with the first part devoted more directly to Williams's own 
understanding of the term, as a way of measuring the distance between 
Williams and some who have taken up his ideas. But this would have 
restricted too heavily the level of analysis I found necessary in `Part one' 
(which has now effectively become `the thesis'). In particular, it proved 
important to devote considerably more space to Williams's very early work 
than I had expected initially. However, that leaves open the possibility for a 
different sort of work, one more interested in studying the current practice of 
cultural materialism, something which has been attempted, although I would 
argue with only limited success to date. ' Although that is not now the subject 
of the present work, its importance means that I am unable to ignore it 
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completely, particularly since only through such investigation can it be 
understood just why cultural materialism (however `defined') is still of some 
significance. In chapter seven, on theories of the postmodern, I suggest that 
the American, Fredric Jameson , effectively takes Williams's cultural 
materialism into the postmodern debate, and that this therefore represents a 
possible future. The conclusion understands `future' rather differently, 
looking at how cultural materialism has been taken up and adapted after 
Williams's death, particularly in relation to the present state of `English 
studies', and even more specifically the public debate over the `appropriation' 
of Shakespeare; and at where else it can or should go from here. For the rest 
of this introduction, I want to concentrate on how cultural materialism is 
understood, and to deal briefly with some of its critics, before summarising 
the contents of the thesis. 
In the conclusion, we will find a whole phalanx of critics ranged 
ag . 
inst the practitioners of cultural materialism. Largely (but not entirely) 
they will consist of conservative critics, apparently threatened by `theory' and 
particularly the suggestion that there are non-transcendental ways of reading 
Shakespeare. But cultural materialism has its critics on the left as well: Fred 
Inglis dismisses it as a `ringing oxymoron', and Marxism and Literature, 
where it is given its fullest theoretical analysis, Williams's `unreadable book'. " 
A rather more `theoretical' analysis is given by Robert Young in his White 
Mythologies', and it will be useful to consider some of Young's criticisms 
briefly, particularly because they relate to an important aspect of the `limits' 
of cultural materialism, which is its distinction from `new historicism'. 
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Young starts off by appearing to be as straightforwardly dismissive of 
cultural materialism as Inglis: it amounts merely, he writes, `to a way of 
describing British ex-Marxists. 8 But as his analysis continues, it becomes 
clearer that, despite his doubts about its theoretical validity, it nevertheless 
has certain advantages over the more `academic' new historicism, in that its 
practitioners are prepared to announce in advance their own political agenda, 
unlike the new historicists, who tend rather towards hiding their own politics. 9 
For Young, both strategies owe an allegiance to the work of Foucault, in that 
`they neither propose, nor utilize, a general theory of history as such; but 
unlike Foucault they simply tend to shelve the whole problem so as to avoid 
its theoretical difficulties'. " 
What Young is drawing on here I think is the way the `historical' and 
the `materialist' aspects of historical materialism are `shared out' between 
cultural materialism and new historicism, so that neither of them can claim to 
incorporate a Marxist historical perspective. This criticism has some 
foundation: in particular it is true that much of what passes for `cultural 
materialism' is rather a way of considering contemporary political issues 
through the `mirror' of earlier (mainly Renaissance) texts. Although this new 
`reflection theory' can thus reveal much of interest about contemporary 
culture and society, it does so at the expense of sidelining the more 
specifically `historical' aspects of the particular texts considered. In other 
words, as Young emphasizes, the desperate search for (Foucauldian) 
categories such as subversion seeks not to discover whether such texts 
actually were subversive, instead the texts are considered to have relevance to 
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the extent that they can be read today as speaking about subversion. " Three 
points though need to be emphasized about Young's arguments. First, it is his 
own commitment to certain poststructuralist theories (this specific debate 
appears as a `coda' to his chapter on Foucault and discourse theory) which 
makes Young so resistant to those alternative strategies which seem inclined 
to hold on to `metaphysical' notions of agency and the subject. Because 
cultural materialists appear to `ignore the theoretical consequences of 
Foucault's work for many Marxist conceptsi12 suggests Young, their own 
assumptions cannot be defended. But this in turn avoids a proper 
investigation into Foucault's own idiosyncratic use of `history', as well as his 
own trenchant denials of the validity of ideological critique. 13 Second, 
although Young is right to show how cultural materialists can appear to 
`avoid' history as they relate the past to the present, this is far from being all 
they do. Just as frequently, they attempt to show how certain apparently 
`transcendental' cultural concepts are themselves historical by interrogating 
history in a way rather different from more traditional historicist approaches, 
which rely on simply `mapping' text onto context, at the same time tending to 
privilege the `literary'. I would suggest that this emphasis on a new 
understanding of historical contextualization is central to the practice of 
cultural materialism, and further that it is the approach favoured by Williams, 
as later chapters will demonstrate. Third, this emphasis on a different 
understanding of historicäl investigation is one important way for attempting 
to distinguish between cultural materialism and new historicism, whereas the 
tendency in Young's argument is to elide the differences between them. 
7 
It is to this differentiation that I now turn. Obviously, there are 
similarities between the two approaches, and, certainly in their recent 
practice, both have seemed to owe more allegiance to Foucault than Williams. 
They have tended to be distinguished by seeing new historicism as 
concentrating on forms of oppressive power relationships (Foucauldian 
`panopticism'), and cultural materialism by contrast concentrating on the 
possibilities for opposition against dominant ideologies (a Williams-like 
`resource of hope'). As Richard Dutton has suggested, `the two wings concur 
and overlap in their convictions about the materiality of discourse, about its 
positive role in the shaping of cultural forms and structures, about its function 
as an agency of power', so much so that he notes how Carol Thomas Neely 
prefers to label them all `cult-historicists' instead. 14 But this merging is not 
complete. The new historicist emphasis on discourse and representation (their 
`flagship' journal is Representations) tends to devalue ideological critique in 
favour of understanding `history' as `text'. I would argue that, contrastingly, 
cultural materialists incline rather to Fredric Jameson's understanding of the 
relationship between the two: that history is not reducible to text, but that it is 
only through texts that we are allowed access to history. It also recognizes 
and emphasizes the `history of texts', which is why Williams is so keen 
frequently to indicate how a production today of (say) Lear is effectively not 
`reproduction' but `new' production. 
These theoretical differences, between on the one hand a cultural 
poetics, and on the other a cultural politics", are emphasized, I believe, in the 
practices of the two disciplines. Since both the theory and practice of cultural 
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materialism are the central concerns of much of what follows, I am able to 
concentrate here on the methodology of new historicism, as exemplified by 
the work of its most famous practitioner, and the man who claims to have 
coined the term `new historicism', Stephen Greenblatt. 16 My problems with 
new historicism are not centred on its concentration on oppression always 
incorporating resistance. Greenblatt himself has argued powerfully that such a 
reading misunderstands the subtlety of his arguments in an influential essay, 
`Invisible Bullets'. 17 The problem rather is one of political significance, both 
cultural materialism and new historicism, as I suggested above, indulge in a 
form of historical contextualization, but one fundamentally different from 
earlier ('old') historicist approaches. This `new' historicism refuses to 
distinguish in any simple way between the text, and its context, rather seeing 
both as part of a whole. In Terence Hawkes's words: 
On the one hand [new historicism] represents a reaction against a de- 
historicized idealism, in which an apparently free-floating and 
autonomous body of writing called `literature' serves as the repository 
of the universal values of a supposedly permanent `human nature'. [... ] 
Such a historicism's `newness' lies precisely in its determination to 
reposition `literature' altogether, to perceive literary texts as active 
constituent elements of their time, participants in, not mirrors of it-18 
Much of this is also applicable to cultural materialism of course, and will 
become the subject of further consideration in the Conclusion. But it is in 
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Hawkes's extension of this explanation that the gap between the two starts to 
become more evident. Writing that `[Shakespeare's texts] take their place in 
an extensive symbolic field which must also include royal proclamations, 
parliamentary debates, architecture, music, song, letters and travellers' reports 
as aspects of a number of different rhetorical or "textual" strategies available 
and consistently utilized for the production of meaning'19, Hawkes suggests 
the wide field available for analysis. Thus, in an attempt to make the `literary' 
inform history at the same time as history helps to `explain' literature, the 
analyst has at his or her disposal the whole field of textual `evidence'. But the 
risk with such an approach is that it ignores the likelihood that some evidence 
is likely to be more `informative' than others: in a discussion of Lear's 
relationship to his daughters, a song may well be relevant, but a royal 
proclamation is probably a better starting point. In Hawkes's own case, his 
choice of parallel text is a map (actually in his case the idea of a map rather 
than a specific historical example), particularly appropriate to Lear's calling 
for the map as his own textual support for the momentous decisions he is 
about to make about his kingdom. Greenblatt however tends to approach the 
task much more indirectly, and his method, based on searching for 
`homologies' between the historical period and the specific text being 
considered has tended to become the norm of such new historicist analysis. 
Despite Greenblatt's arguments that his reading in `Invisible Bullets' 
has been misunderstood, what is undeniable, and manifest, is the great 
emphasis he places on his chosen `homologous' text, Thomas Harriot's Brief 
and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia. As Frank Romany has 
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argued20, Greenblatt produces from this a typically suave and intriguing essay, 
but one which is much more concerned with Harriot's text (wherein reside 
those `invisible bullets') than the Shakespearean ones whose analysis follows 
in the second part of the essay. This becomes the method for all of the essays 
in Greenblatt's Shakespearean Negotiations21. As Romany summarises the 
approach: `each chapter juxtaposes a representative play with other texts and 
documents, some from the hinterland of established sources, others with no 
formal connections with Shakespeare'. 22 Such a technique is reminiscent of 
Foucault's approach to historical scholarship, and similar qualifications seem 
necessary. While on the one hand such trawling among the obscurities of the 
past often nets illuminating examples usually ignored, the danger is that it 
does so at the expense of more common, but also more relevant material. In 
Foucault's case, this may not be important, since he insists continuously on 
the futility of equating history with truth. Greenblatt, by substituting histories 
for `history', or as Romany puts it, abandoning the `grand recit' in favour of 
the `thick description of telling anecdotes'23 effectively abandons the sort of 
way Williams would want to understand `history', and the relationship 
between text and context. 
The worry then, is that if we extend this analogy between the practices 
of Greenblatt and Foucault, we may find that `truth' itself, the truth of 
history, is too easily abandoned in favour of the more interesting `telling 
anecdote'. This is certainly the suggestion made in a more recent essay by 
John Lee devoted to Greenblatt's work. 24 Concentrating now on Greenblatt's 
Learning to Curse, Lee argues persuasively that Greenblatt's delight in the 
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ephemera of history (in this case a hat in the library of Christ Church, Oxford 
which may have belonged to Cardinal Wolsey) has led him to rewrite history 
in order to make the hat `work' and so prove the value of a new historicist 
approach. Comparing two versions of the same essay ('Resonance and 
Wonder'), one from the hardback edition of Leaning to Curse and one from 
the paperback, Lee carefully reconstructs Greenblatt's textual manipulations, 
emphasizing in the process how easy it is for the anecdote (necessarily 
`personal') to blur the distinctions between story-telling and historical 
reporting. As Lee points out, this emphasis on the anecdote at once 
distinguishes the work of new historicists from cultural materialists: whereas 
the cultural materialists `will typically concentrate on some aspect of culture 
that is marginalized within the text that is being studied [... ] and begin to 
contextualize the play from this point, thus giving themselves criteria of 
relevance', the new historicist by contrast `contextualize[s] a play by placing 
it next to an aspect of culture - often to be used synecdochially [sic] to stand 
for all culture - arguing that play and aspect should be closely associated, 
even when there is no literal connection'. 25 As Lee goes on to argue, the 
beauty of the anecdote is its appearance of `newness': however interesting 
Hawkes may be on maps in Lear, someone has probably been there before; 
whereas `Lear seen through the Reverend Wayland's disciplining of his son 
[Greenblatt's reading] has not been written about before'. And Greenblatt's 
more recent work has tended towards `a sequence of anecdotes, interwoven 
with a sequence of moral conclusions'. 26 
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Everyone likes anecdotes, even Raymond Williams27, and this thesis, 
and cultural materialism, may not be free of them. But I would want to argue 
that what the thesis demonstrates is that the practice of cultural materialism as 
developed by Raymond Williams understands history somewhat differently. 
Interpreting a text requires more than finding something of similar age and 
then saying something interesting about them, however well this is done. The 
chapters which follow, and which I will now summarise briefly, attempt to 
make sense of what Raymond Williams means by cultural materialism, and 
how it can be put into critical practice - they do not ignore the problems, 
despite my belief that cultural materialism is valuable in a way which is much 
less certain of new historicism. 
The first two chapters following the Introduction concentrate largely 
on Williams's earliest critical writing, and try to make sense of that 
complicated relationship between him and the enormous influence on English 
studies of the work of F. R. Leavis in particular. They argue, first through 
detailed analyses of some of that early work, in particular the largely 
forgotten Reading and Criticism28, and later through an examination in detail 
of the differences in literary critical practice (through Leavis's and Williams's 
`readings' of Dickens), why tagging Williams as a `Left-Leavisite' is both 
inevitable and reductive. Inevitable, because particularly in Reading and 
Criticism the debt to Leavis is so clear; reductive, because already in that 
early work Williams makes it clear that he is starting to write in opposition to 
Leavisian ideas. It is for this reason that I have subtitled the two chapters 
`Away from the Organic Community' and `Towards the Knowable 
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Community', suggesting both that there are very different ways of looking at 
the same thing, and that from the beginning Williams wants to reject a 
dominant strand in Leavisian criticism. 
Chapters four and five deal in detail with some of the major theoretical 
issues which need to be confronted in the development of cultural 
materialism. `Base and Superstructure in Terry Eagleton' takes its title from 
an essay on Williams by Eagleton29, in which Williams's radical rewriting of a 
central Marxist metaphor of determination, fundamental to a Marxist theory 
of culture and ideology, becomes almost the defining moment both of the 
`limits' and the `limitations' of cultural materialism. The centrality of this 
issue requires a re-examination of Marx's and Engels texts in the light of 
Eagleton's critique, as well as a further consideration of some alternative 
ways of understanding the internal dynamics of `base' and `superstructure' 
and the relationship between them. Chapter five takes up Volosinov's critique 
of Saussure's sign theory, and argues that Williams's early engagement with 
the work of Volosinov and the `Bakhtin school' allows him to develop a 
language model which bypasses the `structuralist controversy', using this as a 
way of completing his model of cultural materialism. 
In chapter six, I use Williams's work from The Country and the City30 
on `Country-House' poetry as a way both of examining in some detail the 
practice of cultural materialism, and to indicate how such analysis needs to be 
further extended, in particular by an examination of the historical records on 
the `Penshurst' estate at the beginning of the seventeenth-century belonging 
to the De L'isle family. Chapter seven, contrastingly, brings the thesis right up 
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to the last writings of Raymond Williams, represented by the collection of 
essays published after his death, The Politics of Modenrism. 31 It uses the 
work of the American critic Fredric Jameson as a way of showing how 
cultural materialism can be used to interrogate, and try to make sense of, that 
strange phenomenon `postmodernity', and how Jameson and Williams are 
related through their commitment to a sort of utopian `resource of hope'. 
Finally, the Conclusion examines briefly what has happened to cultural 
materialism after Williams's death, in particular through an examination of the 
debate around the `appropriation' of Shakespeare. It also suggests some 
further `limitations' to the discipline as practised by Williams, and how they 
may be beginning to be confronted. 
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2 
Reading and Criticism: Away from the Organic Community 
At a Cambridge faculty meeting to discuss the radical notion of 
including a new paper on the novel in Part II of the Tripos, attended by F. R. 
Leavis and Raymond Williams, the debate centred on the advisability of 
including `non-English' novels on the syllabus. 1 To Leavis, any suggestion for 
including a foreign writer was `misdirection' and must be resisted. As the 
debate continued, and Leavis realised he would lose in a vote, he turned to 
Williams, the committee secretary: `I put it directly to you, Mr Secretary. The 
coherent course would be the English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence'. 2 
Williams's remembrance of this relatively small incident says much for the 
divergence in their positions: `He knew quite well that this was the title of my 
main current lecture course. He knew also, I think, that the course was an 
attempt at a sustained argument against The Great Tradition'. 3 Leavis's 
shrewd tactic (although, as it transpired, an unsuccessful one) manages at one 
and the same time to co-opt Williams in to his English tradition (from the 
perspective of the other faculty members), and to let Williams know he is 
aware of the hidden agenda behind the lecture-course structure. It is apparent 
then, that, by this time (the mid 1960s), there is a recognizable difference in 
literary approach between the two figures. If, as has been sometimes 
suggested, Williams was at one time a `Zeavisite' (`Left' or otherwise)4 he is 
obviously something else by this time. I want to suggest that this difference is 
a consequence of Williams's slowly maturing concept of `cultural 
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materialism'; and that it can be specified in the formal differences between 
Leavis's `organic' and Williams's `knowable' community. Based on this 
anecdote, it would seem appropriate to offer a comparison between Leavis's 
The Great Tradition and Williams's The English Novel from Dickens to 
Lawrence. 5 But I want to start before this, looking at a number of books and 
documents relating to Williams's early written work, and comparing them 
with the pioneering work of Leavis, exemplified by his editing of Scrutiny, to 
test how similar or different their approaches were in Williams's formative 
period. 6 
We need, I think, to start by stepping back slightly, to acknowledge a 
real continuity between the work of Leavis, Williams, and previously 
influential critics, all concerned with the `definition' of `culture', a `selective 
tradition' which attempts to put culture (however defined), at the centre of 
critical debate. The names and the texts would then include T. S. Eliot 
(`Tradition and the Individual Talent'); Matthew Arnold (Culture and 
Anarchy); and Thomas Carlyle ('Signs of the Times') 7 It is necessary to 
recognize these continuities as much as the perceived differences: in their 
different ways, all of these writers (including Leavis and Williams) are 
confronting modernity after the start of the Industrial Revolution. Their work 
is thus intimately concerned with ideas about `progress', `civilization', the 
relationship of the individual to an increasingly `technological' environment, 
the need for new forms of education, the meaning of `democracy' etc. There 
is thus a structure which effectively binds their work together, while at the 
same time allowing a developing dialectic. Just as The English Novel from 
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Dickens to Lawrence responds to the demands of The Great Tradition, so 
Williams's Culture and Society tacitly recognizes and resists the influence of 
Culture and Anarchy. Culture and Anarchy starts from the Carlylean position 
that modem society is increasingly `mechanical' and `external'. `The Function 
of Criticism at the Present Time' (Arnold, 1865) is taken over by T. S. Eliot, 
and later forms the basis for an extended debate on literary criticism between 
Leavis and F. W. Bateson (acknowledged as an influence by Williams). 8 The 
first name mentioned by Leavis in `Mass Civilization and Minority Culture' 
(1930) is Arnold; and, as for Eliot, the debt is obvious and enormous: one 
example must suffice, in `T. S. Eliot's Later Poetry' Leavis quotes Eliot's own 
words from `Tradition and the Individual Talent': `[Tradition] cannot be 
inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour' to describe 
the writer of Four Quartets, a poet possessed of `magnificent intelligence'. 9 
And just in case we want to distinguish Williams from all the others by his 
insistence on the `ordinariness' of culture, we are reminded by Richard 
Hoggart that it was T. S. Eliot who `said "culture is ordinary" long before 
Raymond Williams elaborated it and made it one of the rallying-cries of the 
New Left'. '° 
1. Leavis and How to teach Reading 
From my investigations, I would see the 1950s as the decisive period 
for a radical split in theoretical position between Leavis and Williams, but, in 
order to understand this history, it is necessary first to return to the 1930s, 
and Leavis's pioneering work in editing the Cambridge periodical Scrutiny 
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(along with others such as L. C. Knights, Donald Culver, Denys Thompson 
and D. W. Harding), which started in 1932, and finally closed in 1953.11 This 
important work, together with a series of influential full-length texts make up 
a sustained and dominant oeuvre, which sets the cultural agenda, and offers a 
critique of the (then) current practice of literary criticism, and its relative 
importance compared with other disciplines. It attempts to offer nothing less 
than a totalizing vision, which, nevertheless, refuses to embrace alternative 
cultural, political or philosophical models. This would include Marxism, 
which Leavis saw as a complete dead-end, but also, I will want to argue, 
Cambridge positivism, exemplified for Leavis by the work of I. A. Richards12, 
this in spite of the obvious debt owed to Richards's emphasis on `practical 
criticism'. 
In attempting to categorize Leavis's position, I will start by 
examining that rather odd offering from 1932, How to Teach Reading. 
Subtitled A Primer for Ezra Pound, it takes the form of a rebuttal of Pound's 
How to Read, offering both a very distinctive critique of that work, and, in the 
second part, Leavis's `positive suggestions' for a better alternative. Typical of 
Leavis's very Eliotic conception of `culture', `tradition' and `criticism', it 
starts with Eliot's belief that `great literature is simply language charged with 
meaning to the utmost possible degree'. Like Pound, Leavis wants to make a 
decisive break with one very particular `tradition', that style of English 
criticism which has the `habit of discussing literature in terms of Hamlet's and 
Lamb's personalities, Milton's universe, Johnson's conversation, 
Wordsworth's philosophy, and Othello's or Shelley's private life'. 13 But he 
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resists absolutely Pound's `prescription' for `a minimum basis for a sound and 
liberal education in letters', both for its ignorance of the practicalities of 
teaching and learning ('reading what one is supposed to have read would be a 
full-time business'), and for its insistence on the priority of foreign names at 
the expense of canonical English writers, particularly Shakespeare and Donne 
(HTTR, pp. 6-11). 
For Leavis, Pound's problems arise particularly because, although, 
like all critics, he insists on a certain level of `abstraction' (inevitable in 
Leavis's view), such abstract theorizing will only be fruitful where it is 
wedded to an acknowledgement of the central importance of `sensibility' 
(again the homage to Eliot is clear), otherwise, it becomes abstraction for its 
own sake, exemplified in Pound by his desire to reduce poetic interpretation 
to a triad of obscure Greek rhetorical terms (HTJR, pp. 12-13). Fundamental 
here is Leavis's argument that Pound's conception of `tradition' is misplaced, 
not only because he sees the canon as merely `a matter mainly of individual 
works [... ] written by individual artists' (and therefore lacking an `organic' 
dimension), but also because he fails to recognize the very real relationship 
between language and literature, between the consciousness of a people and a 
literary `memory': again, Eliot is the guide: 
[A] given literary tradition is not merely, as it were by geographical 
accidents of birth, associated with a given language: the relation may 
be suggested by saying that the two are of each other. Not only is 
language an apt analogy for literary tradition; one might say that such 
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a tradition is largely a development of the language it belongs to if one 
did not want to say at the same time that the language is largely a 
product of the tradition. Perhaps the best analogy is that used by Mr. 
Eliot in `Tradition and the Individual Talent' when he speaks of `the 
mind of Europe. ' `Mind' implies both consciousness and memory, and 
a literary tradition is both: it is the consciousness and memory of the 
people or the cultural tradition in which it has developed (H7TR, p. 
19, emphasis in original). 
The movement from `literary' to `cultural' is important: for Leavis, literary 
criticism is much more than a system (`scientific' or otherwise) for aesthetic 
evaluation, it becomes rather the basis for a whole set of moral and cultural 
judgements which are `extra-literary', and thus replaces other such `meta- 
narratives', including, most obviously, all those coming under the heading of 
`philosophy'. 
`One cannot be seriously interested in literature and remain purely 
literary in interests' (HT7R, p. 21): with this, Leavis ends his `critique' of 
Pound, and moves on to the second part of his thesis, a series of `positive 
suggestions', a mini blueprint for a new university education, and the `training 
of sensibility' (HITR, p. 25). This `training' needs certain standard works of 
criticism as its basis, and it is useful to compare the advice given here by 
Leavis, with his slightly amended suggestions in the version of How to Teach 
Reading given ten years later in Education and the University. In the earlier 
version, Leavis is very much in the debt of Richards and Empson: this is his 
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summary of the value, for instance, of Richards' The Principles of Literary 
Criticism (1924), and Practical Criticism (1929): 
This apparatus [Richards' two books] will not give [the student] a 
technique of analysis, but with Dr. Richards' account of `What is a 
Poem, '? of rhythm, meaning, sentimentality and so on, and a good 
sensibility trained in constant analytic practice, he will be able to learn, 
and to teach, how to discuss profitably the differences between 
particular poems, to explain in detail and with precision why this is to 
be judged sentimental, that genuinely poignant; how the unrealized 
imagery of this betrays that it was `faked' while the concreteness and 
associative subtlety of that come from below and could not have been 
excogitated; and so on (HTTR, p. 26, emphasis in original). 14 
Similar praise, although with at least the hint of a reservation, is given to 
Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930); `those who are capable of 
learning from it are capable of reading it critically, and those who are not 
capable of learning from it were not intended by Nature for an advanced 
"education in letters"'. In 1932, besides these examples, there is, states 
Leavis, `little to recommend' (HTTR, p. 26). However, in the version printed 
in Education and the University, all this detail about Empson and Richards is 
removed, and, instead, a footnote directs the reader back to chapter three of 
that work, `Literary Studies'. Now, Empson's work is offered with the 
equivalent of a government health warning: `a warning against temptation that 
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the analyst whose practice is to be a discipline must resist'. 15 Again, it is only 
the already-able student who will benefit from Empson's work, but it now 
looks a much less desirable text: 
A useful exercise for the moderately seasoned student would be to go 
through W. Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity, or parts of it, 
discriminating between the profitable and the unprofitable, the valid 
and the vicious. Empson's extremely mixed and uneven book, offering 
as it does a good deal of valuable stimulus, serves the better as a 
warning -a warning against temptation that the analyst whose practice 
is to be a discipline must resist. 16 
By now, Richards, like Empson, offers a combination of `the stimulating and 
the aberrant', particularly in regard to his strongly `scientific' desires, the 
`ambition to make analysis a laboratory technique'. " Indeed, a comparison of 
Leavis's later problems with both critics indicates a very important duality in 
Leavis's method: he both resists prescription, denying regularly any argument 
which is based on saying `this is the correct method' (which would 
presumably be the result of Richards's positivist approach), while, at the same 
time, wanting to challenge what he calls the `Empsonian kind of 
irresponsibility', which delights in ambiguity and language games. 18 
This, surely, marks the interest and the real ideological problems in 
Leavis's approach, and is linked, inevitably, to a whole other debate over the 
ability of an aesthetic (in this case `modernism') to offer a critique of 
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modernity; and it is one reason why T. S. Eliot appears to represent an ideal 
for Leavis. Eliot, for Leavis, is neither positivist (a la Richards) nor 
Empsonian relativist. In `T. S. Eliot's Later Poetry' Leavis summarises these 
features in Eliot's mature poetry: 
The poetry from Ash-Wednesday onwards doesn't say, `I believe, ' or 
`I know, ' or `Here is the truth'; it is positive in direction but not 
positive in that way. [... ] It is a searching of experience, a spiritual 
discipline, a technique for sincerity - for giving `sincerity' a meaning. '9 
This description, combining as it does experiential analysis and religious 
organization fits perfectly with Eliot's own developed persona, but how 
helpful is it as a method for literary criticism? While giving something a 
meaning is not necessarily the same as fixing a meaning, it implies at least 
that such stability is possible and desirable. But how can it be achieved? - just 
what is a `technique for sincerity'? The problem is that `sincerity' is as loose 
and `ambiguous' a term as `sensibility'. 
Further, it points towards a more extreme version of `poetic 
sensibility', one exemplified for instance in Eliot's extension of his arguments 
in `Tradition and the Individual Talent', given in 1933 in the series of lectures 
offered to the University of Virginia, and published as After Strange Gods: A 
Primer of Modern Heresy. 20 Moving away from what he considers the over- 
literary emphasis of the earlier essay, Eliot now ties a similarly understood 
version of `active' tradition, to `orthodoxy'. While explicitly insisting that 
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these terms are not being used in a narrowly religious sense, he nonetheless 
emphasises the deeply theological structure to his argument by stating: `that 
an acceptance of the validity of the two terms as I use them should lead one 
to dogmatic theology, I naturally believe' (ASG, p. 31). `Dogma' might well 
suitably summarise the tone of Eliot's lectures, which contain some 
particularly virulent material, supported by his view that `a spirit of excessive 
tolerance is to be deprecated' (ASG, p. 20). 21 His main thesis, an extension of 
the `lost organic community' theory, is that modern literature has become 
divorced from any genuine moral perspective as England has suffered `the 
decay of Protestantism', and that this discloses itself in a failure of aesthetic 
achievement (ASG, p. 38). In giving examples of this decline, Eliot writes off 
many of the pioneers of modernism and before, the names that will inform the 
`Great Tradition'. Thus he dismisses Pound: `his powerful and narrow post- 
Protestant prejudice peeps out from the most unexpected places'; Yeats: who 
adopted `the doctrine of Arnold, that Poetry can replace Religion'; George 
Eliot: `we must respect her for being a serious moralist, but deplore her 
individualistic morals'; Hardy: his `extreme emotionalism' is `a symptom of 
decadence'; Hopkins (a Jesuit priest): `not a religious poet in the more 
important sense in which I have elsewhere maintained Baudelaire to be a 
religious poet' (ASG, pp. 41-55). Only Joyce is saved: he is `the most 
ethically orthodox of the more eminent writers of [Eliot's] time', and his 
work is `penetrated with Christian feeling' (ASG, pp. 3 8,48). Eliot is far from 
illuminating about his privileging of the very unorthodox (certainly in religious 
terms) Joyce, but it may be linked to Eliot's belief that he can no longer talk 
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of blasphemy, since only a believer can blaspheme (ASG, p. 52). For surely, 
Joyce, at least as much as Hardy or George Eliot, is guilty of the `heresy' of 
shifting his writing towards the `personal', or of intruding the `diabolic' into 
modem literature (ASG, pp. 53,56). For it is this, above all else, which has 
led, in Eliot's view, to the `crippling effect of [the] separation from tradition 
and orthodoxy' (ASG, p. 56). As an example of this fall, Eliot singles out 
Lawrence for particular attention. From the failure of his mother to give him a 
sound religious education, to the production of Lady Chatterley's Lover, 
which shows Eliot that he was a `very sick man indeed', and `spiritual' but 
`spiritually sick', Lawrence is for Eliot `an almost perfect example of the 
heretic' (ASG, pp. 38-39,60-61). 
This represents a very significant point of difference between Eliot and 
Leavis, and, although Leavis starts his Scrutiny review of After Strange Gods 
by rather wishfully dismissing it as `not a book the author would choose to 
have written', u he obviously cannot ignore what amounts to a radical 
dismissal of much of what has previously informed his own critical position. 
He therefore rejects both Eliot's critical argument, that moral analysis should 
replace literary criticism (`moral or religious criticism cannot be a substitute 
for literary criticism'), and accuses Eliot of being a bad critic ('the criticism 
seems painfully bad - disablingly inadequate, often irrelevant and sometimes 
disingenuous'). 23 In particular, Leavis rescues Lawrence, using the very terms 
reserved by Eliot as marks of value: `it must be plain why for those 
preoccupied with orthodoxy, order and traditional forms Lawrence should be 
especially a test'. 24 Lawrence stands, argues Leavis at the end of his review, 
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`for something without which the preoccupation (necessary as it is) with 
order, forms and deliberate construction cannot produce health'. 25 
2. The Organic Community 
The remainder of How to Teach Reading, Leavis's `positive 
suggestions', summarises many of the ideas which underpin much of his life's 
work; the concentration on the relationship between art and morality, the 
necessity for a `critical approach' to criticism, and, significantly, the notion of 
`tradition' as intimately linked to the present as much as to the past (again, 
the model, inevitably, is Eliot, but the Eliot of `Tradition and the Individual 
Talent'). It is this insistence which fuels his continual resistance to that other 
notion of `tradition', represented in Cambridge English by the emphasis, for 
instance, on the study of Anglo-Saxon and `The History of the Language' as 
prerequisites to `understanding': for Leavis, the `traditional' training in 
Cambridge English rather prevents the student from `acquiring any real 
understanding of anything', and produces `not merely a deadening waste of 
time and energy, but exposure to a deadening and dehumanizing spirit' 
(H17'R, pp. 46-7). This, for Leavis, is not `tradition', but `traditionalism', a 
disregard for the present (including of course contemporary literature) which 
`means usually an incapacity for any real interest - the kind of interest that 
understands the meaning of "technique" - in literature at all' (H77R, p. 39). 
The focus, then, is on the present, but the solution to the `present problems of 
art' can only be by bringing the `forces of the past to bear upon the solution 
of these problems' (HTTR, p. 39, quoting Eliot). Only once this type of 
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critical sensibility has been achieved, can there be any profit in spending 
significant time on `other literatures' or `the classics' (a link here to Leavis's 
later rejection of European novels as `misdirection'). In this, Leavis admits to 
being very much a product of Romanticism, citing both the Wordsworth of 
The Prelude and the Coleridge of Biographia Literaria as exemplars of the 
rejection of Augustan `rule[s] and precedent', a system of `language divorced 
from experience' (H77R, p. 44). 
It is here, in the interaction between `language' and `experience', that 
we enter into what will form the most important point of comparison between 
Leavis and Williams, between what I want to call the `organic community' 
and the `knowable community'. Coming out of a long historical debate about 
the methods of literary criticism, and the desirability to `place' a text 
(conventionally a short poem) within a suitable context, this becomes, for the 
Leavis of the 1930s, a crucial moment of distinction between his 
understanding of the activity of criticism, and that practised under the heading 
of `Practical Criticism'. This latter term, the title of Richards' book from 1929 
(Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgement), relates to Richards' 
Cambridge experiments, in which he forced his students to sharpen their 
critical awareness by making them write comments on unsigned poems, 
concentrating, therefore, on the `words on the page'. While applauding the 
effort at close reading which this obviously entails, for Leavis it ignores a 
large part of the `function of criticism', which requires that literary 
appreciation has to be linked to `training in the awareness of the environment' 
(HTTR, pp. 48-49). [Before continuing, it is important to emphasize here that 
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Leavis's arguments are complex and sometimes contradictory: in particular, 
we will later have to confront more carefully exactly how he understands the 
distinction between `text' and `context' by examining his debate in the 1950s 
with F. W. Bateson]. For Leavis, writing in the early 1930s, `awareness of the 
environment' means a recognition of the development of what he will want to 
stigmatize as `mass culture', a cultural environment which acts as a `pervasive 
counter-influence', and for which `the literary training of sensibility in school 
is an inadequate reply' (HTTR, p. 49). This extended sensibility, one which 
links the activity of literary criticism to cultural practices such as advertising 
and the cinema, is the subject of much of Leavis's work in the 1930s, 
including `Mass Civilization and Minority Culture' and Culture and 
Environment. 26 
Culture and the Environment confronts head-on Leavis's and Denys 
Thompson's fears about the encroachment of `mass culture', and the loss of 
the `organic community', and thus completes a set of critiques embracing 
Carlyle, Ruskin and Arnold in the nineteenth century, and continued into the 
twentieth by the likes of Eliot and E. M. Forster. Indeed, we can see one 
small, ironic example of such historical continuity in Leavis's reworking of 
Arnold's anxieties over the decline of popular reading matter in `Mass 
Civilization and Minority Culture': Opening his article by complaining about 
the `much more desperate plight of culture to-day' (compared with the 
1860s), he adds, in a footnote, Arnold's argument, from Culture and 
Anarchy, that the decline in cultural standards is evidenced by the success of 
the Daily Telegraph. Leavis completes this by adding, without comment, `It 
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is the News of the World that has the largest circulation to-day'. 27 Like the 
full-length work, `Mass Civilization and Minority Culture' offers an overview 
of contemporary culture, and promotes the idea of an educated minority 
(again, following on from the work of Coleridge, Carlyle and Arnold). Both 
works denigrate the Press, cinema, advertising and most of what had, through 
the nineteenth century, gone under the heading of `progress'. Although 
`minority culture' is promoted, Leavis and Thompson expected Culture and 
Environment to help a wide cross-section: though `designed for school use, 
they hope it will prove of use also to trainee teachers, workers in adult 
education, debating societies, even the `general reader'. 28 The book's 
anxieties, fuelled by a belief in the physical and spiritual debilitation caused by 
the Industrial age: mass-production, standardization, a general `levelling- 
down', find their apotheosis in a loss of tradition and the `organic 
community'. This decline, the opposite of a Whig theory of continual 
progress, is one to be investigated again when we consider Williams's 
Country and the City and his analysis of `golden age' rhetoric. For now, it is 
worthwhile noting just what importance Leavis attaches to his discipline of 
literary criticism, given his intense pessimism at the `plight' of culture. 
Nevertheless, despite an insistence on the increased need for training in 
`sensibility', Leavis is reconciled to a structural faultline - no amount of 
literary education can replace `the organic community with the living culture 
it embodied' (CE, p. 1); and, like any good village nostalgic, he remembers 
the `good old days': 
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Relics of the old order are still to be found in remote [sic] parts of the 
country, such as the Yorkshire dales, where motor-coach, wireless, 
cinema and education are rapidly destroying them - they will hardly 
last another decade. In those parts speech is still an art. And the 
cultivation of the art of speech was as essential to the old popular 
culture that in local variations existed throughout the country as song, 
dance and handicrafts (CE, p. 2). 
This is the `organic community' which mass civilization has destroyed. Leavis 
and Thompson base most of their analyses on the writings of George Sturt, 
from the 1910s and 20s. 29Following Sturt, Leavis and Thompson describe a 
(pre-dominantly) rural economy subject only to slow change over time (what 
will be categorized later by Williams as a `residual' formation); a community 
where `tradition' is embodied in the daily activities of tradesmen, who inherit 
ways of working with `natural' materials which offer them aesthetic and 
spiritual fulfilment, as well as physical satisfaction. The danger with 
standardization and the `levelling-down' associated with the machine age, is a 
loss of what Sturt calls the `picked experience of ages' (CE, p. 80); and Leavis 
and Thompson link this back again to a concern with the effect on culture and 
language. They see the activity of communication as dependent for its well- 
being on that sense of order which we saw earlier: a link back to the past, 
which `depend[s] for [its] life, vigour and potency on being used in 
association with such traditions as the wheelwright' (CE, p. 81). If this last 
link with the past, a linguistic one, is lost, then, so their argument goes, 
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`culture' is dead, and language is only used `in association with advertising, 
journalism, best-sellers, motor-cars and the cinema' (CE, pp. 80-82). This is 
the reason literature, and literary criticism are now of such central importance 
to a `definition of culture': 
It now becomes plain why it is of so great importance to keep the 
literary tradition alive. For if language tends to be debased [... ] instead 
of invigorated by contemporary use, then it is to literature alone, 
where its subtlest and finest use is preserved, that we can look with 
any hope of keeping in touch with our spiritual tradition - with the 
`picked experience of ages' (CE, p. 82). 
It is here where the cultivated minority are so important, only they have the 
right level of sensibility, a `tradition of taste' which goes beyond the 
individual, and matches, at the linguistic level, that `picked experience of 
ages' which Sturt senses in his own agrarian economy and history. Sturt's 
vision of the `organic community' is now commonplace: it represents 
stability, continuity, no `division of labour', a society where village life 
represented a symbiotic relationship between human and nature, and the 
town, though `different', still had to tune itself to the demands of the country, 
demands that were regulated and sensitized by the rhythm of the seasons (CE, 
pp. 87-92). But it is to D. H. Lawrence that Leavis and Thompson turn for the 
literary evocation of Sturt's social history, the Lawrence, contra Eliot's After 
Strange Gods, of Lady Chatterley's Lover, offering Connie's description of 
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her drive through Tevershall, the drab monotony of the devastated, urbanized 
landscape figured in the repetition of key words - the `black' of the buildings 
and streets, the `blot on the landscape' which turns England into a gigantic 
palimpsest, overwritten with new narratives which destroy its history: 
The car ploughed uphill through the long squalid straggle of 
Tevershall, the blackened brick dwellings, the black slate roofs 
glistening their sharp edges, the mud black with coal-dust, the 
pavements wet and black. [... ] This is history. One England blots out 
another. The mines had made the halls wealthy. Now they were 
blotting them out, as they had already blotted out the cottages. The 
industrial England blots out the agricultural England. One meaning 
blots out another. The new England blots out the old England. And 
the continuity is not organic, but mechanical (quoted CE, pp. 94-95). 
It is only reasonable to acknowledge that, despite what I will later want to call 
`village nostalgia', or the `Golden Age' mentality, Leavis and Thompson are 
not straightforward post-Romantics, yearning for a simple return to pre- 
industrial society, like the inhabitants of Samuel Butler's Erewhon; or hoping, 
with Lawrence, that new forms of building will in themselves transform 
society (an idea we will return to much later in the `postmodern' notion of 
`critical regionalism'). Interestingly, they often appear more like George 
Orwell, with his familiar anxiety about the abuse of language, and the need to 
sustain a form of `linguistic memory' which holds on to the past. 3° If the 
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organic community really is something that is irrecoverable, then it becomes 
the job of education, the training of sensibility and the rigours of literary 
criticism, to act as a positive antidote to what remains. Once `work' was 
`leisure', so that, for instance, for earlier generations `their work trained them 
aesthetically and morally', a society where everyone `had a fine code of 
personal relations with one another and with the master, a dignified notion of 
their place in the community and an understanding of the necessary part 
played by their work in the scheme of things' (CE, p. 105). 31 Now, with work 
reduced to repetitive toil (the link to a theory of `alienation' seems clear but is 
not acknowledged) leisure is similarly filled with passive `substitute-living' 
which relies on day-dreaming and `fantasying' (CE, pp. 99-103). This failure, 
a failure specifically at the literary level, represents a serious decline in our 
reading habits, away from `literature' and towards `mass culture'. It is a 
central concern of Q. D. Leavis's Fiction and the Reading Public, and is also 
confronted in `Mass Civilization and Minority Culture', where Leavis makes a 
direct link between popular cinema and pulp fiction, by quoting a letter from 
Edgar Rice Burroughs. Burroughs, the creator of Tarzan, describes his 
writing technique in terms of lessons learned from the cinema: his readers are 
not required to think, for he has, he argues, `evolved [... ] a type of fiction that 
may be read with the minimum of mental effort'. 32 To this, Leavis merely 
adds, `the significance of this for my argument does not need comment'. 33 
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By concentrating until now on the formation of Leavis as a literary 
and cultural critic, I have attempted to indicate a set of parameters within 
which we can identify something as specifically `Leavisian', since this will 
form the `starting point' for Raymond Williams's own cultural formation, and 
the discipline now described as `cultural materialism'. The most concrete by- 
product of this influence is Williams's Reading and Criticism, published in 
1950 in the `Man and Society' series. 34 Some critics see Reading and 
Criticism as overwhelming evidence of Williams's total reliance on the 
working methods and arguments of Leavis. 35 It is certainly true that this early 
work is within the Leavisian tradition, as evidenced both by its concerns, and 
its acknowledged influences. Denys Thompson `read the manuscript and 
suggested some improvements' (RC, p. x); Leavis is praised for being `largely 
responsible for the intelligent development of critical analysis as an 
educational discipline', and Williams is `indebted' to the work of Scrutiny 
(RC, p. ix); a short list of recommended books of criticism includes four by 
F. R and Q. D. Leavis, as well as a number from the same critical background, 
including Eliot and Arnold (RC, p. 109). However, as we work through some 
of Williams's arguments from Reading and Criticism and related work from 
the same period, I hope to show that, even this early, there are clear, and 
important points of difference between the two critics. Indeed, such 
differences are insisted on by Williams himself in the `Preface', where his 
acknowledgement of influence is followed immediately by a denial that he is 
part of any `school of criticism' (RC, p. ix). Any common ground, for 
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Williams, is at the level of recognizing `the text as the starting-point of 
criticism', beyond that, he acts as an `independent student' (RC, p. x). 
Two central chapters, `Critics and Criticism' and `What is Analysis? ' 
summarise much of Williams's defining arguments. In the first, besides 
dismissing much popular (newspaper) `criticism' for lacking anything like 
`serious reviewing' (RC, p. 24), he confronts the very real problem of 
deciding what, if anything, represents a `standard' by which valuable criticism 
can be measured and recognized. And, rather like Leavis, he rejects basing 
such decisions on abstract systems, since `a preoccupation with theories of 
literary judgment and value seems quite frequently to be of little relevance to 
the actual judgment of literature' (RC, p. 25). Continuing, Williams 
encapsulates much that has been used over the years to judge him as `anti- 
theory': 
Often, indeed, one has seen a theoretical interest of this kind distract 
attention from literature. I must not be understood as implying that all 
literary theory is distraction. It is my experience, however, that it is 
not in theory (of a kind) that the general reader is lacking, but rather 
in straightforward practical reading ability (RC, p. 26). 
In fact, unlike Leavis, for whom the training of `sensibility' as we have seen, 
is both paramount and technically unproblematical, Williams sees problems in 
this just as much as with any `scientific exposition' (RC, p. 26). However, as 
Williams's interlocutors point out in Politics and Letters36, when Williams 
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rejects theory in this way, and supports instead a system of literary evaluation 
and the setting of literary standards based on the pre-existing category 
`literature' (RC, p. 26), he is adopting `the classic Leavisite argument, at its 
most circular'. 37 It will be some time (as we shall see), before Williams is able 
easily to move away from such a formulation. In the meantime, while 
consciously attempting to expand and redefine the `definition of culture', he 
holds on to a canonical understanding of `literature', which, while accepting 
the adoption of new entrants to the `canon' (in particular the works of literary 
modernism) fundamentally recognizes a sense of stability and order which is 
decidedly Leavisian, not to say Eliotic. Williams's response to the criticism, 
that he `wasn't thinking so much of the theory of literature as of the theory of 
literary judgmenti38 is barely adequate, but, as Reading and Criticism makes 
explicit, Williams, in 1950, already had a concept of literary criticism (if not 
`theory') which was starting to question those very tenets which his critics 
want to stigmatize as `Zeavisite'. Firstly, rather than an emphasis on 
`sensibility' defined by an `educated' elite, Williams sees the setting of 
standards as `inseparable from the values of the larger culture' (RC, p. 27), 
which presumably has to be defined in relation to just that `mass culture' seen 
as inimical by Eliot and Leavis. 
Criticism, for Williams, is `essentially a social activity' (RC, p. 29), 
although, as for Leavis, it consists largely in a form of what we might now 
call `reader-response' theory, where the activity of reading, or what Leavis 
calls `analysis', takes over the text in an act of `re-creation' (RC, p. 31, 
quoting Leavis). Williams expands on this idea, to offer what is surprisingly 
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similar in explanation to a proto-structuralist conception. As I will want to 
argue later, cultural materialism shows strong affinities with versions of 
semiotics. Here, it is useful to quote Roland Barthes at his most 
`Structuralist': 
[W]e must speak of a structuralist activity: creation or reflection are 
not, here, an original `impression' of the world, but a veritable 
fabrication of a world which resembles the first one, not in order to 
copy it but to render it intelligible. Hence one might say that 
structuralism is essentially an activity of imitation, which is also why 
there is, strictly speaking, no technical difference between 
structuralism on the one hand and literature in particular, art in general 
on the other. 39 
Rather like Barthes in 1963, Williams in 1950 sees the activity of criticism as 
the production of new structures. He specifically rejects traditional notions of 
structure, particularly what is commonly called `thematic' criticism, arguing 
instead that `the structure or pattern of a work is more than the text; it is the 
text and the response' (RC, p. 73, emphasis in original). 
This advance in the evaluation of the practice of criticism carries with 
it the difficulty that it would seem to legislate against an approach which 
makes literary judgments on the basis of small extracts, the general technique 
of criticism when short poems are abandoned in favour of longer prose 
works. And yet, just like the work of Leavis, Thompson and Richards, 
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Reading and Criticism relies on just such small extracts for its analysis. 
Indeed, introducing his `extracts for analysis', Williams conforms to 
Richards's schema in Practical Criticism, arguing that the pieces shown are 
anonymous because `it has been found that names create irrelevant responses' 
(RC, p. 110; presumably the student who recognizes one of the pieces, or 
guesses at its author, must reject this piece, tainted as it must be by such 
debilitating knowledge). While recognizing and endorsing the reservations of 
Q. D. Leavis, to the effect that even `great' novels may have serious lapses 
(RC, p. 73), Williams counters this by arguing that a `trained reader' will 
make selections which recognize this risk and select accordingly (RC, p. 73). 
The critic's assessment consists primarily in finding the over-riding structural 
`pattern', and then seeking out `adequate passages which convey this pattern 
at a length suceptible [sic] to demonstrated analysis' (RC, p. 74). But how is 
the critic to discover the `fundamental pattern', other than by selecting 
passages which appear to show shared characteristics, and then stand in for 
this overarching `pattern'? Like the definition of the `literary', this too 
represents circular thinking, emphasizing how each act of reading has to 
negotiate the `hermeneutic circle', and play the game of preconception and 
anticipation. What must actually be happening, as Williams later 
acknowledges, is that what appears to be objective evaluation from close 
textual analysis, is in reality reliant on judgments from `outside' the text and 
predating the analysis. 40 In fact, though not in 1950 recognizing this further 
difficulty, Williams points out that in other respects he was already uneasy 
about `conventional' literary practice, since the methods which seemed to 
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work for a self-contained poem (i. e. a `complete' work), appeared more 
precarious when applied to anything as vast and complex as a novel. This 
method, of small-scale textual analysis, dates back to work on poetry, and 
typically took the form of a comparison of two poems from different writers, 
or different periods, thus allowing comparative analysis. An example can be 
found in How to Teach Reading, where Leavis recommends doing 
`comparisons between representative poems of the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries, in order to bring out the advantage the seventeenth-century poets 
enjoyed in being in the "tradition of wit", (H7TR, p. 37). As Williams explains 
later, he had doubts about such methods, particularly as applied to the novel, 
from a very early age. In Reading and Criticism he selects two pairs of 
passages each from George Eliot and D. H. Lawrence, and `proves' that, in 
one instance, Eliot is the better writer, and in the other Lawrence. This ironic 
challenge to the Scrutiny method dates back to Williams's Cambridge 
`Tripos', in which he offered a special paper on Eliot which included just this 
comparison. "' It should be added though, that this `evidence' of problems 
with the methods of close reading did not, at the time, push Williams away 
from a basic belief in the validity of the system, and he concludes his analysis 
with very positive support: 
Analysis will lead us to judgments of particular pieces of writing, and 
will develop a capacity for close reading. From a number of such 
judgments certain general ideas about reading will be constructed, so 
that in our normal reading of complete works our response is more 
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aware and more controlled. This is the use of analysis for reading. Its 
use for criticism may be suggested by the examination of the 
Lawrence and George Eliot passages which we have briefly 
undertaken. By analysis of representative successes and failures one 
may slowly build up, and in written criticism demonstrate, a total 
judgment of a work and of an author which will avoid reiterated 
generalities and which will indicate certain facts about the author's 
actual writing (RC, pp. 44-45). 
Here then we have a summary of the twin values of close textual analysis: at 
the general level, it tends to sharpen up our reading `awareness', so that our 
responses become more `aware' and `controlled'; more specifically, in 
relation to the activity of literary criticism, it enables us to come to a `total 
judgment' about an author. There is no evidence, in Reading and Criticism, 
that Williams shared in the Leavisian vision of literary criticism as the road to 
cultural salvation. It has importance `only' in relation to the habits of reading, 
and the teaching of English. For Williams at this time, as the `Introductory' 
makes clear, acknowledges, like Leavis, that `modern' society is significantly 
different, in that communications (the `media') has accelerated. But that is not 
a reason for overestimating the importance of literary criticism, or, for that 
matter, for denigrating all new `mass' culture as inferior and debilitating. 
Leavis's problems seem to derive largely from his complete refusal to 
confront anything beyond an impression of this new culture, added to a 
willingness to confuse new artistic production with other types of cultural 
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production, such as advertising, so that the obvious commercialization and 
`levelling-down' of the one tends to infect the others. This is the reason he 
can dismiss formations like cinema, the `main form of recreation in the 
civilized world', and argue that they are bad because `they involve surrender, 
under conditions of hypnotic receptivity, to the cheapest emotional appeals, 
appeals the more insidious because they are associated with a compellingly 
vivid illusion of actual life'. 42 
This failure to recognize any value in film, and the privileging of 
`literature' which goes with it, stems, I believe from two sources. Firstly, in 
1930, Leavis's knowledge of anything other than `popular' American cinema 
appears to have been slight. This is particularly true if we compare his 
attitudes with those of Williams, who, even as an undergraduate, took a great 
interest in `avant-garde' (predominantly European) cinema, and appears to 
have believed, in the 1930s, that being `new' equated with being 'radical'. 43 
Secondly, I think Leavis's views in the early 1930s are determined to a large 
extent by his concentration on contemporary `literature', which inevitably 
meant literary modernism (particularly of course the work of T. S. Eliot). 
Hence the act of literary criticism, like that of reading generally, becomes, as 
he searches for a new critical idiom to cope with the demands of a new, more 
allusive medium, a much more obviously `active' pursuit, which helps to 
reinforce a sense of the superiority of literature over other cultural forms, 
considered in comparison as merely `passive diversion'. 44 (Since the name of 
Roland Barthes has already been mentioned in relation to Williams's 
`structuralist' tendencies, it might be useful to mention here that Barthes also 
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wanted, at one stage, to differentiate between modernism and its predecessors 
in terms of a more `active' role for the reader). 45 Hence his ideas about 
reading are influenced very much by his own recent concentration on 
modernism, at the expense of ignoring much that, even for Leavis, actually 
comes under the heading of `literature' (including, of course, most of the 
`Great Tradition'). 
4. Culture - `Sport, Food, and a Little Art' 
We have here then, at least the beginnings of some evidence that, even 
at his earliest, Williams's views of `culture' in general, and `literature' / 
`literary criticism' in particular, were similar to, but different from, those of 
Leavis. While not yet prepared to reject wholesale the rationality of practising 
literary criticism, or the parallel rejection of `literature' as a `special' area46, 
Williams already refuses to make literary criticism the new moral framework, 
and recognizes the potential problems in relying on small textual fragments as 
the basis for overarching views about literary value. But, more importantly for 
the development of cultural materialism, he wants to challenge the 
fundamentally Arnoldian definition of `culture' taken over by Eliot and 
Leavis, and, as I will argue, this `democratization' of culture goes alongside a 
very important literary debate about the relationship of text to context, which 
will again offer the opportunity both to examine Leavis's own techniques, and 
contrast them with Williams's. All of this must inevitably be linked to the 
formal differences in academic development pursued by the two, with 
Williams spending fifteen years working outside the academic `establishment', 
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in adult education. 47 The culmination of this period would be the publication 
of Culture and Society in 1958.48 But the 1950s saw a considerable body of 
work concerned with this new definition of culture and its relationship to the 
literary establishment, all of it clearly influenced by, and developed in relation 
to, the real activity of adult education. Thus, in 1950, acknowledging that by 
this time `Culture and Environment' has become a standard course title, 
Williams once again recommends a predictable list of Scrutiny critics, 
alongside Eliot, Arnold etc. 49 However, he rejects the `conventional' 
approach, marked by Leavis and Thompson in their support for George Sturt 
and the `organic community', and, in particular, its development by other 
`Scrutineers' into `the assertion of a "minority"', which he finds `largely 
irrelevant and, in certain social terms, idle and harmful'. " More `masses', less 
`culture', this was the approved Scrutiny formula, summarised twenty years 
earlier in `Mass Civilization and Minority Culture'. But other ways of thinking 
were also beginning to take hold, not least from within the arena chosen by 
Williams from the late 1940s for his work, adult education and the Workers' 
Educational Association ('W. E. A. '). As late as 1954, correspondents to the 
W. E. A. 's house journal, the Highway, could write letters like that from one 
Rev. W. M. Collins, complaining that the casual use of Christian names was a 
`sign of deterioration in what we have learned to call the British Way of 
Life'. " Two years later, Donald Macrae initiated a whole series of articles 
and correspondences concerned directly with a new definition of culture, and 
a reformulation of `mass' civilization52, in which he started to argue against 
just this `learned' response and assumption that there is general agreement 
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about just what constitutes a `way of life' for the majority of people. While 
accepting, like Williams, that much which goes under the heading of `mass 
culture' may be inferior, he refuses to accept that this is any reason to dismiss 
everything `popular' as worthless. More importantly, like Williams he has a 
distaste for the word `masses' itself and its inevitably homogenizing 
tendencies. Rather, he shares with Williams almost an amazement that, in the 
face of an ever-expanding capitalism, `the continued capacity of the common 
people in the face of circumstance is, after all, the most surprising and 
heartening thing in history'. 53 Similar points are made by Williams in `Culture 
is Ordinary'. `There are in fact', writes Williams , `no masses, but only ways 
of seeing people as masses'. 54 `Masses' has taken over as the new word to 
replace 'mob', and, with the advance, post 1870, in the availability of `mass' 
education, `culture' has given way to the commercial and the material. " 
Williams completely rejects this, privileging a new version of culture 
which refuses to succumb to an elitist definition based on exclusion and 
privilege, and instead recognizes that one of the potential benefits of 
`progress' is the possibility for expansion both in the `popular' and `minority' 
senses of the term. As he makes clear in his critique of Leavis in Culture and 
Society, much of Leavis's own radical reworking of past `traditions' refuses 
to recognize the deep complexities in all of this. Earlier, in considering the 
work of T. S. Eliot, Williams had criticised a narrowness of vision, as Eliot, in 
Notes towards the Definition of Culture, reduces culture to `sport, food, and 
a little art -a characteristic observation of English leisure'. "' Now, in 
analysing Leavis, Williams shows how Leavis is subject to a particular 
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ideological position (unannounced), by apparently not needing to ask the hard 
questions which precede analysis: 
If our civilization is a `mass-civilization', without discernible respect 
for quality and seriousness, by what means has it become so? What, in 
fact, do we mean by `mass'? Do we mean a democracy dependent on 
universal suffrage, or a culture dependent on universal education, or a 
reading-public dependent on universal literacy? If we find the products 
of mass-civilization so repugnant, are we to identify the suffrage or 
the education or the literacy as the agents of decay? Or, alternatively, 
do we mean by mass-civilization an industrial civilization, dependent 
on machine-production and the factory system? Do we find 
institutions like the popular press and advertising to be the necessary 
consequences of such a system of production? Or, again, do we find 
both the machine-civilization and the institutions to be products of 
some great change and decline in human minds? Such questions, 
which are the commonplaces of our generation, inevitably underlie the 
detailed judgments. 57 
This recognition of the inherently complex nature of cultural definition 
is explored in `Culture is Ordinary', and linked directly to a consideration 
about `progress' and the products of modem civilization. Early on in the 
essay he stresses the real advantages to working people resulting from the 
Industrial Revolution, and summarises them in one word, `power': `steam 
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power, the petrol engine, electricity, these and their host of products in 
commodities and services, we took as quickly as we could get them, and were 
glad'. 58 He then attempts to rid himself of `a legacy from our most useful 
critics; a legacy of two false equations, one false analogy, and one false 
proposition'. 59 The `false equations' I have already dealt with, relating as they 
do to a belief in simple relationships between education and culture; and 
between `bad' culture and the general lives of individuals. The `false 
proposition' is that dirt and ugliness are the price always to be paid for new 
power. Williams, here at his most utopian, dismisses this, arguing that new 
sources are capable of giving us more power and a better environment. 60 The 
`false analogy' takes us directly back, again, to Leavis, since it relates to what 
Leavis and others wanted to call a `Gresham Law', a law of diminishing 
returns, based on the proposition ascribed to Sir Thomas Gresham, that `bad 
money drives out good'. 6' Williams quickly disposes of this analogy - bad 
money will drive out good : bad culture will drive out good, by arguing (as so 
often with only minimal supporting evidence it has to be said), that we live in 
an expanding culture, where `bad' culture is increasing, but not at the expense 
of `good': `the editions of good literature are very much larger than they 
were; the listeners to good music are much more numerous than they were; 
the number of people who look at good visual art is larger than it has ever 
been'. And he ends his rebuttal by once again arguing that new questions have 
to be asked: `about relative rates of expansion; about the social and economic 
problems raised by these; about the social and economic answers'. 62 This is 
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the work which will take up much of Williams's time post Culture and 
Society. 
5. Williams, Leavis, and Marx 
It would be too easy to argue either that Williams never was 
influenced in any real way by Leavis, or that he never really stopped being a 
Left-Leavisite. The first is clearly untenable, as Williams acknowledges in 
`Culture is Ordinary' and elsewhere. 63 1 have tried to develop an argument 
which also gives the lie to the second, since it seems that this is a more 
difficult position to refute. If `cultural materialism' is to be seen to have any 
defining characteristics at all, it has to be so defined in relation to, and 
ultimately in opposition to, what I have tried to summarise as the Leavisian 
conception of culture and tradition. `Culture' is a word which will have to be 
defined again, but `materialism' has rather been ignored up until now, and for 
a good reason, for it is in their respective relationships to materialist theories 
of culture, pre-eminently Marxism, where the clearest divisions in method 
start to appear. The theoretical debate about `materialism', and whether the 
term carries the same meaning in `cultural materialism' as it does in `historical 
materialism' will be examined in a later chapter. Rather like the European 
novel in relation to English studies, Marxism, as a tool for cultural analysis 
(or anything else), was always a `misdirection' for Leavis. Williams was well 
aware of this, and regretted it: `Leavis has never liked Marxists, which is in 
one way a pity, for they know more than he does about modern English 
society, and about its immediate history'. ` 
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As we shall later see, the relationship with Marxism was no easier for 
Williams during this period, than for Leavis, but their reactions to it were very 
different. As Leavis made clear in 1940, looking back at the first decade of 
Scrutiny, one of its prime motivations was to promote the relative autonomy 
of the `human spirit', something for the Scrutineers not possible by adopting 
Marxist positions. 65 Eight years earlier, in `Under Which King, Bezonian? ', 
this avowedly anti-Marxist position was made explicit. In this essay, Leavis 
condemns `the dogma of the priority of economic conditions', which relegates 
culture to the `methods of production'; and argues that: `if there seems to be 
no reason why supporters of Scrutiny should not favour some kind of 
communism as the solution of the economic problem, it does not seem likely 
[... ] that they will be orthodox marxists'. 66 Leavis, relying on Trotsky's 
Literature and Revolution for his summary of the Marxist position on culture, 
argues that Trotsky, `that dangerously intelligent Marxist', makes culture 
`derivative from the methods of production'. Against this, Leavis offers his 
version of organicism as if it was an answer to Trotsky, offering a pre- 
industrial system where the `methods of production' are intimately linked to 
cultural production: `an art of living, involving codes, developed in ages of 
continuous experience, of relations between man and man, and man and the 
environment in its seasonal rhythm'. 67 More than once, Leavis returns to a 
`Sturt'-like evocation of a lost, organic past, a culture destroyed by `the 
progress of the nineteenth century'. `What survives of cultural tradition', 
argues Leavis, `survives in spite of the rapidly changing "means of 
production"'. 68 
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Several things are important about Leavis's arguments here, and some 
of the inconsistencies in his approach were confronted by A. L. Morton, in a 
response to the essay, published in the following issue of Scrutiny. Leaving 
aside Morton's assessment of the appropriateness of Trotsky's model, what is 
most significant is Morton's recognition that Leavis fails to distinguish 
between `methods of production' and the `totality of productive relations' or 
9 mode of production'. 69 In Morton's words, this failure of definition has `led 
Mr. Leavis to conceive the connection [between culture and production] as a 
rigidly determined, mechanical one rather than a fluid, dialectical one. Though 
secondary, the cultural level reached by a society at any point becomes in its 
turn a factor helping to determine productive relationships'. 70 This, of course, 
summarises a central debate within Marxist theory, to which we must return 
later, since the dialectic of the relationship between `base' and 
`superstructure' becomes a fundamental point of crisis in the definition of 
Williams's cultural materialism. For now, I want rather to emphasise the other 
half of Leavis's misconception, that culture has disappeared `through the 
progress of the nineteenth century'. First, as Morton points out, and as 
Williams stressed in `Culture is Ordinary', it just is not true: for Morton 
neither the novels of Lawrence, nor the `methods of salesmanship described in 
Mr. Denys Thompson's article Advertising God' would have come into 
existence without Imperialist capitalism. " Most significantly for this thesis, 
Leavis, by failing to differentiate clearly between `mode' of production and 
`methods' of production, does not just hold on to a too-rigid, deterministic 
model of culture, but also gives way to what we will later define as 
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`technological determinism', which sees the activity of technological 
`progress' as self-determining. Or, rather, his version privileges `methods of 
production' ('technology'), over basic economic production, reversing the 
fundamental order of Marxist determination. 
It seems clear, from Leavis's `retrospect' in 1940, that he never 
moved very far from this fundamental position. Designating the 1930s as a 
`Marxist' decade, the contributors to Scrutiny largely maintained their 
resistance to any recognized `system' (bar their own unacknowledged 
ideology). Thus, in 1940, Christopher Hill, reviewing Henry Parkes's 
Marxism: A Post-Mortem, has once again to challenge an unreconstructed 
version of Marxist theory. `Dr. Parkes', he writes, seems to have met the 
phrase `ownership of the means of production', but `its meaning eludes 
him'. 72 At the root of what Hill sees as the fault in Parkes's method is that 
difficulty which has fundamentally problematized cultural debate from Carlyle 
and Arnold to Eliot and E. M. Forster: all of these thinkers want to resist what 
they see as the cultural impoverishment of capitalism, while clinging on to a 
set of beliefs, `liberalism', which depend for their maintenance on that very 
mode of production. Such a situation is evidently contradictory, and Hill 
makes this clear as he points to a number of inconsistencies in Parkes's 
analysis, as he offers at once the right to `individual freedom' and the need for 
`order' and `co-operation'; where the `free market' must be preserved at all 
costs, and yet controls are needed to give much needed social services. 73 
`Scrutiny', writes Leavis in `Retrospect', invites the description "liberal"'. 74 
Leavis is attempting here to remove `liberalism' from its identifiably 
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ideological connotation. But, from the editors' comments before Hill's review 
of Parkes, their alignment is essentially liberal in its specifically political 
sense. 75 
A later chapter will look in detail at Williams's theoretical responses 
to his own difficulties with Marxism. For now, it will be worth examining 
briefly how this particular set of beliefs interacted with and influenced his 
formative years at Cambridge; and, specifically, how he understood the 
relationship between Marxism and the practices of reading and criticism. As I 
noted above, the Williams of `Culture is Ordinary' believed that the average 
`Marxist' was more knowledgeable about our recent history than Leavis. But 
he also privileges Leavis, who: `knows more than any Marxist I have met 
about the real relations between art and experience'. 76 By this time (1958), 
Williams has clearly settled for a position which accepts fundamentally the 
Marxist interpretation of culture which emphasises its ultimate dependence on 
the mode of production (thus rescuing this fundamental analysis from its 
deformation by the Scrutineers); and alongside this recognizes that 
`education' - is always for the minority only. But he rejects absolutely the 
extension of these ideas: that `since culture and production are related, the 
advocacy of a different system of production is in some way a cultural 
directive, indicating not only a way of life but new arts and learning'. " What 
has to be stressed here, I think, is that Williams's difficulties with this 
extension of Marxism is much more a product of his own resistance to 
`socialist realism', than a product of his adherence to Leavisism. This is made 
explicit in Reading and Criticism, where he rejects both a Zhdanovite push 
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towards `social' works which ignore quality in favour of ideology; and the 
appeal to `minority' culture, which fails to acknowledge its capitalist base. 78 
This position is supported in his interview in Politics and Letters, where he 
notes that, in the `Writers' Group' at Cambridge, they were more interested 
in modernism and the avant-garde than socialist realism. 79 By supporting, 
therefore, albeit without its Stalinist overtones, the Marxist understanding of 
literature, Williams adopts at least the beginnings of a cultural materialist 
model, which will be particularly sensitive to the relationship between 
literature and cultural production; between text and context. Here we 
encounter a further, and fundamental point of comparison between the early 
methods of Williams and Leavis. It will be necessary therefore to return once 
more to the work of Leavis, as he struggles to make sense of this boundary 
(real or imagined), between the work of art (the `words on the page') and its 
conditions of production and consumption. I will want to argue that, despite 
what is frequently a level of analysis far superior to many of his 
contemporaries, Leavis fails properly to theorize this relationship, and that it 
is in Williams's development of the analysis that we can see most clearly the 
beginnings of a significant shift in his thinking away from the constraints of 
the Leavisian model. 
6. Text and Context: Leavis v Bateson 
The best way to understand Leavis's own position is through the 
series of exchanges between him and the Oxford critic F. W. Bateson 
conducted in the pages of Scrutiny, and its Oxford rival Essays in Criticism, 
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in 1953.80 Briefly, Leavis holds to the position that the text is something 
`determinate', from which meaning can be taken; whereas Bateson takes the 
`historical' side, arguing that meaning is the product of contextual matters. 
But this summary suggests a simple differentiation between their two 
approaches, which reinforces also a notion of `text' and `context' as 
occupying different `spaces'. In fact, as Leavis will make clear, his 
understanding of `determination' is not one fixed by the `self-contained text'. 
Rather, as he argues with the philosopher Rene Wellek81, Leavis understands 
the text as `determinate' in the sense of an active production of meanings, and 
this is linked intimately with a sort of `intertextual' relationship between the 
text and its historical relations. This is the basis of his analysis in 
Revaluation82, where he develops Eliot's work on the Metaphysical poets and 
the `dissociation of sensibility', to argue that there is a `line of wit' which 
`runs from Ben Jonson (and Donne) through Carew and Marvell to Pope'. 83 I 
want to examine the differences between Leavis and Bateson, and then offer a 
way past what appears to be an unresolvable breach, by using the arguments 
of the philosopher Quentin Skinner, to suggest that Skinner's response to 
`Leavis v Bateson' represents a model for Williams's own developing 
understanding. 
Bateson's essay84 is divided into two main parts: the first half gives 
examples of what he calls the `irresponsible' critic, exemplified by American 
`New Critics' like John Crowe Ransom; and their English counterparts, the 
`Practical Critics' like Richards, and those wedded to analysis based on 
ambiguity and irony like Empson. All of these critics (the list inevitably will 
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include Leavis) are `irresponsible' because they concentrate on the `words on 
the page' to the exclusion of `all that lies behind the words and the word- 
order - the forces, conventions and precedents that have made and modified 
them' (Bateson, p. 13). 85 Bateson's response to this `irresponsibility' is to 
emphasize the value of `literary context', which he differentiates from `literary 
background' (author's biography, social history of the age, earlier critical 
accounts etc. ). This background, though of interest, is for Bateson `extrinsic', 
whereas his `literary context', defined as `the framework of reference within 
which the work achieves meaning', is `intrinsic' (Bateson, p. 14). [He 
`explains' this position by using an example from Leavis to which I shall 
return]. Bateson summarises his method of contextual reading into four 
`stages', which successively resolve ambiguities and lead to the possibility of 
arriving at determinate meaning: 
1. The `verbal' stage ('plane of dictionary meanings'), where `the black 
marks on the page' are translated `into their mental equivalents'. This still 
leaves open the possibility of multiple interpretation, although some 
initially possible meanings are excluded `by considerations of word-order 
or grammar'. 
2. The `literary' stage, `at which the surviving meanings acquire an extra 
dimension, as it were, as they dovetail into a familiar tradition or genre'. 
3. The `intellectual' stage - relating the work to the main currents of 
philosophical `thought patterns' pertaining to the date of production. 
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4. The `social' stage - `Behind the intellectual context lies a complex of 
religious, political and economic factors that can be called the social 
context' (Bateson, pp. 16-18). 
Thus, as `context' extends from the words on the page outwards towards the 
social context, so meaning is pinned down, and the `ultimately social content 
of critical responsibility' is achieved (Bateson. p. 19). This, for Bateson, is not 
`value-free' judgment, since, once the social context has been determined, 
`the values implied in the poem become explicit, and its relative goodness or 
badness declares itself' (Bateson, p. 19). Finally, rather like Williams, Bateson 
also rejects the `sociological' critics ('Marxists or semi-Marxists'), and for 
very similar reasons: while acknowledging their greater awareness of society 
compared with the `textual' critics, `their contact with literature is 
proportionately precarious' (Bateson, pp. 23-24). 
This then is a summary of Bateson's `contextual' approach. To 
demonstrate it, he chooses to use a piece of comparative analysis from 
Leavis's Revaluation. It is obviously outside the scope of this enquiry to 
analyse in detail Bateson's reading, or Leavis's response, but it will still be 
helpful for what follows to have the lines of verse available: 
A Soul hung up, as `twere, in Chains 
Of Nerves, and Arteries, and Veins. 
Tortur'd, besides each other part, 
In a vain Head, and double Heart. 
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(from Marvell's `A Dialogue between the Soul and Body') 
First slave to Words, then vassal to a Name, 
Then dupe to Party; child and man the same; 
Bounded by Nature, narrow'd still by Art, 
A trifling head, and a contracted heart. 
(Pope, Dunciad IV, 501-04) 
Bateson does not mention that Leavis introduces the Marvell by stating that 
`It is, then, plain enough that Pope's reconciliation of Metaphysical wit with 
the Polite has antecedents'. 86 Further, immediately after the Marvell, and 
before the Pope, Leavis writes: 
The familiar turn of that close, a turn not confined to Marvell, of 
whom, however, the supreme representative of seventeenth-century 
urbanity, it is most characteristic, surely has affinities with a 
characteristic effect of Pope's longer couplet. 97 
This suggests that Leavis chooses the two passages, not as Bateson argues 
because they share the `head and heart' conceit (although that is a pleasant 
bonus), but because they indicate the `line of wit', and Leavis emphasizes this 
by following the two examples with a third, chosen, as he puts it, because it is 
`insistently unlike anything Pope could have written'. 88 
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Following his schema given above, Bateson progressively 
`contextualizes' the two extracts, in the process coming to a set of 
increasingly surprising conclusions about the `real' meanings of each. Among 
his long list of criticisms and doubts about the value of the two poems, the 
following are relevant: 
1. The `verbal identity' of the two last lines, which he assumes to be Leavis's 
specific reason for choosing them, is `contradicted by the very different 
figures of speech and stylistic conventions employed by the two poets'. 
2. `The Metaphysical style in which he was writing has forced Marvell to say 
what he cannot have wanted to say. And Pope's Augustan style has forced 
his hand in the same way'. 
3. In the Pope, there is a lack of linguistic precision, so that `slave', `vassal' 
and `dupe' are `virtually interchangeable', as are `Bounded', `narrow'd' 
and `contracted'. 
4. `There is an obvious connection between Marvell's metaphors and the 
analogical thinking of the Tudor and Stuart divines. [... ] And the abstract 
character of Pope's diction can be related without difficulty to the 
philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume'. 
5. The early seventeenth century is a `world of appearances', which `came to 
a disastrous end, of course, in the 1640's, and a certain grotesquerie, 
bordering at times on farce, in Marvell's `Dialogue' can be taken as a half- 
realization that his medium was on its last legs and could no longer be 
taken with complete seriousness. [... ] "Common sense" inevitably left its 
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rationalist imprint on the language and the literary tradition from which 
Pope's poetry was created' (Bateson, pp. 15-17, emphasis in original). 
I can here only glance at Leavis's response, although it will perhaps be 
apparent from the examples given above how it will proceed. What is most 
noticeable about Bateson's `progressive' contextualization, is how it allows 
him to become increasingly confident about the poems, as he moves further 
away from them. This is emphasized in the developing certainty of expression: 
`obvious connection', `can be related without difficulty', `of course', 
`inevitably'. Leavis's reply is the opposite of stunned silence: `How can we 
explain such a performance? Can it be said that the critic who can tell us, with 
this serene assurance, these things about such a poem has, in any serious 
sense of the verb, read it? i89 
Leavis's essay needs to be read in full to see why he perhaps deserves 
the epithet `responsible'. I will refer here only to two of the many ways in 
which he attempts to rescue Marvell and Pope from Bateson's criticism. First, 
Leavjs proves more than a match for Bateson's `verbal' analysis, by offering a 
reading of Pope which justifies Pope's choice of `slave' `vassal' and `dupe' in 
terms of a development from child to man in which an initial inability to 
master language, leads to personal subservience to a `Name', and ultimately 
`dupe' to Party politics. 90 Leavis's work on the Marvell is equally subtle and 
convincing. In particular, he denies Bateson's assumption that Marvell's 
`Dialogue' represents a simple and conventional approach to the mind/body 
dualism, arguing from specific textual example that `this poem has for theme 
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the difficulty of the distinction - its elusiveness; it explores with remarkable 
originality and power the perplexities and problems that, for one bent on 
distinguishing, must, in concrete experience, be found to he behind the 
distinction as conventionally assumed'. 91 Thus Leavis recognizes what 
Bateson refuses to: that the `Dialogue' is no simple support for a dualist 
interpretation of consciousness, but a much more subtle `dialectical' analysis, 
in which the problems caused by accepting such a dualist position are 
acknowledged, while at the same time a materialist rejection of such a 
position is refused. 
Leavis asks of Bateson just what he means by invoking the `complex 
of religious, political and economic factors that can be called the social 
context', and how one is to arrive at such a context, which apparently allows 
the poem to be reinstated in its original historical setting, within which `the 
human experience in it begins to be realized and re-enacted by the reader? '92 
Against this, Leavis offers his own version of `responsible' criticism: 
If [Bateson] had really read the poem, and kept himself focused upon 
that - have seen that in the poem, whatever minor difficulties of 
convention and language it might present, he had something 
determinate - something indubitably there. [... ] The poem as I've said, 
is a determinate thing; it is there; but there is nothing to correspond - 
nothing answering to Mr. Bateson's `social context' that can be set 
over against the poem, or induced to re-establish itself round it as a 
kind of framework or completion, and there never was anything. 93 
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Here we have the crux of their theoretical differences. Leavis insists on his 
`determinate' approach, arguing that Bateson's `contextualism' cannot be a 
proper discipline because he does not produce a determinate object. For 
Leavis, the poem produces its meanings through its own determinate activity, 
whereas for Bateson only a form of deep historical contextualization can 
achieve what for him can only ever be the recovered `meaning'. But this 
approach is clearly shown to be flawed. All Bateson can do is produce an 
assortment of empirical odds and ends (like the `Pope-Warburton' note) 
which reduce the specificity of the poem's productive activity to a set of 
literary cliches. For Bateson, despite his argument that his analysis differs 
from a reliance on `author's biography' etc., his aim is to recover the 
intentions of the author by recreating the `context' from within which 
`intention' can be identified. This is made explicit in their later exchanges, 
where Bateson rejects Leavis's notion of the poem as determinate, as 
`indubitably there' prior to analysis: 
[S]trictly speaking, of course, there is nothing there, nothing 
objectively apprehensible, except a number of conventional black 
marks. The meanings of the words, and therefore a fortiori the 
meaning of the whole poem, are emphatically not there. To discover 
their meaning we have to ask what they meant to their author and his 
original readers. 94 
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On one level this looks like a sophisticated denial of language as stable and 
complete in itself. But Bateson's response to such undecidability is a return to 
origins which reinstates a sense of order and makes Pope and Marvell, like 
Shakespeare, speak `for all time'. In essence, his approach is reminiscent of a 
particular brand of new historicism, which hunts around for a suitable text to 
place alongside the object-text, and then reads one off against the other, or 
rather, as Leavis argues, somehow `completes' what is immediately available. 
Leavis, meanwhile, insists on a form of reception theory which puts great 
demands on the abilities of the reader to interpret, while still ultimately 
privileging something beyond interpretation, in this case the `words on the 
page'. 
Initially, it might be thought that the historical criticism favoured by 
Bateson would be more closely aligned to Williams's methods than Leavis's 
approach, but this is then problematized by the evident faultlines in Bateson's 
analysis when his method is put into practice. The problem, fundamentally, is 
that in a sense we are dealing with a false opposition, between Leavisian 
`textualism' and Batesonian `contextualism'. If, as I have attempted to 
indicate, this opposition is not straightforward, then what is needed is a way 
past, towards a different understanding of analysis. This question of 
`determination' will be important in later chapters, particularly in relation to 
Williams's re-writing of the base/superstructure paradigm, and his work in the 
later chapters of Marxism and Literature where he attempts to produce a sort 
of conceptual hierarchy of determinations. 95 But work from a different 
direction may help to suggest a way past the `text/context' opposition, and 
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for this reason I want to consider Quentin Skinner's philosophical 
investigation of the `history of ideas'. 96 
7. Skinner: Text and Context Redefined 
Skinner actually uses the summarised positions of Leavis and Bateson 
to represent the two `orthodox' approaches to interpretation, although he 
soon moves away to concentrate more specifically on philosophical and 
political texts and critics. As an `historian of ideas', it is perhaps unsurprising 
that he rejects out of hand the `textual' orthodoxy: 
I have argued that the danger of writing historical nonsense, in direct 
consequence of concentrating on the text in itself, is often incurred, 
and indeed very seldom avoided altogether in current practice. I now 
wish to claim that even if all the dangers I have outlined could be 
avoided [... ] the underlying assumption of this whole approach - that 
one should focus simply on the texts themselves, and study what each 
classic writer has to say about each doctrine - must necessarily remain 
a wholly inadequate methodology for the conduct of the history of 
ideas (Skinner, p. 31, emphasis in original). 97 
Skinner cites a number of specific examples to support this view, and, in 
particular for our discussion relating more directly to literary texts, makes the 
reasonable point that unless we have some understanding of writing 
strategies, no amount of close reading will help, as say in the case of Swiftian 
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irony (Skinner, p. 32). But this, of course, immediately requires information 
and evidence `outside' the texts, without which we are left in the position of a 
reader of Swift, who, without any biographical apparatus, finds it impossible 
to read his work obliquely or against the grain. Skinner spends some time 
exploring this position, and concludes strongly that `the text in itself is shown 
to be insufficient as the object of our inquiry and understanding' (Skinner, p. 
35). 
Having dismissed `textual' analysis as insufficient, Skinner explores 
the alternative, a Batesonian `contextual' approach, and uses, as his example, 
the notion of following an `idea' through an historical period, attempting to 
identify its `essential meaning' (Skinner, p. 35). Specifically mentioning 
Bateson as an example of someone operating in this way, Skinner writes: 
The great mistake lies not merely in looking for the `essential 
meaning' of the `idea' as something which must necessarily `remain 
the same, ' but even in thinking of any `essential' meaning (to which 
individual writers `contribute') at all (Skinner, p. 37). 
That this `idea' based methodology is faulty, Skinner emphasises by pointing 
out that what is missing from such an account is any attempt to account for 
the particular status such an idea may have had at any particular moment of 
history, because no proper consideration has been given to the use of 
particular utterances, as opposed to their mere occurrence. In practice, as 
Skinner points out (using as his example the `idea' of Utopia), it is often the 
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case that the historian can only describe what appears to be an undefined and 
apparently limitless set of meanings, so that the only `proper' history of 
`Utopia' would be in fact `a history of the various statements made with the 
given expression, [... ] an almost absurdly ambitious enterprise' (Skinner, p. 
39). But when Skinner reaches this point in his analysis, something strange 
starts to happen, because it is of course just here where Bateson's desire to 
give a context within which meaning is stabilized would appear to offer a 
solution to the difficulties otherwise encountered. In other words, Skinner's 
`idea' problem looks, from Bateson's perspective, to be simply an extension 
of the limitations of the textual approach. Acknowledging that just such a 
contextual approach has started to become something of an orthodoxy in the 
humanities in the late 1960s, Skinner recognizes that it could be seen to 
respond to many of the difficulties he has put forward against text-focused 
analysis, but stresses that such accounts tend to put text and context into a 
relationship of cause and effect. This is problematical, because it tends to 
assume that `knowledge of the causes of an action' is `equivalent to an 
understanding of the action itself' (Skinner, p. 44). But, as he shows by 
example, there are plenty of situations where this is just not true, such as the 
case of statements about the intention to do something. Drawing on speech 
act theory, Skinner uses J. L. Austin's notion of an `illocutionary act'98 to 
make the point that, however well contextual study might manage to explain 
a text, it would not necessarily aid understanding, without having some 
knowledge of the illocutionary force involved (Skinner, p. 46, emphasis in 
original). Skinner supports this view with a neat example, using the statement 
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`a prince must learn how not to be virtuous', from chapter fifteen of 
Machiavelli's The Prince. Skinner then shows that two historians, relying on a 
combination of textual and contextual evidence, come to opposing 
conclusions about the import of this statement: either Machiavelli's cynical 
advice was commonplace in Renaissance moral tracts, or such advice had 
hardly ever been offered before. Obviously, as Skinner argues, only one of 
these conclusions can be true, even though the context appears to allow for 
either illocutionary act to have force. Therefore, whichever method we adopt, 
it would appear that we cannot with certainty come to any single agreed 
`meaning': 
It cannot in consequence be enough to study either what the statement 
meant, or even what its context may be alleged to show about what it 
must have meant. The further point which must still be grasped for 
any given statement is how what was said was meant, and thus what 
relations there may have been between various different statements 
even within the same general context. [... ] To concentrate either on 
studying a text in itself, or on studying its social context as a means of 
determining the meaning of the text, is to make it impossible to 
recognize - let alone to solve - some of the most difficult issues about 
the conditions for understanding texts. ' 
The last part of this statement still appears to suggest that what 
Skinner is offering is in effect some sort of collaboration between these two 
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distinct methodologies, but this is not in fact the case. In his conclusion, he 
stresses again that what all of this analysis shows is how unreasonable it is for 
historians to claim that somehow there are a set of transcendental ideas, 
which can be recovered, and then used to `answer' our present problems. This 
is of course just the method so frequently used by that branch of literary 
studies which `appropriates' canonical authors. But, as Skinner points out, 
even assuming we can identify what appear to be equivalent questions over 
time, is no guarantee that the answers given in the past will be at all relevant 
to our present condition (Skinner, pp. 50-52). Rather than relying on the past 
('tradition') to solve our own present problems, Skinner suggests that the real 
value in the history of ideas is in offering us the chance to distinguish between 
`what is necessary and what is the product merely of our own contingent 
arrangements' (Skinner, p. 53). Skinner's way of going past the impasse 
between Leavis and Bateson is to recognize first that what is missing is any 
consideration of the linguistic dimension to the study of texts. Rather than 
following Bateson, and treating `context' as the determinant of text, Skinner 
prefers the study of context to take its place within a different framework of 
meaning which concentrates on `delineat[ing] the whole range of 
communications which could have been conventionally performed on the 
given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance and this wider 
linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given 
writer' (Skinner, p. 49, emphasis in original). Thus `social context' can now 
be used in a rather different way from that seen earlier. Now, it is to be 
`treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally 
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recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have 
been possible for someone to have intended to communicate' (Skinner, p. 49, 
emphasis in original). This move into a sort of linguistic contextualization 
must have some implications for Williams's own developing methods, and, as 
we shall see later, he is able at one point even to equate cultural materialism 
with `historical semiotics', in a way which appears close to Skinner's ideas. In 
addition, this refinement of the other methods can lead to a study of texts 
which concerns itself also with their actual conditions of existence, or, in 
other words, makes textuality itself the object of study. Of course, what has 
been left out of Skinner's analysis is that particular brand of `deterministic' 
theory, i. e. Marxism, which forms the other part of Williams's approach. This 
will have to wait for further chapters, but it is reasonable to mention here that 
much of what Skinner agonizes over in relation to deterministic models of 
text and context is also a feature of Williams's own difficulties with a Marxist 
approach, and that Williams's `solution' is also similar, in that he amends the 
Marxist model to play down this particular emphasis. For now, I will 
complete this `early' phase of the defining and limiting of cultural materialism, 
by considering briefly Williams's own approach to the text/context 
opposition. This will then be followed by the first of two experiments in 
testing the theory against its use as a tool for literary criticism, in the process 
making clear the real and fundamental differences between the approach of 
Williams and Leavis. 
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8. Literature in Relation to History 
That Williams, in his early phase, is close to accepting something like 
Skinner's revision of the Leavis / Bateson opposition, we can see from some 
of his work in adult education in the early 1950s. One way of thinking about 
the relationship between text and context, would be to argue that `textual' 
criticism is predominately a `literary' affair, whereas the `contextual' 
approach is a kind of historical investigation (we will see later how Volosinov 
attempts to deconstruct this opposition between the `literary' and the 
`historical' through a form of semiotics). The interdisciplinary nature of much 
adult teaching has had the effect of drawing the disciplines of `English' and 
`History' closer together, though often without much of an attempt to 
investigate properly just how they can relate to each other. In 1950, this state 
of affairs prompted the organization of a week-long course for tutors held at 
Hertford College, Oxford, under the title `Literature in Relation to History, 
focusing on the period 1850-75. As Director of Studies, Williams wrote up a 
brief `Formal Report' of the events, and with it a much longer `Personal 
View' of his impressions. '°° 
The list of active participants to the course was a distinguished one. It 
included Humphrey House running seminars on Dickens and Hopkins, and 
Isaiah Berlin and Asa Briggs lecturing on `Scientific and Philosophic 
Thought', and `Religion in England' respectively. Williams himself ran a 
seminar on George Eliot. Despite this level of expertise, it is clear from 
Williams's personal comments that he was less than impressed with the 
general level of understanding of some of the fundamental issues involved in 
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relating literature to historical studies. Most significantly, he is against the 
historical approach which either uses details from literature to support 
historical `evidence', or (worse still), reads off such `internal' historical 
information against alternative contextual evidence, in the process finding a 
failure on the literary writer's part to treat history `properly'. Williams gives 
two examples from his own seminar group on George Eliot to show what he 
means. In the first (a hypothetical example), he points out how only a bad 
historian would use Felix Holt as `evidence' of 1830s radicalism without 
recognizing the very specific, ideological viewpoint Eliot adopts from her 
perspective in the 1860s. Secondly, he highlights what he calls the `This is 
where I get interested' school of historical criticism, evidenced by a moment 
when the group considers `in passing a letter by George Eliot in which she 
commented on the revolutions of 1848'. 101 Almost inevitably, the result of 
this discovery is to prompt the historian to condemn Eliot for her lack of 
knowledge of international affairs of the period. But, as Williams comments: 
`Is it as a commentator on international affairs that George Eliot is 
historically important? '102 
For Williams, more stress needs to be put on literary production. This 
is obviously particularly important in the context of this particular course, in 
the case of `historical' novels, which tended to be the main source of interest 
for the historian. For Williams, this is mistaken for two reasons: first, because 
`all novels are historical novels, except historical novels', by which he means 
that, even where an historical novel is the result of careful research, it is still 
research from the perspective of the present, and it is therefore the history of 
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its own production which is the valid location of scholarship. 103 Second, this 
emphasis on the `significance' of the historical novel, ignores the very real 
value of other sorts of literature for historical research. At this point, he takes 
the opportunity to shift his criticism onto his own `literary' colleagues, whom 
he sees as condoning a reductive `fact-finding' approach because of their own 
`old sense of guilt', an insecurity about the validity of their own particular 
discipline, exacerbated by a concentration on biography at the expense of a 
more rigorous literary criticism: 
I had assumed that historians would be naturally interested in an 
account of the nature and quality, at any given time, of specific, 
though unpolitical, human experience; or of the particular workings of 
social institutions; or of the effect of economic change upon 
differentiated individual persons, as well as upon a class. [... ] The 
poem which states in particular terms the fantasies of an adolescent is 
as much a part and a product of [a complex whole] as the novel which 
deals with the conditions of workers in an industrial town; and may 
indeed be just as valuable a clue to a general understanding. 104 
Part of achieving this redefinition of the relationship of literature to history 
can be simply translated into the text/context opposition. By treating literature 
in itself, context is only invoked as it were when the text demands it, or, 
rather, when the reading of the text brings out the requirement for historical 
investigation to explain something specific. '°5 This treating of literature in 
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itself brings with it the element which formed the conclusion of Skinner's 
argument: the most significant `contextualization' of literature is one related 
to language use, which Williams describes as `the changes in language as a 
medium of expression, changes which reflect subtle and often unconscious 
changes of assumption and mental and emotional process'. 106 
One obvious feature of cultural materialism is its emphasis on the 
central importance of language, and we will see this becoming of increasing 
significance in later chapters. Skinner's sensitivity to language use will then 
find its counterpart in Williams's `going beyond' the Leavis / Bateson 
opposition, and his substitution for the text/context polarity of an emphasis on 
first the `knowable community', and ultimately on a community of language. 
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3 
Novel Ideas: Towards the Knowable Community 
If, as I want to suggest, Williams's developing cultural materialism 
forms itself to some extent as a reaction to Leavisian textual criticism; if 
Williams rejects that cultural image which writes our history in terms of the 
gradual loss of the `organic community'; if he tries to build on the value of 
close textual criticism by attempting a sort of synthesis or going beyond of the 
Leavisian and Batesonian approaches to reading, then it should be possible to 
see the effects of this shift in his own literary criticism. Later, as we confront 
a more sophisticated level of the underlying theoretical position, we will be 
able to test Williams's ideas by looking at his work in one particular area, the 
seventeenth century `country-house' poem. As we have seen in following the 
Leavis / Bateson debate, the argument tends to be conducted around the 
reading of poems. When anything as `loose and baggy' as a novel is 
confronted, very small extracts are selected for analysis, so that similar 
techniques can be used. This is also true of course for the early Williams, as 
we have already seen, although even in Reading and Criticism there is at least 
the recognition that `complete' works need to be tackled. ' 
1. Leaving the Organic Community 
Leavis's determination to define the `great tradition' is well known. 
What still surprises on re-reading his early work on the novels, is how 
absolutely sure he is that he is capable of making these very large, 
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generalizing decisions about what should be in the canon and what should 
not. This confidence is not, it must be said, because he simply offers a 
summary of what is already `canonical'. Rather, he uses his Eliotic notion of 
`tradition' to redefine the canon from a present perspective, so that it can 
include Jane Austen and D. H. Lawrence; George Eliot and Henry James. 2 
There is little doubt that Leavis was one of the first, and almost 
certainly the most influential of University critics to champion the modernist 
writers of the 1920s, and we have already seen his praise for T. S. Eliot's 
experiments. It is therefore something of a surprise to realise how little value 
he appears to place on the work of James Joyce, and it is therefore useful to 
examine briefly why this must be so. A clue is given in The Great Tradition, 
where Leavis praises Ulysses for its `extraordinary variety of technical 
devices', and its `attempts at an exhaustive rendering of consciousness', but 
nevertheless argues that there is no `organic principle' acting to control the 
text. Rather than a `new start', this is for Leavis a `dead end', confirmed for 
him by the later production of Finnegans Wake, which `engaged the interest 
of the inventor of Basic English'. 3 Leavis has a long memory. He had made 
the same connection, between the literary experimentation of Joyce and the 
linguistic reductiveness of C. K. Ogden, fifteen years earlier when reviewing 
chapters of Work in Progress (later Finnegan Wake) for Scrutiny in 1933. 
In the Scrutiny article, Leavis extends his criticism back from Work in 
Progress to Ulysses. Again, it is the word organic which defines Leavis's 
criticism, and now it is linked to a reference to Vico which emphasises again 
Leavis's distrust of philosophy: 
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A certain vicious bent manifested itself very disturbingly in Ulysses, in 
the inorganic elaborations and pedantries and the evident admiring 
belief of the author in Stephen's intellectual distinction, and the idea of 
putting Vico's theory of history into the concrete would seem rather 
to derive from this bent than to be calculated to control it. 5 
Surely Leavis's generally astute literary judgement has failed him here. 
That there is an intimate relationship between the author of Ulysses and the 
character of Stephen Dedalus is of course clear. But far less certain is Joyce's 
celebration of his alter-ego's `intellectual distinction'. This seems true, firstly, 
because it becomes increasingly difficult in Ulysses to distinguish between any 
originating author and the multiple narrators who inhabit the text; secondly, 
because even in the passages which directly explore Stephen's 
`intellectualism', most significantly the debate over Shakespeare in `Scylla 
and `Charybdis' (chapter 9), Stephen is frequently exposed as someone with 
an overdetermined sense of his own `theolologicophilolological' intellectual 
abilities, and this is often made explicit by the ironic juxtaposition of 
Stephen's deep `aesthetic theorizing' alongside some other character's satiric 
comment. 6 
More directly relevant here, is Leavis's insistence on the lack of the 
`organic' dimension in Joyce's work, which Leavis ties in to an historical 
analysis comparing this `failing' on Joyce's part to the success of 
Shakespeare. Recognising their shared interest in puns and word-play, Leavis 
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argues that this is merely an end in itself in Joyce, whereas for Shakespeare 
there is `complete subjection [... ] of the medium to the uncompromising, 
complex and delicate need that uses it'. 7 This might be seen almost as a 
negative summary of the modernist experiment. Certainly, Leavis sees Eliot's 
attempt to reconcile `concrete particularity with inclusive generality' as a limit 
text for this kind of experimentation. 8 Joyce's work, as Lawrence suggests, is 
for Leavis a linguistic dustbin: `old fags and cabbage-stumps of quotations 
from the Bible and the rest, stewed in the juice of deliberate, journalistic dirty- 
mindedness'. 9 Returning to the comparison with Shakespeare, Leavis replays 
all the `organic community' rhetoric, this time in the form almost of an Eliotic 
`dissociation of sensibility'. Shakespeare's advantage is that he wrote from 
within `a genuinely national culture, to a community in which it was possible 
for the theatre to appeal to the cultivated and the populace at the same time 
[... ] a national culture rooted in the soil'. 10 Reacting predictably to the sort of 
cultural pessimism displayed in his other writings from the period, Leavis 
once more invokes the name of George Sturt ('Bourne') as support for his 
views about the loss of the organic community, tying it in now to a belief that 
modern culture has taken away from us the ability to talk to each other. 
Instead of the old order (it is Leavis's own emphasis), we are left now with 
`cultural disintegration, mechanical organization and constant rapid change'. 11 
I suppose it could be argued that the literature of the modernist 
period, Eliot's The Waste Land, Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, 
Joyce's Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, Woolf s Mrs Dalloway, all in various 
ways chart this feature of the twentieth century, a landscape marked by this 
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`cultural disintegration, mechanical organization and constant rapid change'. 
However, with the notable exception of Joyce, the other writers make every 
attempt to show the contempt they feel for this `loss' of tradition and past 
culture. It is this surely which brings together the `Bloomsbury Fraction' and 
the miner's son, and marks them off from the self-exiled son of Dublin, who 
does not so much celebrate this change as just accept it as the state of things, 
within which there is still a culture to be shared and understood, a community 
which needs to be identified, a `knowable community'. This too, is surely the 
mark which distinguishes Joyce from Lawrence for Leavis, and means he 
cannot admire Lawrence without finding Joyce a failure. " Actually, this 
division is apparent too in the early criticism of Williams, but in the opposite 
direction. At Cambridge, the texts Williams and his associates `most admired' 
and set up in opposition to socialist realism were Ulysses and Finnegans 
Wake, and Joyce was `much more attractive than Lawrence'. 13 
Williams is very clear that one of the most significant features of 
Lawrence's work is his `critique of industrialism', which links him directly 
back to Carlyle. Taking this lead, we can then see a clear line of influence: 
Carlyle, Arnold, Eliot, Leavis, although it is only fair to recognize, as 
Williams explicitly acknowledges, that this historical thread is denied by 
Leavis. 14 Lawrence represents, for Leavis, the latest point in a long line of 
`English' novelists stretching back to Jane Austen, who have succeeded, like 
Shakespeare, in bringing the past to bear on the present; who, through 
aesthetic innovation, act to resist `mass civilization' and reintegrate us with 
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our cultural history, thus exemplifying what Leavis describes as `the creative 
human spirit and its power to ens fulness of life. " 
2. The Knowable Community 
When Leavis begins The Great Tradition with: `The great English 
novelists are Jane Austen, George Eliot, Henry James and Joseph Conrad', 16 
he is not, as Catherine Belsey has suggested, accepting `greatness' as an 
unarguable category. " Belsey is too quick to condemn a writer like Leavis for 
his `failure' to deconstruct transcendental concepts like `greatness'. She fails 
to recognize that, while Leavis is sure what he means by `great' (as he 
composes his introduction), he also recognizes the historical mutability of 
such a term. This is clear, because he willingly excludes from this list names 
which are already canonical (here in particular Hardy, and Dickens with the 
exception of Hard Times); and further, because, as we have already seen, by 
the end of the same introduction, just twenty-odd pages later, Lawrence has 
joined the list. 
If Leavis's notion of `greatness' is more complex than Belsey is 
willing to allow, it is also true that his decisions on what to include and what 
to exclude are based on a firm belief in his own ability to make such 
distinctions, and that the identification of `greatness' (however defined), is the 
appropriate end of literary criticism. It becomes apparent from very early in 
Williams's career that he is far from happy to think in this way, and that, 
although questions of value remain relevant, his own decisions on what is 
worth writing about are the result of a different set of thought processes, 
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most commonly linked to some form of historical identification. Thus, most 
famously, he chooses in Culture and Society to devote a longish section to an 
examination of what he calls the `Industrial' novels of the mid-nineteenth 
century. Similarly, in The English Novel, he starts by meditating on the 
production of key texts in 1847 and 1848, inevitably linking these works to 
`revolution' (Industrial and otherwise). This work, continued in The Country 
and the City and elsewhere, focuses its attention not on some lost `organic 
community', but on what Williams calls the `knowable community', one of 
the `key terms' around which cultural materialism starts to define and limit 
itself It is important to recognize at once the difference in emphasis between 
the two: the organic community is lost but `known', the knowable community 
exists but has to be discovered, `knowable', not `known'. As Alan O'Connor 
has pointed out, what this means in effect is that there is a deep irony built 
into the term itself, since `what is being shown is how much of the society is 
deeply unknowable'. 18 
As Williams makes clear in The English Novel, it is the `exploration of 
community: the substance and meaning of community' which he sees as 
central to the production of the novels he focuses on there. '9 By 
concentrating on `community' (knowable or otherwise), Williams seeks to 
resist falling into Leavis's cultural pessimism. While accepting that something 
has happened to change society and its culture, Williams refuses to stigmatize 
it as the `bad after', a wasteland of despair, of cultural pessimism. If 
`community' still means something, then there is still a value to society, and 
the novel's function then is to explain change rather than merely reject it. This 
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is a point he makes explicit in a slightly earlier essay, which is introduced 
ironically with a paraphrase of Sturt: `there is always change in the village': 
[T]he difference between Jane Austen and George Eliot and Hardy is 
not the sudden disintegration of a settled, traditional order but a 
change in literary bearings which brings into focus a persistent rural 
disturbance hitherto unrepresented in fiction. Thus we can say that the 
traditional novel, by which is meant very often the traditional novel of 
country and provincial life, depends essentially on a knowable 
community. This is a point to consider with Dickens, who, responding 
to the scale and complication of the city, had to remake the novel in a 
quite different direction. But a real continuity from Jane Austen to 
George Eliot, and then on to Thomas Hardy, can focus our attention 
on the problem of the knowable community within country life. 20 
This essay, published in 1969, is the first time Williams uses the phrase 
`knowable community' in print (an amended version of it becomes chapter 
sixteen of The Country and the City), and it is important as a clear mark of 
difference between himself and Leavis, not just in the sense that other writers, 
most notably Hardy, become the focus of interest; but also because the 
`knowable community' represents a different way of thinking about literary 
and cultural production, `a matter of consciousness as well as evident fact'. 
21 
This then finds its fuller analysis in The English Novel, published in the 
following year. Despite Williams's insistence that The English Novel was a 
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challenge to the Leavisian model of criticism, Leavis is notable in the text by 
his absence (only one brief, throwaway mention). But, nevertheless, the whole 
work does offer a clear and radical break with everything we have seen to 
date, including of course Williams's own achievements in Reading and 
Criticism. This then, to utilise Harold Bloom's terminology, represents the 
agonistic site of struggle for Williams, where he finally throws over that 
`anxiety of influence' which was Leavis, in a desperate and necessary oedipal 
reversal, only after which, as the archetypal `strong' critic, he can really open 
up a critical space for his own personal version of literary theory. 22 As 
Williams's interlocutors argue in the Politics and Letters interviews, this 
throwing-over manifests itself in The English Novel in `its apparently 
sustained, virtually symmetrical inversion of the authors, evaluations and 
emphases to be found in The Great Tradit/on'. ' Williams's reply is that 
Leavis's domination of literary studies in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
particularly in relation to canon formation and the novel, made it inevitable 
that Williams's own work would have to be a form of response; even at the 
expense of him `starting' in the 1840s instead of the 1790s. 24 The theoretical 
shift of influence, from Leavis's `organic community' to Williams's 
`knowable community', can, I think, be recognized by looking more closely at 
their responses to the significance of specific writers, and I will want to argue 
that, ultimately, Leavis himself succumbs to what is effectively a `reverse' 
anxiety of influence, as he redefines his own great tradition. Asked years later 
why he appears to have amended his opinion of Dickens he bypassed the 
25 question, but held on to his insistence on `the right to contradict [him]self . 
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But change he certainly did, and it seems appropriate to suggest that, if 
Williams started out being a `Left-Leavisite', Leavis turned into a `Right- 
Witliamsonian'. 
In The English Novel, It is not altogether clear that `knowable 
community' is being used in his literary analysis, although, in the introduction, 
Williams makes frequent references to the centrality of `community', arguing 
that the mid-nineteenth century represents the historical moment at which the 
sense of community radically changes, as the landscape becomes 
predominantly urban and industrial. The effects of this are then not only to 
produce accelerated social change, which makes `community' itself possibly 
less certain, but also to tend towards obscuring the processes of social change 
(EN, pp. 11-12). Williams makes the interesting point in Keywords, that, 
alone among terms of social organization, community `seems never to be used 
unfavourably'. 26 1 suppose what this suggests is that it has been appropriated 
at various times by groups with opposing ideologies, who have then appealed 
to it as a measure of a form of consensus or local agreement. The word 
`knowable' then, added to community, rather than tying down meaning, acts 
in the opposite direction, by recognizing that there are then question-marks 
over understanding community, and that this relates to personal relationships, 
and also to society as a whole: both in effect tend to be perceived as 
`unknowable', but are capable of becoming `known' (or at least more 
`knowable') through analysis. This is where the term becomes useful as a key 
to reading strategies, since novels too can be defined as `knowable 
communities' (EN, p. 14). For Williams, in their `classic' mode, novels offer 
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us sets of `known' relationships realised as parts of a `wholly known social 
structure'. But this only works, of course (if it can ever be said really to 
`work' at all), where the society being represented in the novel is already 
known and understood. If, as Williams suggests, such a situation breaks down 
some time in the nineteenth century, coincident that is with the coming to 
maturity of the realist novel as a dominant mode of literary production, then it 
must presumably be the case that this development in some way represents a 
real crisis of representation, a desperate search for the `real', which will move 
the novel from the certainty of a Jane Austen to the doubt and confusion of a 
Virginia Woolf. And this is the reason for Williams's belated recognition that, 
by starting his narrative in the 1840s (like Leavis leaving Austen as the silent 
precursor of the realist text), he is really too late to identify fully the historical 
effects of this change in the knowable community. 
It might be thought that what has so far been said of the knowable 
community is really just a sort of paraphrase of the Leavisian organic 
community, which itself represents a break-point between a known past and 
an unknown present. But this only works if we link the idea of community 
directly to the perceived differences between rural and urban formations. 
Williams emphasises that this division assumes that we can somehow `know' 
a rural community more fully than an urban one. If, as he argues, these 
relationships are ones of consciousness as well as `fact' (i. e. social and 
material circumstances), then similar problems of representation present 
themselves, in effect all communities are essentially unknown, and the novel 
is a site of exploration, within which often very narrow and selective parts of 
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that community are investigated and discovered. This must in fact be true for 
country and city alike, and it effects writers and critics. Thus, Dickens's 
London is a very carefully delineated space, a literary selection within which 
relationships of an essentially narrow range can be successfully explored; just 
as Austen's `England' excludes large sections of community, because they 
were effectively `unknown' (or uninteresting) to her. All writers, however 
`realistically', produce facsimiles of the real which allow them to avoid the 
complexities of the real, which is why the Petersburg of Dostoevsky's Crime 
and Punishment looks so different from that of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, 
even though less than ten years separates them. 27 
Whether or not it was ever valid to talk about the `loss' of an `organic 
community', there is little doubt that in many ways the Britain of 1850 looked 
very different from the England of 1800 or 1750. The time of the Great 
Exhibition and the 1851 census marked the dominance of the capitalist mode 
of production, and, alongside it, the first recorded time in history where more 
people lived and worked in `urban' rather than `rural' formations. 28 
Aesthetically, this produced a growing body of art which celebrated or 
criticised the new situation, from the visual art commissioned by the new 
industrialists, to the `Industrial' novels; the new industry bringing into being 
the new cities. Conveniently for our comparison of Leavis and Williams, it is 
one such novel, Dickens's Hard Times, which can act as a measure of those 
differences, and help to make clear some of the constituents of Williams's 
cultural materialism. 
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At the beginning of the previous chapter I noted the relationship 
between Williams's The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence and The 
Great Tradition. As Williams commented, his work in the 1960s (first the 
Cambridge lecture series and later the book) was a sustained attempt to 
challenge the by then hegemonic influence of Leavis over matters of the 
`canon' and literary criticism. Without mentioning Leavis by name, Williams 
begins his chapter on Dickens by recognising the partiality of previous 
approaches, which have bemoaned the loss of `traditional culture', and 
produced a belief that only an `educated minority' deeply connected to its 
cultural past could maintain correct moral standards. Against this, Williams 
argues that it forgets another culture, the `ordinary culture' which, rather than 
closing itself off from the present, responds to it actively: 
What is missing is that element of authentic popular response to the 
new conditions of life, through which in many ways - in new radical 
institutions and beliefs, but also in the crowded many-voiced 
anonymous world of idioms, stories, songs, jokes, parodies, 
sentiments, caricatures - people described and responded to their 
unprecedented experiences (EN, p. 28). 
This language is strongly Bakhtinian?, describing a Rabelaisian 
counter-culture which escapes the dominant and produces a new `structure of 
feeling'. Structure of feeling becomes for Williams another way of defining 
and limiting cultural materialism, and, in his work on Dickens, will be 
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intimately related to the `knowable community', so it will be useful here to 
spend some time investigating more fully what it means to him. 
3. Structures of Feeling, the Organic Community Refined 
`Structure of feeling' reappears throughout Williams's long writing 
career. The first reference I can find is in Reading and Criticism, where he 
writes of `the structure of personal feelings of many writers and readers'. " 
The phrase also appears in Culture and Society, but the first extended 
discussions are in Drama from Ibsen to Brecht and The Long Revolution. 31 
Like everything in Williams, the term is inherently `historical', so it will not 
necessarily mean the same, or have the same critical use, throughout his 
work. 32 Indeed, we will need to return to it later, when the discussion of the 
postmodern will intersect with that more `fluid' understanding of structures of 
feeling given in Marxism and Literature. 
In Drama from Ibsen to Brecht he uses it as one half of a relationship, 
between structure of feeling and `convention' (convention both as tacit 
consent to the `necessity of tradition', and as `dramatic method' for 
displaying essentially `new modes of feeling'). 33 Structure of feeling, as a tool 
of dramatic analysis, then explores what Williams sees as the `essential 
relationship' between the conventions of a period which are adopted by the 
dramatist, and his own transformation of this received position. Williams here 
makes a particular claim for art, one which will find its counterpart in the 
work of structuralist Marxism, and bears an ironic relationship to the beliefs 
of Leavis : the work of art is privileged, in that it contains within itself some 
`element' which does not seem to appear `external' to it. 34 
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The work on structure of feeling is really just sketched in here, but the 
treatment is much more detailed in The Long Revolution, and tied in to an 
`analysis of culture' which concentrates, appropriately for this chapter, on the 
literature (predominately the novels) of the 1840s. He introduces the term by 
writing about the problems different generations have in understanding one 
another, and how this can then be extrapolated to indicate the more serious 
problems to be overcome when we as social critics examine past periods, 
relying only on the cultural remains. This sense of what we might call here a 
`knowable community' in the sense of one which we want to analyse and 
come to understand, is now designated a `structure of feeling': 
The term I would suggest to describe it is structure of feeling. it is as 
firm and definite as `structure' suggests, yet it operates in the most 
delicate and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this 
structure of feeling is the culture of a period: it is the particular living 
result of all the elements in the general organization. And it is in this 
respect that the arts of a period, taking these to include characteristic 
approaches and tones in argument, are of major importance. For here, 
if anywhere, this characteristic is likely to be expressed; often not 
consciously, but by the fact that here, in the only examples we have of 
recorded communication that outlives its bearers, the actual living 
sense, the deep community that makes the communication possible, is 
naturally drawn upon. 35 
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There is obviously a lot to be said about all this, not least that, even for 
Williams, it is far from clear from his `explanation' just what a `structure of 
feeling' is (perhaps this uncertainty is reinforced, ironically, by Williams's 
certainty that structures are always `firm' and `definite', a notion soon to be 
questioned by deconstruction). He appears to see it primarily as a way of 
defining a particular `group' epistemology, which is dependent on generations 
sharing a similar world view, one which changes as generations change, at 
which point `the nearest we can get to this vital element is in the documentary 
culture, from poems to buildings and dress-fashions, and it is this relation that 
gives significance to the definition of culture in documentary terms'. 36 As 
earlier, there is an emphasis here on the special nature of `documentary 
culture' (a rather wider term than the use of art in Drama from Ibsen to 
Brecht). Williams continues: `The significance of documentary culture is that, 
more clearly than anything else, it expresses that life to us in direct terms, 
when the living witnesses are silent'. 37 `Expressing life to us in direct terms' 
carries with it I would argue, two related problems. One, connected with a 
rather Leavisian debate about the value of `experience', which I will return to. 
The other is more directly concerned with ideology, since Williams appears to 
be suggesting that we can get direct access to the `real' through its 
documentary culture, in a sort of unmediated, and curiously complete 
condition. This is obviously a very serious problem for cultural materialism, 
since it seems to ignore all sorts of difficulties, including the likelihood, as 
Williams later recognizes, that in general, `culture' is `dominant' culture; and 
the effect of the `selective tradition' in filtering out all but a very specific 
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version of the totality of cultural production. Yet (again a point made by 
Williams), if the `structure of feeling' is not even fully known to those living 
it, what can it mean to suggest that we, as archivists, can be given that life `in 
direct terms'? In other words, what relationship exists between the structure 
of feeling, and any actual social conditions?: 
In some respects, the structure of feeling corresponds to the dominant 
social character, but it is also an expression of the interaction 
[between competing social characters]. Again, however, the structure 
of feeling is not uniform throughout the society; it is primarily evident 
in the dominant productive group. At this level, however, it is 
different from any of the distinguishable social characters, for it has to 
deal not only with the public ideals but with their omissions and 
consequences, as lived. 39 
I would suggest that this rather tortuous argument reflects in `indirect terms' 
Williams's increasing difficulties in finding a way of writing about the 
relationship of culture to society while avoiding confronting directly Marxist 
theories of ideology, a crisis which will find its catharsis much later, in the 
work of the 1970s, particularly Marxism and Literature. And this is where 
`ideology' and `experience' come together in the analysis of culture using a 
concept like structure of feeling. As his interviewers in Politics and Letters 
suggest, we can use these two terms to locate the opposing forces of 
Williams's cultural materialism in the 1960s, and the `scientific' Marxism of 
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Louis Althusser. 39 For Althusser (or so they argue), experience is equivalent 
to illusion, ideology in its pure state, whereas the Williams of Culture and 
Society and The Long Revolution frequently promotes the value of experience 
as a necessary antidote to the `false fixity' of the world of doctrines. At their 
extremes, both interpretations are faulty - there are plenty of examples where 
our immediate experience can be seen to be `true' without the need for 
scientific thought ('we can look out of the window and tell whether the sun is 
shining or not without any knowledge of meteorology'); on the other hand 
absolute reliance on immediate experience may not be enough (without some 
knowledge of planetary rotation we will `believe' that the sun rotates around 
the earth). All of this is further problematized in the case of reliance on 
`documentary culture' (whether in the form of `official' ideology or creative 
experience in the novels say), since its `selective' nature means that key areas 
are ignored completely (in the 1840s for instance the Irish Famine). 
In other words, to use again Williams's alternative terminology, the 
`knowable community' (in this case, say, the society represented by the 
novels of the 1840s) cannot be known in its totality through this very 
restricted version of `experience', even if the novel is capable of somehow 
materializing something of the `unsaid' of ideology (since, in ideology or 
experience, the Famine is excluded). Williams's response to this apparent 
aporia is significant, because it engages directly with his work on the novels, 
and, particularly, on Dickens. He notes that the period being investigated 
intersects importantly with the development of statistical theory, and the 
advanced arrangements for the collection of data, `symbolized by the 
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foundation of the Manchester Statistical Society'. 40 This work, obviously 
related at some level to `Blue Books', utilitarian theory and the rest, was a 
way past the limitations of experiential research, a method which offered to 
the efforts of personal observation a degree of scientific analysis which could 
at least attempt to penetrate the new, unknowable society of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The literary example Williams uses here (the same one is used in The 
English Novel), is the passage from Dombey and Son `where he envisages the 
roofs of houses being taken off, so that some `good spirit' can show the 
actual social relationships not `empirically observable'. 41 That good spirit is of 
course the novelist himself, and we will see a similar device being used, an 
appeal to the novelist to lay bare the workings of ideology, in Hard Times. 
But the mention of Hard Times might also suggest here another connection. 
Because it is in that novel, from the post-revolutionary 1850s, that scientific 
knowledge, the `deadly statistical clock' of utilitarian theory, is given no 
credence at all as a method to enhance empirical observation. In effect, Hard 
Times answers to an extreme version of the theory versus experience debate, 
with theory only identified with abuse and lack of humanity. 
4. Re-reading Hard Times 
Returning then to the novel criticism, it is worth noting the very long 
lead-time between The Great Tradition (1948), and The English Novel 
(1970). By the time Williams publishes his `response' to Leavis, we have 
Leavis's own revision of his earlier position, in Dickens: The Novelist, 
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published in the same year as The English Novel, and co-authored by F. R. 
and Q. D. Leavis. 42 This then gives us a curious sort of symmetry between 
their two positions on Dickens. Williams includes a piece on Hard Times in 
Culture and Society, just as Leavis offers it as an `analytic note' to The Great 
Tradition. Leavis then includes Hard Times in Dickens, using almost an 
identical version to that in The Great Tradition, but it remains absent from the 
`Dickens' chapter in The English Novel. These inclusions, repetitions and 
absences can tell us a great deal about the two critics' differing attitudes to 
the literary. For Leavis, it represents, to adopt an appropriate Dickensian 
description, a `change of heart' ('the right to contradict myself ). In The 
Great Tradition, Dickens is `great', and a `genius', but it is `the genius [... ] of 
a great entertainer'. Excluding Hard Times, in which `his distinctive creative 
genius is controlled throughout to a unifying and organizing significance', the 
value of Dickens is restricted to being a good bedtime read: `The adult mind 
doesn't as a rule find in Dickens a challenge to an unusual and sustained 
seriousness'. 43 By comparison with other Dickens' novels, Hard Times is on a 
small scale, and this allows it to manifest its structure in a way which is 
impossible in the other `loose baggy monsters': it `leaves no room for the 
usual repetitive overdoing and loose inclusiveness'. It is a `completely serious 
work of art', in which Dickens is `for once possessed by a comprehensive 
vision'. 44 
Looking in detail at Leavis's chapter on Hard Times, it soon becomes 
clear how this `greatness' manifests itself. Originally the first of a series of 
essays in Scrutiny under the general title: `The Novel as Dramatic Poem'45, 
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the chapter displays to the full all of Leavis's deepest beliefs about the value 
of his brand of literary criticism. As Michael Bell has suggested, Leavis's 
decision to read the novel as a `dramatic poem' makes it possible for him to 
re-evaluate the work of writers like Lawrence, who appear resistant to a 
straightforward `realist' approach, by subsuming `mimetic reference to the 
world' into `that inner dimension of mimesis encapsulated in the enactive 
conception of language'. 46 Relying on a formula which equates `literariness' 
with poetic device, Leavis turns the metonymy of the novel into the 
metaphorical richness of a Shakespearean sonnet: 
[B]y texture, imaginative mode, symbolic method, and the resulting 
concentration, Hard Times affects us as belonging with formally 
poetic works. [... ] The excerpt in itself suggests the justification for 
saying that Hard Times is a poetic work. It suggests that the genius of 
the writer may fairly be described as that of a poetic dramatist, and 
that, in our preconceptions about `the novel', we may miss, within the 
field of fictional prose, possibilities of concentration and flexibility in 
the interpretation of life such as we associate with Shakespearian 
drama. [... ] The final stress may fall on Dickens's command of word, 
phrase, rhythm and image: in ease and range there is surely no greater 
master of English except Shakespeare. This comes back to saying that 
Dickens is a great poet. " 
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Accepting that any piece of writing may display `formal' poetic devices is not 
the same thing at all as suggesting, based on a few carefully chosen extracts, 
that Hard Times represents some novelistic equivalent to a piece of 
Renaissance poetry. In order to make such claims Leavis is forced to adopt an 
intensely selective approach. Extracts are chosen which press his case for that 
`comprehensive vision', and it is evident that what particularly impresses him 
is Dickens's sustained critique of Benthamite utilitarianism, which itself 
represents all that is wrong with modern society and the loss of the organic 
community, figured for him by the community of the Circus, which brings to 
the downtrodden `Coketowners' `not merely amusement, but art'. 48 
But what Leavis misses is the city itself and its people, Williams's 
`crowded many-voiced anonymous world of idioms, stories, songs, jokes, 
parodies, sentiments, caricatures'. In one sense this is understandable, since 
Coketown seems strangely lacking in such a community, neither known, nor 
even unknown but knowable, just non-existent. Even so, it is strange that 
Leavis does not even comment on that startling use of `poetic' language, in 
which the machinery of the Industrial Revolution is offered in the imagery of 
Circus animals, the `melancholy mad elephants' etc. I am not sure why this 
should be, perhaps it is uncomfortable for Leavis to see Dickens breaking 
down, through his imagery, the stark difference Leavis wants to maintain 
between the moral richness of the Circus performers and the `moral 
stagnation' of the Coketowners. It helps to illuminate just how different 
Williams's approach is, since, for him, the city is the central concern of the 
novel, and further, although like Leavis he relies on short extracts, these are 
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not used for literary evaluation, but to illustrate rather `the central 
preoccupation of the work'. 49 Thus, Hard Times is in Culture and Society 
because it counts as an `industrial novel', not because it is judged to be 
`good' Dickens. Similarly, it is excluded from The English Novel, I believe, 
because it offers a completely inadequate account of the `city'. Relying on 
Dickens's brief exposure to Preston and industrial agitation, it fails to turn the 
alienation of the industrial city (as opposed to the commercial city, London), 
into a knowable community. 
This failure is seen both in the description of Coketown, and in the 
very limited characterizations of its inhabitants, particularly the working 
population. Perhaps wisely, Dickens avoids following Blackpool and Co. into 
the factory, but only there would he be able to test out more fully his ideas 
about the relationship between a philosophical system (utilitarianism) and an 
economic formation. For Williams, Hard Times is `an analysis of 
Industrialism, rather than an experience of it' (a deeply ironic comment given 
the novel's abandonment of analysis in favour of `experience'), and as a 
`whole response' it is `more a symptom of the confusion of industrial society 
than an understanding of it', albeit `a symptom that is significant and 
continuing'. 50 This lack is exposed most crucially in the language, and 
particularly in the use of dialect. Despite Leavis's praise for Dickens's 
`command of word, phrase, rhythm and image', those qualities seem sadly 
absent in the speech given to Stephen Blackpool, where Dickens makes it 
apparent how difficult it is to impersonate the speech of an unknown 
culture. 5' 
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But perhaps a more fundamental concern is the way Dickens's 
narrative is dominated by the equation of industrial exploitation and utilitarian 
philosophy, to such an extent that, as Williams notes, many commentators 
confuse Gradgrind with the mill-owners. s2 Dickens is therefore unable to 
acknowledge (and neither is Leavis), the genuine reforming desires of much 
which goes under the heading of utilitarianism, at the same time recognizing 
the double bind which welds it to that very economic system it wishes to 
transform. Effectively, as the Politics and Letters interviewers suggest, the 
industrial, economic mode of production is overdeterminedS3, squeezing out 
alternative modes of existence, so that the only possible `alternative' is the 
quasi-mystical Circus, which only ever exists, if it `exists' at all, on the outer 
fringes of Coketown. This is enough for Leavis, since he would prefer to 
locate the organic community `outside' modern industrial society. For him, 
the Circus can represent a sort of time capsule, in which the values of the 
organic community are preserved in perpetuity. Sissy then becomes the means 
through which these timeless virtues are re-introduced into the barren 
household of Gradgrind, and, through her unswerving loyalty, trust and 
honesty, a Dickensian `change of heart' becomes at least possible for some of 
the Coketowners. For Leavis, Sissy's confrontation of Harthouse after 
Louisa's panicked return to her father's house signifies her `quiet victory of 
disinterested goodness', and is `wholly convincing'. 54 As Williams argues, this 
is all very well, but, whether or not Hard Times can be judged an `aesthetic' 
success, it is a serious shortcoming that every reference to Parliament or 
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`Blue books"' sets Reform not in opposition to Exploitation, but as `two 
sides of the same coin, Industrialism'. 56 
The analysis by Williams in Culture and Society is necessarily limited 
by the comparative format, but he also produced an article on the novel, 
reprinted in Writing in Society. 57 Introducing Dickens: The Novelist, Leavis 
had rather optimistically suggested that `ideologically slanted interpretations' 
of Dickens were a thing of the past. 38 Williams confounds this suggestion in 
`The Reader in Hard Times', offering in the process a much more complex 
interpretation of the novel than he had previously attempted. 
The Reader', rather like The English Novel, clearly differentiates 
Williams's approach from that of Leavis. `Traditional' (Leavis's `key-word' 
now weighed down with negative signification) literary criticism is seen by 
Williams as inadequate to the task of dealing with a novel like Hard Times, 
relying as it does on an essentially empiricist approach : `annotating [its] 
questions, assembling their instances, evaluating their effect by some imputed 
criterion of "successful writing", soon reaches its limits, and with Hard Times 
especially soon'. 59 Instead, contra Leavis, Williams offers both an 
`ideological' reading, and an extension, based on his argument that the deep 
structure of Hard Times is effectively incoherent. For Williams, perhaps here 
prefiguring some of the anxieties which will manifest themselves later in 
Marxism and Literature, ideological critique may be able to negotiate 
successfully `immovable tensions and contradictions', but does this from a 
position which assumes a deep level of coherence ('The Reader', p. 169). 
That Hard Times displays tensions and contradictions, Williams evidences by 
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pointing out that the `Key-note' (I, 5) offers a version of Coketown where 
everybody is the same, and `Time' stands still, whereas the narrative shows us 
a very varied cast of `Coketowners' engaged in an unfolding and changing 
history ('The Reader', pp. 166-67). This in itself tends to undermine the 
homogenizing tendency of the epithet `Coketowner', which Leavis is so 
willing to use, a description which suggests homogeneity rather than 
difference. But, more significantly for Williams, `Hard Times is composed 
from two incompatible ideological positions, which are unevenly held both by 
Dickens and by many of his intended readers' ('The Reader', p. 169). 
These `incompatible ideological positions' are the same ones Williams 
refers to in The English Novel: indeed, they are two fundamentally opposed 
ways of understanding our relationship to the world; an idealist understanding 
that `some virtues and vices are original and both triumph over and in some 
cases can change any environment', against a materialist analysis, in which 
`environment influences and in some sense determines character' ('The 
Reader', p. 169). Obviously, as Williams mentions, the first has a much older 
history than the second, and links directly on to various religious debates. 
Restricting the examples to the novel, I suppose we can see a general move 
towards the second, from the innate `good-heartedness' of a `Tom Jones', to 
the tendency in much nineteenth-century fiction towards a much more 
Darwinian, deterministic vision, exemplified in, though not exhausted by, the 
web-like structure ofMiddlemarch. This movement then finds its ultimate end 
in the naturalist novels of Zola and Gissing. Any novel worthy of interest 
would of course be likely to show versions of both epistemologies, although, 
119 
again as Williams suggests, in practice one tends to be favoured over the 
other, so that `the deep formative effect [... ] is usually quite evident' ('The 
Reader', p. 170). Thus we have the effect of education on morals ('Bitzer'); 
the movement from the streets `all very like one another', to the people 
`equally like one another'; but then also characters suffering their 
environment, but not succumbing to it (Blackpool, Rachael, and, in a slightly 
different sense, Sissy). We can see here how the underlying ideological 
formation that produces the novel transgresses any simple difference between 
`fact' and `fancy': Coketown and Circus; and this finds its aesthetic 
counterpart therefore in the adoption of circus imagery to describe the 
(apparent) uniformity of city and factory. We confront here a particularly 
intriguing and complex textual `political unconscious'. Dickens appears to 
choose deeply metaphorical language to show that the drive to utilitarian 
`fact' is always fragile, and at the mercy of `fancy' (so that the language of 
`mad elephants' re-enacts Sissy's `invasion' of the Gradgrind household). But 
his decision to adopt specifically `circus' imagery also reminds us that it is in 
zoos and circuses (not factories) that elephants go `melancholy mad'. Thus 
Dickens's desire to privilege circus over city, `fancy' ovet `fact' is 
undermined by the contradictory epistemologies (idealism/materialism) in the 
novel's political unconscious. 
One response to all of this, presumably one of which Leavis would 
have approved, would be to say that this shows how inadequate any sort of 
ideological critique is for dealing with anything which approaches the 
complexity of the real. Life is, as Stephen Blackpool insists, `aw a muddle', 
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and incapable of reduction to a simplifying model ('The Reader, p. 171). 
`Model' or `muddle', neither seems ideal as a reading strategy, and this would 
appear to be confirmed by Williams's insistence that the novel lacks 
coherence. But at this point, Williams `rescues' Dickens, by arguing that the 
end of the novel, in itself a deeply conventional `realist' tactic, which takes 
the novel beyond its own present into an uncertain future, and then offers 
resolutions to these `uncertainties', offers a different sense of `coherence', by 
appealing directly to an implied reader: `Dear reader! It rests with you and 
me, whether, in our two fields of action, similar things shall be or not'. This is 
an intriguing construction, since, as Williams indicates, one `field' is manifest 
in the text itself, the other has to be constructed. The assumption, common 
enough in realist fiction, is that there is so to speak an ideal presence beyond 
the text, but not one to be sought through a Batesonian contextual criticism. 
However, Williams now recognizes that this is a paradoxical position to 
assume, given that we have already seen that within the text itself, another 
`ideal', the `Coketowner', has proved to be a fiction, even within the 
imaginary `reality' of Coketown. Similarly, despite the desires of the 
reception theorists, no actual `implied' or `ideal' reader is likely ever to take 
up the novel: `any actual reader, among readers contemporary with the text, 
might be the real-life counterpart of Stephen Blackpool or Thomas 
Gradgrind, Louisa or Rachael, Sissy Jupe or Mr Sleary' ('The Reader', p. 
173). If then, as Williams suggests, Dickens `is looking for a general effect', 
such effect can only be identified by investigating `the social relations of its 
specific composition' ('The Reader', p. 172). But what can this be, given that 
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the appeal to action on the part of his `dear reader' would seem to be 
confounded by the fact that, to use our previous terminology, this particular 
`knowable community' seems inherently unstable and contradictory? Or, to 
put it another way, how can Dickens expect his `reader' to identify with the 
structure of feeling, given that that reader is just as likely to be a Bounderby 
as a Blackpool? 
The answer to this, at least the one Williams offers, is indicated by 
those very names, since a further level of `contradiction' or `incoherence' can 
be recognized in the fact that the characters of the novel seem to refuse to 
adopt those `typical' characteristics which tend to be privileged in the realist 
text. As Williams suggests, Hard Times actually appears to alienate all 
potential readers, in that it condemns a wide range of social institutions, 
including churches and chapels, parliament and trades unions, schools and 
workplaces. But this is mediated through the selection of individuals who are 
atypical, and can therefore be distanced from any particular reader, whatever 
that person's actual relationship to the fictional representation: 
All the fundamental economic and political conflicts are then mediated 
in a specific mode. Capitalist employer confronts worker, but as a 
particularized Bounderby (from whom many employers could distance 
themselves) against the humble Blackpool, himself distanced from the 
anonymous workers led (misled) by Slackbridge. Capitalist economics 
is attacked, but in so close an association with philosophical radicalism 
that what is left to oppose it (given the other general exclusions) is not 
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easily generally identified, in ways that might divide the composed 
ideal reader ('The Reader', pp. 173-74). 
Hence, the text, in pointing towards an `ideal reader', manages to 
override any particular ideological partisanship by allowing any actual reader 
to distance himself from any character who initially seems similar. All this 
`typical' reader has to display is a suitable mix of `sympathy, indignation 
[and] concern', and, unlike the narrator, whose action is implicit within the 
text, the field of action of the reader is `left undefined, within the composed 
response, since specifications would fracture his ideal composition' ('The 
Reader', pp. 173-74). This almost concludes Williams's analysis, and it has to 
be acknowledged that, rather like the general work on Dickens in The English 
Novel, it represents a much more positive response to Dickens than that given 
in Culture and Society. It needs to be stressed here I think, that the essay 
risks over-valuing the novel, in a curious replaying of Leavis's own 
privileging technique. Williams does not select Hard Times because of its 
apparent canonical attributes, and even starts by recognizing its manifest 
contradictions. But his own analysis then rehabilitates the text, turning certain 
key `faults', in particular with regard to the characters of Bounderby and 
Blackpool, into a textual strategy designed to co-opt the largest possible 
audience to the overarching social argument. We might, by analogy, then see 
this strategy as akin to some of those more overt `ideological' readings of 
structuralist Marxism, from which Williams will want to distance himself, in 
which the discovery of `absences' and `silences' is not the key to adverse 
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criticism but to celebration, as the text, under suitable critical `therapy', 
successfully reveals its ideological genesis. 60 Thus, whether the novel is 
criticised for its faulty content, or, as the Politics and Letters interviewers had 
done, for offering `an overtotalization of the system - essentially the brute 
early industrial capitalist mode of production'61, Williams can conclude by 
arguing that it `is then a moment, an ideal moment, of a generalized unease' 
('The Reader', p. 74). He just manages to avoid turning Hard Times into a 
Leavisian masterpiece by emphasising its uncertainties, and by arguing that it 
is the expression of a structure of feeling, rather than an ideology. Presumably 
what he means is that the competing ideological positions mentioned earlier 
represent a sort of transitional structure which exists before the later more 
generalized acceptance of social explanations for individual behaviour, as he 
explains it in Marxism and Literature. 62 
5. 'Taking the Housetops Off' - Dombey and Son 
We can develop this, and compare once more the `organic' criticism 
of Leavis with the `knowable' criticism of Williams, by looking briefly at their 
treatment of another Dickens' novel, Dombey and Son. In The Great 
Tradition, Leavis had rejected Dickens, with the exception of Hard Times, 
because it is essentially not adult enough. He turns this argument back against 
himself in Dickens, arguing that Dickens was rejected because it was 
associated in his mind with his own childhood, and being read aloud to by his 
father. 63 Dickens represents something of a Leavisian personal `revaluation'. 
Whereas earlier, only Hard Times offered a `comprehensive vision', now, 
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compared say with Little Dorrit, which gives `something like a 
comprehensive report on Victorian England', Hard Times is a novel of 
`comparative simplicity'. Previously, the `simplicity' of Hard Times, which 
laid bare its structure, was a positive attribute, now it shows its relative failure 
(Dickens, p. 228). 1 want to argue that, by 1970, we can again identify certain 
characteristics shared by Williams and Leavis, but that, by this time, any 
influence is by Williams on Leavis, rather than in the opposite direction. 
Leavis's analysis of Dombey and Son is traditional enough, concentrating on 
the theme of pride, albeit arguing that `pride' functions differently in the 
earlier and later parts of the novel. And, once again, its success is measured in 
poetic terms, in direct comparison with the Shakespearian paradigm (Dickens, 
p. 29). Much of the language of his criticism is by now familiar: `we respond 
as to the fulness of immediately felt life [... ] the whole passage is consummate 
in its ironic trenchancy and its natural truth' (Dickens, pp. 3 and 9). 
But there is evidence, I believe, of a different way of thinking about 
the Dickensian novel. I have suggested that one reason Williams leaves Hard 
Times out of The English Novel is because, for once, Dickens fails to 
concentrate on an urban environment which represents a knowable 
community, so that the structure of feeling is one based on an incoherent 
understanding of society. This is unlikely to be a problem with Dombey and 
Son, firmly based in Dickens's London. Indeed, I think it is reasonable to 
suggest that, for a modern reader, there is almost an over-identification 
between the actual city of the mid-nineteenth century, and our imaginative 
construct of it, dominated by Dickens's novels. In some ways, there is an 
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irony in this, since, as Leavis emphasizes, Dickens's London is often the 
London portrayed by William Hogarth in the previous century (Dickens, p. 
26). This London, as Dickens stresses in the preface to Oliver Twist, is 
Hogarth's London of the `miserable reality' of low life, so evocatively 
portrayed in The Harlot's Progress, Gin Lane, and Southwark Fair. As such, 
it is a London only just undergoing the dramatic changes wrought by the 
Industrial Revolution. Dombey and Son then represents a definite turning 
away from this pre-industrial vision, or perhaps it would be more accurate to 
say it enacts the transition to a fully `industrialised' city, exemplified by the 
building of the railway. Both Leavis and Williams concentrate on the way the 
railway is used. For Leavis, perhaps surprisingly, the organic community is 
not invoked, and that intense technological determinism we saw earlier 
appears to have been suppressed. Contrasting the treatment of the urban 
working-classes in Hard Times and Dombey and Son, Leavis argues that 
Dickens is able to offer a positive identification in the latter, between the 
`titanism and romantic sublimity' of the railway and the `human betterment' 
of the working-class, exemplified by Mr Toodle, the engine stoker (Dickens, 
p. 11). This is obviously a rather different Leavisian stance from before, 
effectively acknowledging a sort of structure of feeling linking the fictional 
representation of the railway, and the Toodle family, unquestioningly `just a 
working-class family belonging to the workaday Victorian world' (Dickens, 
pp. 10-11). There are though problems with this analysis, perhaps suggested 
by Leavis's confidence about the representative value of the Toodles, and it is 
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developed with the example Leavis gives of Dickens being `profoundly 
impressed by the energy and the promise' of the railway: 
In short, the yet unfinished and unopened Railroad was in progress, 
and, from the very core of all this dire disorder trailed smoothly away, 
upon its mighty course of civilization and improvement. 
(Dickens, p. 11) 
Leavis summarises this by writing that Dickens `sees the railway as the 
triumphant manifestation of beneficient energy' (Dickens, p. 11). 1 suppose, 
taken out of its literary context like this, the passage could be read in a clearly 
positive way, although the `old' Leavis would probably be more wary of 
easily equating `improvement' with `civilization'. The problem is, this short 
paragraph follows a much longer one, from chapter six of the novel, in which 
the building of the railroad is described using the language of earthquakes, as 
the narrator describes the devastation caused to local communities as whole 
streets are removed. The paragraph quoted by Leavis thus functions as a 
typical example of Dickens's ironic understatement, summarising what has 
come before by offering what looks like its opposite, the comedy emphasized 
by that `in short' which introduces the paragraph. In fact, the effect of the 
railway on the community (one clearly known to Dickens, based as it is on the 
work carried out in Camden during the construction of the Euston to 
Birmingham line, started in 1834)64, is handled twice, once in chapter six, and 
then in chapter fifteen; the narrative gap mimicking the time scale of the 
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changes made. Dombey and Sori, much more clearly than Hard Times, gives 
us the rapid development of the new urban environment and its complex 
effects, and it is this which interests Williams in The English Novel. 
We saw, in `Culture is Ordinary', how Raymond Williams tried to 
redefine the limits put around the word `culture', and also imply that the 
results of economic power and scientific invention did not necessarily have to 
be rejected. In The English Novel he argues that Dickens, given his intimate 
relationship to the city, was able to actualize in his fiction something `uniquely 
capable of realising a new kind of reality - just because he shared with the 
new urban popular culture certain decisive experiences and responses' (EN, 
pp. 31-32). At one level, this is straightforward - the city is shown as 
producing atomisation, people ignore each other, there is no communication, 
and apparent chaos. To an observer, it is then a city which is meaningless and 
unknowable, Wordsworth's `Babel din / The endless stream of men and 
moving things / From hour to hour the illimitable walk / Still among streets'. 65 
But this is not Coketown, London is `knowable', and Dickens is able to 
develop a fictional method which both emphasizes the new structure of 
feeling, and shows how humans adapt to it and once more come to live within 
it, so that `unknown and unacknowledged relationships, profound and 
decisive connections, definite and committing recognitions and avowals are as 
it were forced into consciousness' (EN, p. 33). A similar point is made by 
Williams in Politics and Letters, where he explains the `knowable community' 
by arguing that Dickens had to `devise different fictional strategies for a much 
more complex urban world [... ] a community unknowable in terms of manifest 
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experience', so that a central issue in The English Novel is actually the notion 
of the unknowable community and its fictional representation. 66 
We have already seen how Dickens, as narrator, contributes to this by 
`taking the housetops off. Similarly, through the further analysis of the 
railway-building, he forces us to realise that that sense of people permanently 
alienated from their labour, so powerful in Hard Times, is not the whole 
story. In this more subtle epistemology the continuing sense of a relationship 
between man and his environment, `his making, his manufacture, his 
interpretation' (EN, p. 40), is explored. Bridges which once went nowhere 
now lead to `villas, gardens, churches, healthy public walks'. Indeed, the 
whole passage from chapter fifteen is one dominated as much by people as by 
city and railway: people now interacting with each other, and with the new 
forms of living which the changed environment has produced. The railway has 
ceased to be a symbol only of threat, as it still will be in Eliot's Middlemarch 
say, or Gaskell's Cousin Phillis, and this is so, I believe, because the railway 
functions as evidence of the urban, so that it can transform London in a 
positive way, seemingly impossible for the more rural settings of the two 
novels mentioned. But despite this `resource of hope', Williams is quick to 
recognize that such positive evaluation is usually close also to its opposite: 
[I]n this dramatic enactment Dickens is responding to the real 
contradictions - the power for life or death; for disintegration, order 
and false order - of the new social and economic forces of his time. 
His concern always was to keep human recognition and human 
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kindness alive, through these unprecedented changes and within this 
unrecognisably altered landscape (EN, p. 44). 
We can now equate this `transitional' vision of the railway, with the idea used 
by Williams earlier, of a gradual movement away from viewing society as 
some sort of convenient backdrop in front of which a drama of vice and virtue 
is played out, to one where there is more of a causal relationship between 
society and personal morals. In effect, Dickens, in Dombey and Son, 
represents an advance in the novel, a `creative intervention', which allows us 
to become aware of a new structure of feeling, in which `an individual moral 
question has become a social question' (EN, p. 48). 
Dickens has to rely on a form of `magic' to reveal this new structure 
(taking the rooftops off), because in `reality' ideology has made it increasingly 
impossible for individuals to properly understand their inter-relationships, or 
their relationship to the mode of production. This seems appropriate, given 
that `creativity' is not just centred on the aesthetic, but also on that new 
technological advance which is always the visible by-product of Victorian 
capitalism. Thus, magic and miracle, usually confined to art and religion, find 
their realization too in the world of the railways and the cities. This is what 
Williams emphasises as he completes his analysis of the culture of the 1840s 
in The Long Revolution: 
We cannot understand any period of the Industrial Revolution if we 
fail to recognize the real miracle that was being worked, by human 
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skill and effort. Again and again, even by critics of the society, the 
excitement of this extraordinary release of man's powers was 
acknowledged and shared. The society could not have been acceptable 
to anybody, without that. `These are our poems', Carlyle said in 1842, 
looking at one of the new locomotives, and this element, now so 
easily overlooked, is central to the whole culture. 67 
One last point needs to be discussed before we can move on from Williams's 
`novel' criticism. I have argued that Dickens is selected in The English Novel 
predominately because he writes of the city, a new `knowable community', 
and that Hard Times is excluded because it fails the test. Dickens reveals 
there that he is trying to work with a structure of feeling which is really 
beyond his knowledge, and this manifests itself most obviously in his 
difficulties with the use of dialect. Williams is sensitive to the frequent failure 
of writers to write in an idiom close to the `customary speech' of their 
intended readers, which leads to another form of alienation. Writing not just 
for, but from within, a popular culture, Dickens is generally able to bridge this 
gap, so that the dominant `omniscient' authorial voice epitomised by the 
narrator of a `classic realist text' like Middlemarch is frequently mediated by 
other voices in ways which diminish the obvious gap between `educated' and 
`customary' speech. 68 This may be one reason why Williams, so often a rather 
Lukacsian privileger of the realist novel, can promote Joyce in a way 
impossible for Leavis. Joyce `speaks' for the city of Dublin in the early- 
twentieth century, just as Dickens had done for the London of the mid- 
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nineteenth century. As Dickens had to search for a suitable language, so to 
does Joyce, to speak and write of a more fragmented, chaotic, unconnected, 
potentially unknowable community. Here, the structure of feeling is pre- 
eminently a structure of language, one where the alienated, `educated' 
language of an omniscient narrator rapidly gives way to the customary speech 
of the street, the pub and the bedroom.: 
[I]t is a paradox that in Ulysses, through its patterns of loss and 
frustration, there is not only search but discovery: of an ordinary 
language, heard more clearly than anywhere in the realist novel before 
it; a positive flow of that wider human speech which has been 
screened and strained by the prevailing social conventions: 
conventions of separation, reduction, in the actual history. The 
greatness of Ulysses is this community of speech (EN, pp. 167-68). 
The speech - of Molly, or Leopold Bloom, or Stephen, then takes the 
place of the characters themselves. Like them, it passes by without 
recognition, voices not so much competing as just avoiding one another, until 
a sense of some new community, a sort of family based not on biology but on 
words - myth and language games, becomes known. Language, fundamental 
to any cultural analysis, is here sedimented, materialized, made not just the 
medium but the message too. 
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The Limits of Cultural Materialism: 
Base and Superstructure in Terry Eagleton 
Williams's cultural materialism appears to develop out of a complex 
and developing relationship between the discipline of `close-reading', a more 
general concern with the `definition' of culture and our relationship to it 
(most particularly in its historical context), and the work of materialist critics, 
specifically those working within the discipline summarised as `Marxism'. Up 
until now, though - that is until around the time of the publication of The 
Country and the City, the last of these appears to have been sidelined by 
Williams, as he has attempted to negotiate a personal path of development 
which maintains his central belief in socialism, but remains troubled by the 
work of Marxist critics, and particularly by those developments, such as 
`Zdhanovism' which seek to impose a cultural model reliant on a simple 
reflectionist relationship between culture and production. In the 1970s 
though, just at the time, that is, when Western Marxism was being 
transformed by the new developments coming out of Europe, in particular 
structuralism (Althusser and his co-thinkers like Macherey and Balibar then 
the `prime movers'), Williams decided it was time to confront much more 
directly his relationship to Marx, and to attempt to produce a more fully- 
defined cultural materialism. 
The major result was the publication, in 1977, of Marxism and 
Literature. ' But four years earlier, Williams initiated this shift of emphasis 
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with an article in New Left Review, `Base and Superstructure in Marxist 
Cultural Theory '2 Taking as his starting point one of the central structural 
metaphors in Marxist theory, and one already the subject of a long history of 
debate, Williams's radical rewriting of the relationship between `base' and 
`superstructure', including redefinition of the terms themselves, opened up 
another series of debates over his own relationship to Marxism. The 
significance of this is indicated by Terry Eagleton's decision, sixteen years 
later, to choose as his contribution to a set of essays dedicated to Williams, 
another investigation of the problem, including what he saw as the mistakes in 
Williams's own analysis. 3 
This chapter, acknowledging that the problem has not gone away, 
takes as its starting point Williams's theoretical position as explained in the 
`Base and Superstructure' essay and expanded in Marxism and Literature, 
and reads it in the light of Eagleton's critique. This will help to indicate the 
historical variability of the Base and Superstructure metaphor, and, in 
particular, how its value may be threatened by deconstructive criticism. 
Williams's selective reading and interpretation of Marx and Engels then leads 
on to a re-appraisal of their own understanding of the position, to show that a 
lot of the problems with the model have been caused by an overly mechanistic 
reading of the early works, and a refusal to recognise the usefulness of 
Marx's and particularly Engels's own explanations of their positions. The 
third part of the chapter opens up the analysis, using in particular Bertell 
Ollman's work on Marxism as a theory of internal relations, and the work of 
Philip Corrigan and others on `State formation' to illuminate further the 
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complex, historically contingent relationship between evolving relations of 
production, and the `superstructural' forms developing out of them. Finally, I 
will return briefly to Williams's own work, and specifically his reply to 
challenges made to his position in the Politics and Letters interviews4 to see 
how he too responds more flexibly to the complexities of the model; and how 
his notion of `dominant', `residual' and `emergent' tries to `flex' the model to 
cope with changing relationships, while holding on ultimately to a notion of 
determination. 
1. `Frire Jacques': Marxism and the Politics of Deconstruction 
Eagleton begins, not with a direct response to Williams's article, but 
with a more general analysis of recent received opinion on the Marxist model: 
Few doctrines of classical Marxism have fallen into greater disrepute 
than the `base/superstructure' model. However much the model may 
be refined and sophisticated, and however much mediation and 
dialectical interaction may be inserted between its twin terms, this 
whole binary opposition would seem to remain stubbornly reductive 
and mechanistic (RWCP, p. 165). 
This, to paraphrase Raymond Williams, is not where we might choose to 
begin. ' It would be more convenient to take the model as a given, and then 
test Williams's reformulation of it, and Eagleton's critique. However, 
Eagleton's apparent unease at the `bad press' such a fundamental Marxist 
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conceptual complex has had, requires me to consider first his own anxieties, 
before those of Williams. 
Eagleton's essay is unusually elusive, in that he does not directly 
reference the names and sources of his concerns (a more common criticism, 
of course, of Williams, notorious for his lack of footnotes and other `scholarly 
apparatus'). But it is easy enough to deduce from the argument itself what his 
particular targets are. A clue is available in his categorising the base and 
superstructure metaphor as a `binary opposition', and is reinforced by his 
later comments: 
Is [the base/superstructure model] not a particularly notorious 
instance of what contemporary post structuralism would brand as a 
'metaphysical' mode of thought, in which a single determining essence 
or transcendental principle is arbitrarily isolated from the complex 
textuality of historical existence and elevated to some theologically 
privileged position (RWCP, p. 165, emphasis in original)? 
Much of this is typical Eagletonian irony: in particular, he would not hold to 
an understanding of 'base/superstructure' as `essence' or `transcendental 
principle' outside historical contingency, although that is how the model has 
often been perceived (by `Marxists' as well as their opponents). But that 
concern with transcendental signifieds and binary oppositions, and the critique 
of metaphysics, of being and presence, suggests that the ghostly presence of 
'Frere Jacques', M. Derrida, hovers behind Eagleton as he writes this. It is as 
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if the combined forces of textual criticism, represented by the `anti- 
representationalism' of Richard Rorty, and postmodernism's insistent flight 
from the real6, together with more tangible displays of the failure of Euro- 
communism and our own country's resistance to even a watered-down 
version of socialism, together make post-structuralism's potential onslaught 
on classical Marxism's central formulation a more pressing problem than 
might otherwise seem likely. Keen as Eagleton is to evaluate Williams's 
formulation, he has to start by convincing us that there is any point to holding 
on to such a notion in the first place. Having raised the question, it remains 
for me to look again at Demda's deconstruction, and decide whether or not 
the threat is a real one, before returning to Eagleton's arguments in favour of 
the model. 
In `Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', 
Jacques Derrida argues that making the `passage beyond philosophy' consists 
`not in turning the page of philosophy (which usually amounts to 
philosophising badly), but in continuing to read philosophers in a certain 
way'. 7 We must now read Derrida in a certain way, which, I will suggest, 
removes the problem Eagleton is concerned with, that is the deconstruction of 
the binary opposition between `base' and `superstructure'. In his reading of 
Claude Levi-Strauss's The Elementary Structures of Kinship, Derrida 
recognizes the inherent potential of any binary opposition to deconstruct 
itself, using the example of the incest taboo, which Levi-Strauss sees as 
instituting a transition from `nature' to `culture', effectively destroying the 
sense of them remaining as pure opposites (their `mutual exclusivity'). 
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Briefly, Levi-Strauss defines everything which has a universal character as 
`natural', and everything `subject to a norm' (i. e. not of a universal form) as 
cultural. As he investigates the incidence of the incest prohibition in various 
cultures, he recognizes what he describes as a `scandal'. Levi-Strauss argues 
that: 
[The prohibition of incest] presents, without the slightest ambiguity, 
and inseparably combines, the two characteristics in which we 
recognize the conflicting features of two mutually exclusive orders. It 
constitutes a rule, but a rule which, alone among all the social rules, 
possesses at the same time a universal character. 9 
Levi-Strauss's arguments have been the subject of much anthropological 
dispute. For Derrida, the `scandal' exists not in the incidence of the incest 
prohibition, but rather `within a system of concepts which accredits the 
difference between nature and culture'. Either the incest prohibition shows 
how fragile the simple opposition assumed between nature and culture really 
is, or else it exists outside this domain. This metaphysical paradox, obviously 
a product of philosophical problems concerning language itself, allows 
Derrida to press a more generalizing conclusion: 
This example, too cursorily examined, is only one among many others, 
but nevertheless it already shows that language bears within itself the 
necessity of its own critique. 9 
147 
It is here surely that Eagleton senses the potential for a deconstruction of the 
base/superstructure opposition. Derrida develops his argument by recognizing 
language as a finite field open to an infinity of substitutions: a `movement of 
play' across a field permanently de-centred: 
This movement of play, permitted by the lack or absence of a centre 
or origin, is the movement of supplementarity. [... ] The movement of 
signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is 
always more, but this addition is a floating one because it comes to 
perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of the 
signified. '° 
In the particular example examined, culture possesses the supplement (its 
universal nature normally present only in nature) which fills the lack in 
nature. " Before returning to the debate between Eagleton and Williams, two 
points need to be considered. First, even in a case such as naturelculture, 
deconstruction of the binary opposition does not necessarily result in an 
abandonment of the model. In Levi-Strauss's case, Derrida recognizes and 
seems to accept as valid, that, as `bricoleur' (someone who uses `the means at 
hand'), Levi-Strauss, while accepting the `ontological nonvalue' of the 
concept, can still work with the nature/culture opposition as a methodological 
tool. 12 Second, Derrida ends his essay by stressing that there are always `two 
interpretations of interpretation'. True, his sensuous writing gives a certain 
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privilege to the deconstructive option, the `seminal adventure of the trace'. 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the alternative interpretation (Levi- 
Strauss's bricolage), `share[s] the field which we call [... ] the social 
sciences'. 13 
Given then that Derrida's deconstruction does not have to force the 
undoing of the binary opposition between base and superstructure, Eagleton's 
nervousness seems surprising; even more so when we find that in his own 
reading of Derrida, he appears to conform to Derrida's `certain way'. Indeed, 
in `Frere Jacques: The Politics of Deconstruction', Eagleton goes so far as to 
recognize Derrida as `evidently some kind of Marxist sympathizer' (what kind 
he leaves open). "' In the same essay, Eagleton argues that there is `a left- and 
right wing of American deconstruction', and he clearly places Derrida on the 
left. In another essay in the same anthology, he berates Perry Anderson for 
ignoring the `threat' posed to Marxism by the challenges of structuralism and 
post-structuralism, and again highlights what he sees as the two `wings': 
Anderson's polemic quite fails to distinguish between `left' and `right' 
deconstruction - between those for whom the theory merely offers an 
opportunity for hermetic textualism and self-indulgent word-play, and 
those who have discerned in it [... ] political possibilities. '5 
Eagleton clearly defends Derrida against the charge that, like some of his `less 
canny acolytes, on both sides of the Atlantic', he has given himself up 
absolutely to the sway of the signifier, and unlimited semiosis: 
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Derrida himself has specifically defended the place of authorial 
intentionality in discourse, acknowledged the determinate forces of 
productive matrix and historical conditions in the construction of 
meaning, and firmly denied that he is a pluralist. 16 
It now seems more clear why Eagleton is so sensitive to the claims of 
post-structuralism. It is not so much Derrida and his philosophy of 
deconstruction which is the problem, but the Derrida industry and 
'deconstructionism; a team of 'acolytes' all too ready to deconstruct at the 
drop of a metaphysical hat, depressingly certain (if such a thing as certainty 
can be tolerated here) that there is `nothing outside of the text'. Now, this 
could reasonably be argued to be nothing more than a straw target, hardly 
worthy of Eagleton's concern. Except that straw targets have an irritating 
habit of resisting the arrows of critique. Eagleton may be right to be 
concerned about the growing challenges to the philosophy of Marxism. '7 
However, in `Base and Superstructure', Eagleton adroitly exposes the 
more serious flaws in deconstruction's desire to deny `opposition' (and 
therefore determination). Pointing out that there is an inherent dogmatism in 
arguing that `the positing of any privileged cause in any situation is 
automatically idealist', he acknowledges nevertheless that the claim that such 
a notion can be applied to something as immense and complex as `history' has 
9a kind of implausible ring to it, which forces us to ask why anyone would 
want to say such a strange sort of thing in the first place' (RWCP, p. 166). 
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But the reason for such a `strange' suggestion is not difficult to discover. 
Despite history's apparent plurality and heterogeneity, it is in fact, `as Mr 
Ford wisely commented, bunk, or at least the same old tedious story' (RWCP, 
p. 167). In other words, we remain within not `history', but rather Marx's 
notion of `pre-history', a realm of necessity which displays not change and 
difference but monotony and repetition. Obviously this less fluid and shifting 
model is one much more amenable to a model like base/superstructure. If 
Marx is right, and `history' to date has been marked by a series of moves 
which seem to repeat themselves, then presumably this must be because it is 
working to a certain underlying logic, and that logic may well be analysable 
using the base/superstructure model of determinacy. 
2. Materializing Culture/Cultural Materialism 
In our attempt to account for Williams's formulation of Marxism, and 
Eagleton's critique, it may be a useful first move to note Eagleton's definition 
of the `specificity' of Marxism as he saw it in the mid 1980s: 
The specificity of Marxism is in my view at least twofold: it lies, first, 
in its claim that material production is the ultimately determinant 
factor of social existence, and, secondly, that the class struggle is the 
central dynamic of historical development. I am tempted to add a third 
distinguishing feature, one which perhaps belongs more properly to 
Marxism-Leninism, and which concerns the revolutionary nature of 
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the doctrine: marxism is among other things a theory and practice of 
political insurrection. 18 
Note in passing, that Eagleton is quick to offer a third definition to his first 
two, one which recognizes that Marxism involves theory and practice; and 
also conforms to Marx's eleventh of his `Theses on Feuerbach': `The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to 
change it'. 19 Holding on to this, I am in a position to deal more specifically 
with the two `Base and Superstructure' essays, while recognizing that these 
do not represent, for either theorist, the limits of their concerns with the 
model. 
Williams's `Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory', 
takes as its starting point Marx's classic definition of Marxist theoretical 
practice: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations 
of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that 
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determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness. 20 
There are a number of things worth considering about this extract. First, the 
`real foundation' (i. e. `base') consists of a totality of `relations of production' 
which constitutes the `economic structure of society'. These relations are the 
relations of `real' men, and they are historically defined by applying to `a 
given stage in the development of their material forces of production'. This 
unravelling of Marx's formulation is important, because most versions of 
`vulgar Marxism' ignore the part human beings and their history play in the 
formulation. Having defined the base, Marx then appears here to offer two 
alternative versions of the superstructure: either it consists of `a legal and 
political superstructure' together with their corresponding `definite forms of 
social consciousness'; or it is made up of `the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life'. Further, we are then offered yet another binary 
opposition, in Marx's famous dictum that `it is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness'. As Eagleton rightly points out, these two pairs are very 
different objects, and only the first requires the believer in it to be a Marxist: 
The case that social being determines consciousness is an ontological 
doctrine, consequent upon the material structure of the human body, 
the material nature of its environment, the necessity for a mediatory 
labour between the two, and the fact that consciousness is therefore 
153 
always in the first place, as Marx says elsewhere, `practical' 
consciousness. That this is not the same kind of claim as that made by 
the base/superstructure metaphor is evident in the fact that one does 
not need to be an historical materialist to support it (RWCP, p. 172). 
Eagleton notes also that Williams is rare among Marxian thinkers in 
recognizing this difference at the start of his `Base and Superstructure' essay, 
making clear his unease about the base/superstructure model which `with its 
figurative element, with its suggestion of a fixed and definite spatial 
relationship, constitutes, at least in certain hands, a very specialized and at 
times unacceptable version of the other proposition' (i. e. that social being 
determines consciousness) (Problems, p. 31). But inheriting as he has, a large 
body of Marxist theory which concentrates on the first proposition, Williams 
is forced to start from there, otherwise `it would be in many ways preferable if 
we could begin from a proposition which originally was equally central, 
equally authentic: namely the proposition that social being determines 
consciousness' (Problems, p. 21). He makes the same comment in Marxism 
and Literature, published in 1977, four years after the article, and in which 
the second section can be read as an expanded version of the arguments 
raised in the essay. 21 Indeed, and as he himself has pointed out, there is no 
`epistemological break' between different periods of his work, and 
substantially the same concerns are apparent as far back as Culture and 
Society, in which he recognizes a certain cautiousness in Marx's formulation: 
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We have Marx's word that changes in the [superstructure] are 
necessarily subject to a different and less precise mode of 
investigation. The point is reinforced by the verbal qualifications of his 
text: 'determines the general character'. 22 
That `general' is crucial as a pointer to the fact that, while the economic base 
may be determining in the last instance, there is no simple correspondence 
between the two. There is not, in other words, the universalizing sense 
inherent in the phrase `social being determines consciousness'. The possibility 
of some form of dialectical relationship is already inherent in the 
base/superstructure model. Yet, even in the second formulation, it is apparent 
that the relationship is less straightforward than it first seems, since 
`consciousness' effectively appears in both parts, and this is central to E. P. 
Thompson's quarrel with Althusser: 
What Althusser overlooks is the dialogue between social being and 
social consciousness. Obviously, this dialogue goes in both directions. 
[... ] Obviously, consciousness, whether as unselfconscious culture, or 
as myth, or as science, or law, or articulated ideology, thrusts back 
into being in its turn, as being is thought so thought also is lived. 23 
Thompson, like Williams, prefers to use the social 
being/consciousness model in his work. Williams opens up his critique by 
pointing out the regular qualifications and amendments necessary in the 
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definition of superstructure since Marx's original formulation. Interestingly, 
he notes that `qualifications were made' even in the later writings of Marx 
and Engels, but does not consider them here (Problems, p. 32). He does 
though list the main shifts in the concept: time lags, reflection, mediation, 
allowing certain activities a greater distance, and therefore less obvious 
relationship with the economic base (philosophy for instance), and finally the 
idea of `homologous structures' (a `correspondence of structures' open to 
analysis) (Problems, pp. 32-33). Williams points out that generations of 
theorists have gone to great lengths to refine the model, which (for him) 
remains structurally flawed. He is certainly right to highlight these efforts, and 
to be cautious of embracing a theory which seems so resistant to definition. 
Take the idea that certain cultural forms seem to possess a `relative 
autonomy', allowing them to transcend their historical moment. This has 
always been a problem for Marxists, not helped by Marx's consideration of 
Greek art in the Grundrisse: 
In the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their 
flowering are out of all proportion to the general development of 
society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as 
it were, of its organization. 24 
Marx then uses the example of Greek art to question the idea of relative 
autonomy: 
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The difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are 
bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is 
that they still afford us artistic pleasure and that in a certain respect 
they count as a norm and as an unattainable model. 25 
Marx's answer to these difficulties is to argue that Greek art gives back to us 
the joy of childhood, arising as it does in `the historic childhood of humanity': 
The charm of their art for us is not in contradiction to the 
undeveloped stage of society on which it grew. [It] is its result, rather, 
and is inextricably bound up, rather, with the fact that the unripe social 
conditions under which it arose, and could alone arise, can never 
return. 26 
In 1976, Eagleton had argued in favour of Marx's analysis because `the 
Greeks [... ] were able to produce major art not in spite of but because of the 
undeveloped state of their society': they inhabited a time when there was still 
a measure of harmony between man and Nature. 27 A year later, Williams is 
less impressed, commenting only that `[Marx's] solution to the problem he 
then discusses, that of Greek art, is hardly convincing'28 (although he 
recognises also in Marx's analysis a suggestion that the relationship - between 
art and society, is far from a simple determinate one). Despite this negative 
reaction, elsewhere Williams has himself considered the problem of relative 
autonomy, and even offered some solutions. One possibility, the subject of 
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earlier discussion, is that certain forms of art are endowed with a `biological 
constant' or `structure of feeling' which somehow escapes ideology in its 
transfer through history. Another idea, closely linked to certain reception 
theories, is that each `re-introduction' of a work counts as a new production: 
We do not now read Shakespeare, we read editions of Shakespeare 
and this is not just in the technical sense of when the pages were 
printed, but in a very much more substantial sense of the reproduction 
of the text in a quite different culture. I would certainly regard the 
conditions of production of a classic author who is continually re- 
introduced and widely read in every period as including that process 
of re-introduction. [... ] The conditions of production thus always 
include the conditions of making a text contemporary. 30 
I will return to this idea later, when discussing Marxism as a philosophy of 
internal relations, in contradiction to the necessarily `external' nature of the 
base/superstructure opposition. For now, it is worth noting that Williams's 
thoughts on the relationship between the originating production of a work of 
art, and its re-introduction into contemporary society helps to emphasize that 
more is needed in understanding the relationship of art to history than only 
measuring its relevance to the contemporary, since that particular society is 
itself the product of a history - which includes the history of aesthetic 
production. 31 
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If Williams has put forward possibilities for redefining the 
superstructure, it is also true that he believes too much time has been spent on 
it, leaving the base to fend for itself He argues that `the base is the more 
important concept to look at if we are to understand the realities of cultural 
process'. Referring to Marx's own formulation, and later interpretations, he 
argues that the base has tended to be objectified: as `the real social existence 
of men', or `the real relations of production corresponding to a stage of 
development of the material productive forces', or `a mode of production at a 
particular stage of its development' (Problems, p. 33). Both here, and in the 
corresponding chapter in Marxism and Literature (pp. 81-82), Williams 
emphasizes the very `static' versions of base put forward, missing as they do 
Marx's own stress on productive activities. Similarly, his well known 
sensitivity to semantic shifts makes him uneasy about the uncritical 
understanding of determination in the model, and he therefore offers 
revaluations of all the key terms: 
We have to revalue `determination' towards the setting of limits and 
the exertion of pressure, and away from a predicted, prefigured and 
controlled content. We have to revalue `superstructure' towards a 
related range of cultural practices, and away from a reflected, 
reproduced or specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we have 
to revalue `the base' away from the notion of a fixed economic or 
technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in 
real social and economic relationships, containing fundamental 
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contradictions and variations and therefore always in a state of 
dynamic process (Problems, p. 34). 
There is always the risk of revaluing the terms until they bear little relation to 
classical Marxism, and it is here that Eagleton takes issue with Williams. 
Using his redefinition of base allows Williams to include within it cultural 
processes previously located in the superstructure, which he considers to be 
`secondary': 
If we have the broad sense of productive forces, we look at the whole 
question of the base differently, and we are then less tempted to 
dismiss as merely secondary, certain vital productive social forces, 
which are in the broad sense, from the beginning, basic (Problems, p. 
35, emphasis added). 
It is that `merely secondary' which will worry Eagleton, as I will show. 
Williams's reservations come out of his reading of Lukäcs, and particularly 
the Lukäcs of History and Class Consciousness, in which he privileges a 
Marxist theory based on `totalities' rather than base and superstructure: 
It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that 
constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois 
thought, but the point of view of totality. The category of totality, the 
all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of 
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the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly 
transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science. [... ] Action, 
praxis - which Marx demanded before all else in his Theses on 
Feuerbach - is in essence the penetration and transformation of 
reality. But reality can only be understood and penetrated as a totality, 
and only a subject which is itself a totality is capable of this 
penetration. 32 
As a `reformed' Lukäcsian, Williams takes from Lukäcs a theory of totalities, 
and refines it by including the notion of `intention', as embodied in a 
Gramscian hegemony, which for Williams leaves intact an idea of 
determination. Williams argues that `the language of totality has become 
common, and [... ] is indeed in many ways more acceptable than the notion of 
base and superstructure' (Problems, pp. 35-36), but recognises also that this 
relational model of interacting social practices can lead to a complete 
rejection of any notion of determinacy (too much Hegel and not enough 
Marx). Thus, he offers Gramscian hegemony, which reinserts into the 
Lukc csian model a sense of determination. Reactions to this amendment are 
not all negative: Alan O'Connor writes that `the fundamental strategy of 
"Base and superstructure" is to deconstruct a category which had been 
treated as an absolute: the Marxist category of the "base"'. Suddenly, 
Williams is portrayed as joining ranks with the anti-metaphysicians against 
Eagleton's cherished concepts. 33 But by `materializing' cultural processes, 
Williams drains off the superstructure, leaving it with at best a realm of 
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immaterial consciousness. Further, as Eagleton notes, Williams's version of 
determination is actually equated with the power of a ruling class, and relies 
on domination. His `intentions' are those of a `particular class' (Problems, p. 
36). Eagleton's contention is not that we cannot recognize a power 
relationship working in one direction, but that taking this as the fundamental 
definition of society places too great a strain on individual persons to regulate 
the system, rather than the workings of capitalism underlying the traditional 
formulation. This is not to argue that Williams is blind to the weight placed on 
a few to regulate the whole system in their favour. Indeed it is because of this 
difficulty that he offers hegemony, rather than ideology, as a regulating 
device. Further, contra Eagleton, for Williams it is the necessity for ideology 
to be imposed which is its main weakness: 
If what we learn there [in the institutions of education, the family etc. ] 
were merely an imposed ideology, or if it were only the isolable 
meanings and practices of the ruling class, or of a section of the ruling 
class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely the top of our 
minds, it would be - and one would be glad -a very much easier thing 
to overthrow (Problems, p. 39). 
Those two `merely's and one `only' suggest a curious blind-spot in Williams's 
formulation. His downgrading of ideology misses out on Marx's own very 
specific conceptual focus, which emphasizes the `double inversion' nature of 
ideology: there is an inversion/occlusion at the level of thought/representation 
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that is produced by an inversion at the level of practice. Jorge Larrain has 
argued that this idea of a `double inversion' in consciousness and reality is a 
consistent feature of Marx's theory, `although in the end it is made more 
complex by distinguishing a double aspect of reality in the capitalist mode of 
production'. 34 It is this further complexity, the relationship between `market 
forces' and the relations of production, which effectively allows social life to 
be `explained' using the discourse of the market. " 
Such an omission in Williams's formulation, which leads him to reject 
the notion of ideology in `Base and Superstructure' and Marxism and 
Literature is all the more surprising given his allegiance to this more 
sophisticated understanding when he decides to put the theory to work (see, 
for example his own version of `Ideology Critique' in the `Penshurst' chapter, 
which relies particularly on an understanding of the Marxian problematic of 
occlusion and inversion). Here, he insists on reducing ideology to a form of 
`imposition', and it is against this `weak' sense of ideology that he offers his 
version of hegemony, a sort of `scientific' structure of feeling which 
permeates society. In Gramsci's original formulation, he differentiates 
between `domination' and `intellectual and moral leadership', and places the 
category of hegemony firmly in the latter, so that hegemony works not by 
coercion, but by consent, as an integral part of `civil society'. 36 In Williams's 
hands, it becomes a flexible tool of analysis which can allow for various 
apparently `rogue' elements, but Eagleton is surely right to indicate the 
`category mistake' Williams makes in replacing ideology with hegemony: 
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Hegemony [... ] can be differentiated into its various economic, 
political and ideological regions. It is not simply a `deeper' version of 
ideology, a more profoundly internalized, experientially pervasive 
diffusion of meanings, as Williams would seem to have it (RWCP, p. 
171). 
In other words, ideology and hegemony are not `alternatives', but, rather (and 
this is how Gramsci understood it) ideology is a necessary tool of hegemony. 
Eagleton sees Williams's `cultural materialism' as a way of completing 
Marx's challenge to an idealist philosophy, rather than being, as Williams has 
argued, a sub-category within historical materialism. Eagleton believes that 
Williams's version of determination is a distorted one, missing the key point 
for Marxism, that `in the production of human society some activities are 
more determining than others' (RWCP, p. 169). Williams's attempt to re- 
think the terms of a classical Marxism leads, argues Eagleton, to a `notable 
irony': 
The effect of Williams's increasing rapprochement with Marxism 
during the 1970s was not, paradoxically, to lead him closer to the 
basetsuperstructure model, but to lead him further away. Essentially 
Marxist concepts [... ] were transplanted into the cultural realm to 
`materialize' cultural processes, thus rendering them equivalent with 
other forms of materialist production, and so intensifying Williams's 
pre-Marxian `circularity' (RWCP, pp. 171-72, emphasis in original). 
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With this Eagletonian summary of what cultural materialism means to 
Williams, we have reached a defining moment in the thesis. Already in this 
chapter I have had to reconsider the `common-sense' meaning of history as 
change, in the light of Marx's writings and Eagleton's critique. Now, the 
word `material' and its derivatives must be given further scrutiny. 
Terry Eagleton's main criticism of Williams's cultural materialism is 
that Williams elides the distinction between `material' as `physical' and 
`material' as `determining'. If, as Eagleton emphasises, Williams's method 
materializes everything, the term itself is drained of force. For Williams, as 
Eagleton notes, the word `superstructure' is equated with a suggestion of 
something being less real than `an element of material production' (RWCP, p. 
168). But, again as Eagleton points out, this notion effectively turns the 
base/superstructure model into an ontological thesis, instead of insisting on its 
specificity as a question of determination. If `material', then, is not here a 
matter of `physicalism', but rather a materialism of practice, this still leaves 
open the possibility for two distinct ways of understanding `practice': either in 
a `technicist' sense (as in Althusser's structuralist Marxism)37, or in a more 
`relational' mode that stresses the internal relations between the agents of a 
practice and its relation to other practices. It is this second, `relational' model 
which I will want to investigate further later. It is possible, by thinking of 
`materialism' in this way, to take over Williams's `limits' and `pressures', to 
argue that the internal structure of one practice (cultural materialism perhaps) 
may be formed by the overriding setting of `limits' and exertion of `pressures' 
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of another set of practices (historical materialism), although such a 
reformulation would be different from Williams's own understanding of 
cultural materialism as a material practice within historical materialism. 38 
Williams's decision to privilege hegemony over ideology, stems at 
least partly from the historical confusion over just what ideology is. Like 
definitions of the superstructure, this term has gone through a chameleon-like 
array of guises going right back to Marx and Engels. Williams can hardly be 
blamed for treating the concept of ideology with suspicion. After all, Eagleton 
himself has taken a whole book to attempt a reasonable classification of the 
term, and yet concludes by still leaving open the possibility of alternative 
definitions. Williams's own sensitivity to change over time would allow him 
to accept Eagleton's historical analysis, but he would surely resist using 
`ideology' as a tool of analysis, given Eagleton's final attempt at definition: 
Very often, it refers to the ways in which signs, meanings and values 
help to reproduce a dominant social power; but it can also denote any 
significant conjuncture between discourse and political interests. [... ] 
My own view is that both of these senses of the term have their uses, 
but that a good deal of confusion has arisen from the failure to 
disentangle them. 39 
This attempt at something like a summary of the `definition' of ideology 
follows his long final chapter, where he tackles head on the relationship of 
`ideology' to `discourse', effectively expanding on some of the themes 
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tackled in the Williams essay. `Discourse and Ideology' takes on a whole raft 
of `anti-ideologists', from Barthes, Kristeva and the `Tel Quel' group, 
celebrating the ceaseless disruption of language, to Hindess and 
Hirst and 
Laclou and Mouffe, `post-Marxists' substituting poststructuralist theories of 
discourse and power for Marxist notions of alienation and 
ideology. 40 
Eagleton, acknowledging again that the Marxist theory of ideology, and base 
and superstructure, ignores at its peril these more recent theories of 
knowledge and interpretation, attempts in his Conclusion to summarise his 
own views on the continuing value of these notions, and, in so doing, is 
forced to adopt some of their ways of thinking about the world. If, as 
Eagleton seems to suggest in the quotation given above, his second definition 
is (ideologically) more neutral than the first, it is also much wider. But then, 
what sort of `political interest' is there which is not `ideological'? 
We seem to have something of an impasse here: Eagleton challenges 
Williams's use of hegemony because of its totalizing nature, but offers an 
equally amorphous ideology in its place, one which Williams doubts is up to 
the job of radical critique. 41 Instead of trying to mediate between the two, it 
may be more useful to respond to Eagleton's three definitions of the 
specificity of Marxism: material production as ultimately determining, the 
central importance of class struggle, and its revolutionary nature. By treating 
Williams as `bricoleur', we can see him using what comes to hand, and 
moulding it to a philosophy of praxis which can only be evaluated in terms of 
its success. Pechey views Williams's materializing of culture as a 
`prefigurative move, [... ] an ethico-political impulse of disalienation informing 
167 
all of his analysis and participating in a praxis of the future'. 42 What Williams 
offers us is a form of cultural revolution, a gradualist `long revolution' which 
accepts the paradox inherent in Marx's recognition that only a highly 
developed society was equipped to overthrow capitalism, and was also very 
unlikely to try. 
3. Engels and the Dialectic of Base/Superstructure 
It may be true, as Eagleton has pointed out, that much of Williams's 
problems with the concept stem from his over-attention to the `vulgar 
Marxist' Marx of The German Ideology, where the superstructure tends to be 
dematerialized (RWCP, p. 168). The restless historical search for an adequate 
reformulation of the base/superstructure opposition has been hindered by the 
frequent time delays in making the whole of Marx and Engels easily available. 
Hindered further, because A thusser, a major influence on Western Marxism 
in the early 1970s (not least on Eagleton), was extremely doubtful about the 
value of the late letters by Engels, in which the whole base/superstructure 
concept is effectively redefined. 43 
In `What is an Author? ', Michel Foucault privileges Marx and Freud 
as `founders of discursivity', whose work `made possible not only a certain 
number of analogies, but also (and equally important) a certain number of 
differences'; a `reexamination of Marx's [texts]', he argues, `would modify 
Marxism'. 44Carrying out such a reexamination, what is so striking about 
Marx's later work, and the letters of Marx and Engels, is the great flexibility 
of the concepts. More than that, any simple relationship between two separate 
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conceptual complexes: here base/superstructure, there social 
being/consciousness, is abandoned in favour of a synthesis. In The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, for instance, where the theory is put to work, 
`material foundations' and `social relations' are made equivalent. 4S Jorge 
Larrain has pointed out that, rather than worrying away at the differences 
between the pairs base/superstructure and consciousness/social being, it may 
be preferable to see the model as including both together. 46 
Reading the letters, what is first apparent is the insistence of Marx and 
Engels that the material base is determining: `men are not free to choose their 
productive forces - which are the basis of all their history'; `the material mode 
of existence is the "primum agens""; `the economic movement finally asserts 
itself'; `in the last instance production is the decisive factor'; from the 1840s 
to the 1890s the `basic' message remains the same. 47 It is this uni-directional 
model of the base which still holds sway in analyses of `classic' Marxism. 
This, too, which provoked Marx's outburst directed at the French `Marxists' 
of the 1870s: `All I know is that I am not a Marxist'. 4' Despite Marx's 
assertion that `every productive force is an acquired force, the product of 
former activity', nevertheless `the productive forces are [... ] the result of 
human energy'. 49 Human beings inherit a productive force always already in 
place, and in this sense are always determined by it, but once this happens 
there is a dialectical relationship between base and superstructure. As the first 
`informed' reader of Marx, Engels goes to great lengths to emphasize this 
two-way relationship, as in his famous letter to Bloch of September 1890: 
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According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately 
determining element in history is the production and reproduction of 
real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence 
if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the 
only determining one, he transforms the proposition into a 
meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. 5° 
Williams is critical of Engels's response because it fails to do what Williams 
wants, that is, to revise the definitions of `base' and `superstructure' and 
`materialize' culture. 51 But it does respond directly to those criticisms of the 
model which insist on assuming that Marx and Engels were ever wedded to a 
simple deterministic model which relegated some of the most important 
structures which categorize us as `social beings' to a `merely secondary' role, 
as Williams often appears to believe. Engels continually stresses the point 
that, for him, Marxism entails both the concept of an economic base which is 
determining in the last instance, and a superstructure which in its turn reacts 
back on that base. Adopting the discourse of deconstruction, we might 
reformulate the opposition, to the extent that the superstructure, as 
`supplement', completes a `lack' on the part of the base as signified. There is 
no `scandal' here for Eagleton, just as there was never any scandal for Levi- 
Strauss, except one of definition. Like the French `Marxists' of the nineteenth 
century, we can only be shocked at the potential for deconstruction of the 
base/superstructure opposition, if we do not recognize that it already carries 
within it the potential for self deconstruction, and that this is what makes it a 
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useful tool of analysis. For, without it, the possibility for revolution would be 
an impossible dream. At times, Engels can even be read as an ancestor of 
Derrida, as he berates his contemporaries for their ignorance of the subtleties 
of post-structuralism: 
What these gentlemen all lack is dialectics. They always see only here 
cause, there effect. That this is a hollow abstraction, that such 
metaphysical polar opposites exist in the real world only during crises, 
while the whole vast process goes on in the form of interaction - 
though of very unequal forces, the economic movement being by far 
the strongest, most primordial, most decisive - that here everything is 
relative and nothing absolute - this they never begin to see. 
52 
Three years later, in 1893, Engels writes to Mehring that `once an 
historic element has been brought into the world by other, ultimately 
economic causes, it reacts, can react on its environment and even on the 
causes that have given rise to it'. 33 It is this more complex understanding of 
the relationship between base and superstructure (and indeed to the relative 
relations between elements of the superstructure) to which I now want to 
turn. 
4. Relations of Production and the Role of the State 
Most of the criticisms of the base/superstructure model (whether 
originating from within a fundamentally Marxist discourse, or from some 
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alternative approach such as deconstruction) are directed at the notional 
inflexibility of the model, with its apparently rigid differentiation between the 
mode of production and the rest of `society', and a very deterministic one- 
way relationship between the two. I have tried to show how reductive this 
understanding of the position really is, but it is fair to add, that as a `model' of 
reality, it needs to retain some element of `rigidity' to be of any practical use 
at all. Any model which is over-deterministic is unlikely to be able to account 
for the real complexities of existence, and certainly would be incapable of 
accounting for alterations in the relations of production, such as the transition 
from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production, which is central to the 
debate in a later chapter. But there is undoubtedly something particularly 
unhelpful and alienating about the model as presented above, which seems 
just too abstract and removed from that other opposition in Marx's original 
formulation, which equates consciousness with social being, and therefore 
reinstates human activity at the centre of the debate. This `externality' in the 
model is one of the reasons why it so easily degenerates into a form of 
`economic determinism'. The problem, as Bertell Oilman has emphasized, is 
one of language and translation. 54 Unless we are sure what Marx means by 
`mode of production' or `determines', we are unlikely to derive much 
satisfaction from a model which appears, in its crudest interpretations to 
speak for all time and always with the same understanding of the 
relationships. As we have seen, and as Engels reminded his correspondents, 
these brief statements of theoretical position have to be read for their 
practical use (as Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire), but they have also 
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to be read in the light of the many amendments to Marx's opening position, 
some of which I have already indicated. Oilman gives the very useful example 
(from the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844) of Marx's claim 
that `religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc. are particular 
modes of production' (Oilman, p. 10), which would presumably find favour 
with Williams. But, helpful as this is as a counter to those more 
`fundamentalist' critics who refuse to allow for any complexity in the model, 
it still leaves us with a relatively static, and `external' sense of the 
relationship. Ollman's radical solution to this is to re-read Marx's theory as a 
theory of internal relations. " 
Arguing that the philosophy of internal relations is `a central facet of 
Hegel's and Marx's dialectic' (OWnan, p. 35), Oilman explains that, for 
Marx, `relation' does not (only) refer to a relationship between things (such as 
between base and superstructure), but has been `extended to cover what is 
related, so that either term may be taken to express both in their peculiar 
connection' (Oilman, p. 26), and he gives as an example his own immediate 
environment: 
[T]he book before me expresses and therefore, on this model, 
relationally contains everything from the fact that there is a light on in 
my room to the social practices and institutions of my society which 
made this particular work possible. The conditions of its existence are 
taken to be part of what it is, and indicated by the fact that it is just 
this and nothing else (Oilman, p. 27). 
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This fertile model is a long way from the crude fundamentalism of 
some understandings of the base/superstructure paradigm, but the problem 
with it is that it seems to deny the possibility for any notion of determination, 
thus draining the model of its historical specificity, and once again shifting the 
theoretical ground in favour of Hegel and away from Marx. Despite Ollman's 
insistence that there is no necessary conflict between a theory of internal 
relations and a desire to emphasize that certain social relations are more 
important than others (Oilman, p. 39), his discussion did not really indicate 
how such a balancing act could be achieved, and this lead to a number of 
specific criticisms of his work, to which he responded in later editions. 
Acknowledging that it is a valid question to ask of him: `how can any system 
based on the philosophy of internal relations single out any process or set of 
processes as "primary" or "ultimately determining"' (Oilman, p. 264), Oilman 
recognized that the danger with his formulation (or rather, with the 
formulation he attributes to Marx), is a draining out of the specificity of the 
opposition between base and superstructure (rather akin to Eagleton's claim 
that Williams drains off the superstructure by materializing cultural practices). 
Referring specifically to the `materialist conception of history', Oilman again 
maintains that `the mutual dependence of all elements in the world is 
conceived of in terms of a constant, multi-faceted interaction (Allman, pp. 
273-74), which does not seem to have got us very far. But he continues by 
arguing that: 
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This does not rule out causal relationships, where one element or 
structure or event is primarily responsible for a change in the form or 
function of others, but simply qualifies them. Whenever a causal claim 
is made, the interactive context limits the possibilities of what is being 
asserted and what, apparently, is being denied. [... ] The actual 
working through of the causal role of the mode of production in 
capitalism as through history, given the assumption of reciprocal 
effect, is the central concern of the materialist conception of history 
(Oilman, p. 274). 
What Ollman's theory of internal relations helps to do, as he himself 
emphasizes, is to remind us that all of these terms - `mode of production', 
`alienation', `base and superstructure', even `history' (so often offered in a 
guise which looks rather too much like the Hegelian `Idea'), are themselves 
`historical' and evolving. This reminder gives me the opportunity to offer a 
further refinement to the model, one which helps to emphasize the complex 
`internal relationships' between elements of the base and superstructure, and 
to indicate that an emphasis on `causal relationships' is not the same thing as 
a reliance on economic determinism. It also acts as some sort of positive 
response to Williams's sense of superstructural activity as `merely secondary'. 
In the chapter on `Penshurst', I will attempt to reveal the relationship 
between a particular form of cultural production (the `Country-House' 
poem), and the society out of which it may be said to have evolved. Since we 
are dealing there with a particularly complex set of relations of production 
175 
(towards the end of the transition from feudalism to capitalism), it would be 
expected that the function of this particular superstructural activity, what 
purpose it serves, how, if at all it functions to maintain existing relations, 
would itself be complex, and this indeed appears to be the case, as we shall 
see later. The suggestion, itself a product of a particularly reductionist 
understanding of ideology, that all those `ideological state apparatuses' 
(religion, education, law, culture, communications)S6 spring in some simple 
way out of the dominant mode of production, and then exist for all time doing 
their bit to shore it up, is confounded by the huge variety of which these 
structures are made up, and their evolving relationship to each other, and 
particularly to the `State' itself, which appears to inhabit some ambiguous 
region within base and superstructure. As Simon Clarke has argued, we 
cannot begin to fully understand `the development of the relations of 
production without seeing the state, and the exercise of state power, as 
having a central role in their defence and even in their definition. 57 We have 
returned here, effectively, to the theory of internal relations, since, as Philip 
Corrigan and others have shownSB : 
State-forms are related to the social relations and conditions of 
specific modes of production in their historical development. State- 
forms are not related contingently and accidentally, nor are they 
externally related [... j but, rather, internally" 
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As Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer emphasize, the development of civil society 
tends to go along with a shift in organizational functions from individual to 
State, but it is a mistake to think of the State either as secondary to 
production (that is `superstructural), or somehow `above' it. 6° Corrigan and 
his colleagues, relying on a Gramscian model of hegemony, argue for the 
State operating through `legitimacy' and the `active consent' of those `over 
whom it rules', but emphasize also that `legitimacy' and `active consent' are 
not `static or abstract'. 61 Further, to argue that the State's power is simply a 
matter of the operation of force or will (or a combination of the two) ignores 
Marx's own emphasis on the State as the creation of `actual, material 
relationships concerning property rights, the division of labour, the class 
structure and the relations of production'. 62 
This does not mean that we can safely think of the State as a sort of 
`neutral' region of influence which attempts to regulate activity to give an 
`average' effect across society, in a kind of super-utilitarian sharing out, 
because the categories Marx identifies - `property', `labour', `class' and the 
`relations of production', all tend to be skewed in one way, in favour of the 
dominant class interest, and history shows us that this is the general alignment 
of the `State' as well. Thus, as Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer comment: 
Who could be against better sanitation, public parks, libraries or 
galleries, and the wider provision of education? But these were never 
offered in vacuo as `social goods'; they were made available in 
specific social forms of State provision which, moreover, marginalized 
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and suppressed pre-existing class and other alternatives. Again, the 
means used to establish these social forms were acts of categorization 
and classification - the construction of that social vocabulary or 
`public languages', through which social experience is increasingly 
'articulated . 
63 
These examples, linked to the construction of a specific discourse, a 
`public language' which tends to occlude or marginalize other ways of 
thinking and behaving, is supported fictionally, as we have seen already, by 
the representation of `utilitarian' education in Hard Times, where the 
provision of a more universal system of education goes along with an 
emphasis on intense abstraction in English teaching, at the expense of other 
worldly epistemologies (Bitzer v. Sissy). The lack of an alternative, indeed, 
the impression that there is no alternative, helps to reinforce that hegemonic 
acceptance of a form of education which silently privileges forms of behaviour 
most in line with the dominant ideology. This attempt at universalization, 
which tends to offer a particular ideological construct as `natural', itself 
involves an often complex and contradictory set of cultural practices: Pierre 
Macherey and Etienne Balibar, applying Althusser's theory of ideological 
state apparatuses to literature, have noted how, in the French educational 
system, there is a contradiction in the teaching of a 'common language', such 
that effectively two versions of the same language are taught, in an attempt to 
reserve a particular site for `literary' activity. 64 
178 
These examples help to indicate some of the ways in which thinking of 
the base/superstructure paradigm in its `vulgar Marxist' formulation is 
completely inadequate to any actual social formation (particularly so, as I will 
show later to that form of `late' capitalism we now live under). But even this 
does not indicate how much the relationship can vary over time. Given that 
we accept the fundamentals of the Marxist model: that is, that the 
superstructures are determined (in the `first' instance), by the dominant mode 
of production, that is not at all the same thing as suggesting that they 
therefore function in support of that mode and help to reproduce it. First, any 
cursory look at particular superstructural activities shows clearly that certain 
`superstructural' practices (such as the legal system) are more likely to 
actively participate in reproduction of the dominant than others (abstract art, 
say). This is why some base/superstructure models want to allow varying 
levels of `relative autonomy' (although, even starting from something 
seemingly as `autonomous' as abstract art leads us quite easily into the 
institutionalization of art, via which we are taken back to the base and the 
extent to which art can be considered capable of resisting its own 
commodification). Second, even within one particular formation there are 
wide differences, both of determination and functionality. Despite evidence 
that the Country-House poem is not a simple reflection of a dominant set of 
relationships, it is unlikely to generate the satiric and de-mystifying strategies 
of stage drama. Within an evolving system of relations of production, there is 
likely to be a continual struggle by the dominant to maintain hegemony, partly 
through the superstructures, but always with the possibility that internal 
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contradictions will result in some of them turning from a functional to a 
distinctly dis-functional role. While it would be a mistake to assume that 
superstructural changes were responsible for the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, it is also true that specific activities helped to fuel the change. 
Thus, the production of a surplus population of under/un-employed 
intellectuals in the first few decades of the seventeenth century became an 
essential pre-condition for a culture of political and religious discontent which 
lead to the English Revolution. 65 The only way that a Marxist analysis can 
hope to reveal these complex relationships, and attempt to account for them, 
is by avoiding at all costs a sort of economic determinism which so easily 
follows a simplistic understanding of the base/superstructure paradigm. 
Williams, in an attempt to recognize this complexity, while refusing to 
abandon the notion of determinacy (as he had appeared to do in some of his 
earlier work)66, refines his cultural materialism by using the notion of 
dominant, residual and emergent formations. 
Responding to his Politics and Letters interviewers, Williams argues 
that he was always sensitive to the variability and `temporal unevenness' 
between and within different superstructures. 67 It is to try to account for this 
historical discrepancy that Williams invokes the vocabulary of dominant, 
residual and emergent formations. As I intend to deal with this aspect of 
Williams's cultural materialism in detail in a later chapter, I will merely 
summarise his ideas here: Williams identifies alternatives to the `dominant', 
which he categorizes in `Base and Superstructure' (and develops in Marxism 
and Literature) as `residual' - that is, practices, experiences etc. which are 
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lived, but reflect a formation pre-existing the dominant (certain religious 
practices would be an obvious example); and `emergent', that is new 
practices being created. Both of these have at least the potential for 
oppositional or at least alternative activity, although they are also both 
subject to possible incorporation by the dominant, particularly where 
perceived as a threat. 
This refined model, although immensely suggestive, still appears to fall 
short of the level of complexity that the theory of internal relations offers (for 
instance in the very difficult set of relations and negotiations between church 
and State, particularly in a country which has an hereditary monarch who is 
head of the `Church of England'). Williams actually appears to recognize this, 
arguing strongly in favour of an understanding of society which acknowledges 
the `inextricable interrelations between politics, art, economics [and] family 
organization', the `indissoluble elements of a continuous social-material 
process'. 68 The problem is, he again invokes a totalizing model which seems 
to exclude determination. Actually, contra the Politics and Letters 
interviewers, Williams's understanding of determination appears quite close 
to those more subtle reformulations of the model suggested by the work of 
Oilman and Corrigan. By reinterpreting Marx's `bat-like' language69 Williams 
can suggest for instance that the industrial revolution was a revolution `in the 
production of culture as much as an industrial revolution in the production of 
clothing', and that the steam press was as much a part of the industrial 
revolution as the steam jenny or the steam locomotive'. 70 What this occludes 
though (by thinking of `culture' as `cultural production') is the fact that 
181 
cultural practices changed, were `revolutionized', by changes in industrial 
production and not vice versa. 
In conclusion, I suppose what I would like to suggest is that, in a 
sense, Williams's analysis is not as far removed from Eagleton's `classical 
doctrine' as he suggests (RWCP, p. 166), but that it appears to be because of 
the language Williams uses, particularly in the `Base and Superstructure' 
essay. By categorizing superstructural activity as `merely secondary' (and 
hence ideology as inadequate), he appears to hold on to a `vulgar Marxist' 
model which relies heavily on a clear division between the base understood as 
a region of `fixed economic or technological abstraction' (Problems, p. 34) 
and an always merely dependent superstructure. In fact, as I have shown, this 
is a gross mis-reading of the actual relationship, as formulated by Marx and 
Engels, and understood by recent Marxist critics. Williams's reformulation of 
the model, as given above, still relies on the primacy of the `mode of 
production', but now defined in a more useful way than one which conflates 
`mode of production' with the `economic', instead of recognizing that the 
`economic' is merely a (very important) part of the larger structure. Far from 
simply collapsing the superstructure into the base, it suggests rather that by 
attempting to understand more fully just what the `economic' means, it is 
possible to hold on to the Marxist model (as a theory of internal relations), 
and continue to argue that `historical causation must be seen primarily in 
terms of production and changes in modes of production'71. 
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5 
The Critique of the Sign: Volosinov v Saussure 
`Monkey always tells the truth, ' Norman added. `But selectively. Precisely 
selected messages to precisely selected receivers'. 
How could she ever make him understand things? Couldn't he see that when 
people were really living together what passed between them was much more 
than the words? ' 
We have seen how Williams, in constructing the concept of cultural 
materialism, attempts to move beyond a version of `Left-Leavisism'; uses and 
rather abandons Lukäcsian totality and Gramscian hegemony; and ultimately 
feels able to re write the base/superstructure paradigm to materialize culture 
itself. This neglects the problem of language in Marxist discourse; and, in 
particular, a theorization of the relationship of language to literature and 
ideology. How, we may ask, can Williams refine the cultural materialist model 
to take account of the significant debates this century around the issue of 
language, and how will this feed into his model of literary and cultural 
analysis? Specifically, how does Williams deal with Ferdinand de Saussure's 
work on the sign? The answer, I want to argue, will bring along with it 
clarification of Williams's relationship to structuralism, including the work of 
the structuralist Marxists, particularly Louis Althusser. It should also open up 
the opportunity to question his often perceived `resistance to theory'; by 
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indicating how his early appropriation of the work of the `Bakhtin school'2 
allows his own theory of language to avoid the more reductive application of 
a structuralism which continued to take up a restricted version of Saussure's 
theories, long after various newer theories had begun to reconsider its 
implications. But it will also indicate how his determination to favour the 
`dialogic' model of the Bakhtin school leads to a surprising inability to 
confront the more radical implications of the Saussurean model as taken up by 
Derrida and his British adherents in the 1970s, including many names familiar 
to Williams from Cambridge (Stephen Heath, Colin MacCabe etc. ). This 
chapter concentrates on the language models of Saussure and particularly 
Volosinov, showing how Volosinov's reading of Saussure feeds into 
Williams's apparently idiosyncratic approach compared with many of his 
colleagues, and allows cultural materialism to embrace a specific 
understanding of the relationship between language and social being. 
1. Saussure's Synchronic System 
In 1963, Roland Barthes wrote: `watch who uses signifier and 
signified, synchronic and diachronic, and you will know whether the 
structuralist vision is constituted'. 3 The implication is clear enough: Barthes 
identifies the `structuralist activity' directly with Saussure's work on the sign. 
For Williams, this appropriation will be disastrous for theory. The reading of 
Saussure, concentrating almost exclusively on the binary opposition between 
signifier and signified, and on langue, the pre existing language system, rather 
than parole, its operation in practice, brackets out any historical sense of 
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language as active. He will argue that such a misrepresentation could have 
been avoided, had the significant contribution of the Bakhtin school not been 
lost from Western history for so many decades, since that work already (in 
the 1920s) offered a critique of Saussure, as well as identifying the flaws 
within a classical formalist approach. As I have already indicated though, 
Williams, like Volosinov, offers at best a partial reading of Saussure which 
itself distorts an understanding of the full implications of his research. We 
need, therefore, to untangle this complicated set of interconnected histories 
(Volosinov's, the formalists, the structuralists, and Williams's), in order fully 
to understand the approach adopted by Williams in his later work, as well as 
his mistrust of structuralism. 
In Politics and Letters, Williams makes it clear that his theory of 
language in Marxism and Literature is `pivotal' to the overall focus of the 
book's argument; and, further, that it developed out of `discussions with 
people [he was] close to about structuralist theories of language'. 4 In that 
earlier work, he starts by stressing what he sees as the `key moments [for 
Marxism] in the development of thinking about language, [... ] first, the 
emphasis on language as activity and, second, the emphasis on the history of 
language'. 5 "Activity' and `history': these two must bring along with them 
thoughts of Marx, and, indeed, the very opening of the chapter on language 
makes the Marxian claim that `a definition of language is always, implicitly or 
explicitly, a definition of human beings in the world' (M&L, p. 21). Marx's 
own specific comments on language are sparse enough, although, in The 
German Ideology, he does argue that `language is practical consciousness', 
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and, effectively repeating the claim that `social being determines 
consciousness', writes that `consciousness is [... ], from the very beginning a 
social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all'6 (and, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, this is the Marxian formulation Williams appears happier 
with). As Williams starts to investigate language, he adopts a position in line 
with Marx's belief in `Man' as a `species-being', a being aware not only of 
himself, but of his relationship to the rest of society.? In this, he therefore 
starts out from a position which will implicitly challenge the simple opposition 
between social and individual, langue and parole. ' This chapter, then, will 
attempt to tease out Williams's theory of language, by investigating the 
difference in approaches exemplified by Saussure and Volosinov (and later 
Bakhtin). 
The two quotations from Williams's novel Loyalties, which form the 
epigraph to this chapter, encapsulate some of the issues which will be central 
to the investigation into Saussure and Volosinov. The first takes as a given 
that it is possible to pass messages from A to B in a way which will ensure a 
perfect one-to-one correspondence; and it suggests further, that the medium 
in which the message is transferred is neutral as regards meaning, so that 
there can never be 'mis'-interpretation. The second, contrastingly, recognizes 
the inherently social aspect of communication and that what passes is always 
in various ways `much more than the words'. `Precisely selected messages' 
and `precisely selected receivers': these phrases presuppose a language 
system close to Saussure's `talking-head' model of communication given in 
the Course in General Linguistics. " The Course, based on lectures given 
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between 1907 and 1911, relies on an unproblematical notion of sound 
transmission and reception between `perfect' speakers and listeners. Any 
particular language is a `social institution', but one in various respects distinct 
from 'political, legal, etc. institutions' (Course, p. 15). In distinguishing 
between the language system (langue), and an individual speech act (parole), 
Saussure describes langue as the social side of language, and he opposes it to 
the individual, unsocial parole: `In separating language from speaking we are 
at the same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual, and (2) 
what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental' (Course, 
p. 13). He argues that the langue is a `well-defined object' that may be 
studied separately (Course, pp. 14-15). 
It is the homogeneous nature of the underlying language system, its 
stability, which makes it worthy of study. Langue represents a uniting of the 
speaking community, a shared system fully available and always in place. But, 
of course, none of this means Saussure is ignorant of the obvious fact that any 
language changes over time. Indeed, prior to his appointment to deliver the 
series of lectures which became the Course, he spent much of his life actively 
engaged in the study of historical linguistics. 10 Such diachronic shifts had been 
the object of consideration long before Saussure; but for Saussure, it tells us 
nothing about the underlying system. Therefore he argues in favour of a 
synchronic linguistics `concerned with the logical and psychological relations 
that bind together coexisting items and form a system, in the collective minds 
of speakers' (Course, pp. 99-100). 1 will have to return to this privileging of a 
synchronic approach later, as we see Volosinov start to challenge its validity 
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as a realistic method of analysis. For now, I will concentrate on Saussure's 
theorization of langue, to discover just what sort of `object' we are dealing 
with. This is significant, since it forms one important strand in Volosinov's 
(and therefore Williams's) critique of the Saussurean position. 
Saussure defines the linguistic sign as a link between a `concept and a 
sound image', a 'two-sided psychological entity' (Course, p. 66). He 
distinguishes therefore between the (then) current terminology, which called 
the sound pattern the 'sign', by offering a triadic definition: 
Sound pattern 'Signifier' 
>'Sign' 
Concept 'Signified" 
Saussure stresses the arbitrariness of the sign: there is no `natural' ('Adamic') 
relationship between signifier and signified, language is not a `nomenclature' 
(Course, pp. 65-7). But further, he insists on the arbitrariness of both the 
signifier and the signified. What generates meaning in the signifier, for 
instance, is not something which is pre-existing, but rather, a matter of how it 
is defined by its relationship to other signifiers around it. The language system 
is a `differential' system: 
Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find [... ] values emanating from 
the system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is 
understood that the concepts are purely differential. [... ] Their most 
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precise characteristic is in being what the others are not' (Course, p. 
117, emphasis in original). 
This relationship of negativity extends syntagmatically, along the signifying 
chain, and paradigmatically, from within the relevant paradigm class; and 
Saussure offers a proto-structuralist model, seeing relationships working 
within this syntagmatic / paradigmatic model, from the phonemic level, right 
up to the most complex combinatory forms allowed within any language. If, 
to quote Saussure, `although a difference generally implies positive terms 
between which the difference is set up, [... ] in language there are only 
differences, without positive terms (Course, p. 120, emphasis in original) 12, 
then we are investigating a form of relational identity, and it is therefore to the 
system which defines such relationships that the linguist must turn. Further, 
the `arbitrariness' of relationships is what allows for historical change, which 
has produced a myriad series of shifts in meanings across time. 
13 Synchronic 
analysis ignores these random alterations, to offer a study of langue at a 
particular time, even though Saussure recognizes that the concept of a 
synchronic `slice' through time ignores the permanently active nature of 
actual speech communities, in favour of an analysis which sees a generally 
stable community of language use at any one point of time. Thus, as Jonathan 
Culler has pointed out, despite the rather idiosyncratic organization of the 
Course, Saussure's argument about the arbitrariness of the sign leads 
inevitably to a concentration on langue instead of parole. '4 
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2. Volosinov's Dialogic Dialectic 
Saussure's argument in favour of the study of langue is powerful, and 
more subtle than some detractors have allowed, but it does open up 
difficulties, some of which are taken up by Volosinov in his critique. His 
criticism hinges on Saussure's location of the social aspect of language within 
langue, leaving parole as the space of individualization. For Volosinov, 
Saussure's linguistics represents the most striking form (c. 1929/30), of what 
Volosinov calls `abstract objectivism'. " He opposes abstract objectivism to 
its antithesis, `individualistic subjectivism', as the two predominant `trends of 
thought' in the philosophy of language, with Wilhelm von Humboldt as the 
foremost representative of the latter, and Saussure as representative of the 
former. Volosinov summarises the main characteristics of each as follows: 
Individualistic Subjectivism Abstract Objectivism 
1. Language is activity, an unceasing 1. Language is a stable, immutable system of 
process of creation (energeia) normatively identical linguistic forms which 
realized in individual speech acts. the individual consciousness finds ready-made 
and which is incontestable for that 
consciousness. 
2. The laws of language creativity are 2. The laws of language are the specifically 
the laws of individual psychology. linguistic laws of connection between 
linguistic signs within a given, closed 
linguistic system. These laws are objective with 
respect to any subjective consciousness. 
3. Creativity of language is meaningful 
creativity, analogous to creative art. 
3. Specifically linguistic connections have 
nothing in common with ideological values 
(artistic, cognitive or other). Language 
phenomena are not grounded in ideological 
motives. No connection of a kind natural and 
comprehensible to the consciousness or of an 
artistic kind obtains between the word and its 
meaning. 
4. Language as a ready-made product 
(ergon), as a stable system (lexicon, 
grammar, phonetics), is, so to speak, the 
inert crust, the hardened lava of 
4. Individual acts of speaking are, from the 
viewpoint of language, merely fortuitous 
refractions and variations or plain and simple 
distortions of normatively identical forms, but 
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language creativity, of which linguistics 
makes an abstract construct in the 
interests of the practical teaching of 
language as a ready-made instrument. 
precisely these acts of individual discourse 
explain the historical changeability of 
linguistic forms, a changeability that in itself, 
from the standpoint of the language system, is 
irrational and senseless. There is no 
connection, no sharing of motives, between the 
system of language and its history. They are 
alien to one another. 16 
I have given the two tables in full to show clearly how Volosinov sets up the 
`two trends' of thought as a pair of binary oppositions, his thesis and 
antithesis. Most relevant to the present discussion are those specific details 
assigned to abstract objectivism, in particular: language as a `stable, 
immutable system of normatively identical linguistic forms', the idea of a 
`closed linguistic system', and the relegation of speech acts to an area of 
irrationalism and irrelevance. Volosinov characterizes all this as a species of 
Cartesian rationalism, particularly in respect of its stress on `the idea of the 
conventionality, the arbitrariness of language'. 17 When Volosinov looks in 
detail at the Course, it is to the social nature of language that he gives his 
deepest consideration; and he exemplifies the split between individual and 
social as the `pseudos proton' [sic] of Saussure's thought: 
Let us underscore Saussure's main thesis: language stands in 
opposition to utterance in the same way as does that which is social 
to that which is individual. The utterance, therefore, is considered a 
thoroughly individual entity. This point, as we shall see later, contains 
the pseudos proton of Saussure's views and of the whole abstract 
objectivist trend. 18 
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For Volosinov, the problem with Saussure is fundamentally one of alignment: 
Saussure could have concentrated on the `historical' aspects of language, just 
as he could have chosen to concentrate on a linguistics of the utterance. For 
instance, in the Course, Saussure notes that it would be perfectly possible to 
construct a linguistics of language (i. e. of langue), and one of speech (parole) 
[Course, pp. 19-20]. Similarly, in a chapter on the `internal and external 
elements of a language' (pp. 20-23), he acknowledges the importance of 
`external' issues (the effect of demographic changes, and of political history 
for instance). '9 Effectively, the internal method is taken up not just because 
external features are `unsystematic', but because part of Saussure's project 
relies on a rejection of a traditional linguistics which concentrated solely on 
such externalities. Switching therefore to a systemic approach, he also rejects 
concentration on the individual speech act because of its lack of `collectivity'. 
Yes, there could be a linguistics of the individual speech act, but this could 
never be `linguistics proper', because there is nothing collective about speech: 
`its manifestations are individual and momentary' (Course, p. 19). 
Volosinov is wrong to accuse Saussure of completely rejecting a 
diachronic approach. In fact, Saussure characterizes synchronic and 
diachronic as the `two parts of linguistics' (Course, p. 99), and dedicates 
parts 2 and 3 of the work to investigations of each in turn. However, 
Volosinov is correct in recognizing in Saussure an assessment of the 
diachronic approach as irrational because unsystematic. Diachronic linguistics, 
argues Saussure, concerns itself with the study of `relations that bind together 
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successive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each 
other without forming a system' (Course, p. 100); and, in summarizing the 
differences between the two approaches later, he sees diachronic analysis as 
actually a series of synchronic slices at intervals over time, rather than being 
characterized by an historical logic or intelligibility (Course, p. 182). 
In effect, Volosinov's approach is to deconstruct the simple 
opposition between individualistic subjectivism and abstract objectivism. He 
wants neither simply to reject both approaches, nor come up with some 
simple mediation between them. If, as Volosinov states, language is a `purely 
historical phenomenon', then its analysis cannot be properly achieved by a 
Saussurean objectivism. Contrary to Saussure's representation of himself as 
advancing beyond a traditional linguistics, Volosinov stigmatizes his work as 
emanating from the same emphasis, a philological concentration on the `alien 
word', and the analyst's `outsider' relationship to his object of study. 20 The 
Saussurean system rejects the utterance as something individual and 
unsystematic, and this represents its `proton pseudos'. Contrastingly, the 
subjective approach embraces the speech act, but it `likewise defines this act 
as something individual and therefore endeavours to explain it in terms of the 
individual psychic life of the speaker'. Thus, it too in fact relies on the same 
`proton pseudos'. 21 For Volosinov, what is required is a dialectical synthesis 
of the two positions, which redefines the utterance as a `social phenomenon': 
[T]he truth is not to be found in the golden mean and is not a matter 
of compromise between thesis and antithesis, but lies over and beyond 
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them, constituting a negation of both thesis and antithesis alike, i. e., 
constituting a dialectical synthesis. [... ] [T]he speech act or, more 
accurately, its product - the utterance, cannot under any circumstances 
be considered an individual phenomenon in the precise meaning of the 
word and cannot be explained in terms of the psychological or 
psychophysiological conditions of the speaker. The utterance is a 
social phenomenon. 22 
It is worth noting, before moving on, that here, for the first time, Volosinov 
distinguishes between an individual speech act (equivalent to parole), and to 
what he calls here its `product' - the `utterance'. This will become significant, 
since it represents a transformation of the subjective, individualistic act, into 
something much more social in character. Utterance becomes, for Volosinov, 
a way of theorizing the activity of language as an interactive process in which 
`dialogue' always takes place. It is here, at the recognition of the utterance as 
a `dialogical' process, that Volosinov attempts to forge a very different 
linguistics from Saussure's, and its explication is critical, since the term, and 
its related `dialogism', have been so severely reduced and misinterpreted in 
relation not just to Volosinov's early work, but as it is used later by Bakhtin 
in his literary analysis. Volosinov's response to the thesis of individualistic 
subjectivism and the antithesis of abstract objectivism is to offer his own third 
tabulation, a dialectical/dialogical transformation of the pairs of binary 
opposites into the dialogical third term: 
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1. Language as a stable system of normatively identical forms is 
merely a scientific abstraction, productive only in connection with 
certain particular practical and theoretical goals. This abstraction is 
not adequate to the concrete reality of language. 
2. Language is a continuous generative process implemented in the 
social-verbal interaction of speakers. 
3. The laws of the generative process of language are not at all the 
laws of individual psychology, but neither can they be divorced 
from the activity of speakers. The laws of language generation are 
sociological laws. 
4. Linguistic creativity does not coincide with artistic creativity nor 
with any other type of specialized ideological creativity. But, at 
the same time, linguistic creativity cannot be understood apart 
from the ideological meanings and values that fill it. The 
generative process of language, as is true of any historical 
generative process, can be perceived as blind mechanical necessity, 
but it can also become `free necessity' once it has reached the 
position of a conscious and desired necessity. 
5. The structure of the utterance is a purely sociological structure. 
The utterance, as such, obtains between speakers. The individual 
speech act (in the strict sense of the word `individual') is 
contradictio in adjecto. ' 
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The relationship between Volosinov's `third term' and the first two can be 
given in schematic form as follows: 
1. Dialectical Synthesis ('DS') 1 `demotes' Abstract Objectivism 
(`AO') 1, giving it value only in a strictly regional sense, and with 
limited validity as a methodological abstraction. 
2. DS 2 takes over Individualistic Subjectivism ('IS') 1, but 
substitutes the `social-verbal intention of speakers' for `individual 
speech acts'. 
3. DS 3 rejects IS 2 and AO 2, arguing instead that `the laws of 
language generation are sociological laws'. 
4. DS 4 rejects IS 3 and AO 3. 
5. DS 5 accepts the `structuring' systemic emphasis of AO 4, but in 
relation to the `sociological structure' of the utterance rather than 
the underlying language system, which it redefines (rather like IS 4) 
as the determinate product of practice. 
I think the table is adequate as an indication that Volosinov offers a successful 
non-Hegelian exit from the binary that does not either simply cancel or 
preserve it, in other words the process of a materialist dialectic. 
3. Dialogism v Monologism 
Volosinov's first amendment to Saussure's analysis of language use, is 
to refine the `talking-heads' model, in which Saussure represents speech as an 
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unproblematical transference of a psychological concept, via a physiological 
process; a system which makes language itself transparent in the process 
(Course, pp. 11-12). Volosinov, rather like Roman Jakobson, sees the 
structure of the utterance as being determined by a complex set of competing 
functions, including the relative social position of the two parties, the context 
within which the discourse takes place, how it is transmitted, for what 
purpose etc. For Volosinov, `verbal interaction' is the basic reality of 
language24: 
The actual reality of language-speech is not the abstract system of 
linguistic forms, not the isolated monologic utterance, and not the 
psychophysiological act of its implementation, but the social event of 
verbal interaction implemented in an utterance or utterances. 25 
That use of the epithet `monologic' requires explanation, which will also 
confront some of the complexities in `dialogism'. In an earlier discussion, 
Volosinov has used the term `monologic utterance' to mean something 
finished, unable to change, `divorced from its verbal and actual context and 
standing open not to any possible sort of active response but to passive 
understanding'. 26 This idea is linked to Volosinov's criticism of traditional 
philology for its treatment of language as the `alien word', so that the 
philologists and linguists become the `decipherers' of alien `secret' scripts, 
priestly disseminators of the 'Logos". 27 But his use, in this criticism, of the 
difference between `dialogism' and `monologism' is both problematical, and 
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symptomatic of a certain looseness of definition, which will become even 
more evident in the later work of Bakhtin. There is no such thing, for 
Volosinov, as a purely monologic utterance, even when it appears to be used 
in opposition to dialogism, as its binary opposite. `Any monologic utterance', 
he writes, `is an inseverable element of verbal communication'. Although the 
philologist attempts to tear each 'monument' out of its 'real domain', treating 
it as if it were `a self-sufficient, isolated entity', in reality it `makes response 
to something and is calculated to be responded to in turn' (in other words, is 
part of a dialogical process). 28 What Volosinov is suggesting here, is that the 
term `monologic utterance' is merely a convenience, an artificial abstraction, 
which pretends that the utterance is drained of its dialogic `being' when it is 
removed from its linguistic domain, and can therefore become the simple 
object of individual philological enquiry. But if all utterances are actually 
dialogical, how useful is it as a term of analysis (more than being an 
interesting observation about the complexity of language)? In fact, as I have 
suggested, Volosinov actually uses the terminology in other ways. 
Specifically, he differentiates `monological' from `dialogical' utterances by 
arguing that they describe how language use is affected by power 
relationships. Briefly, his argument is that the dominant ideology attempts to 
restrict the possibility for language to be `multi-accentual', that is, to be able 
to be used by competing ideological positions. The dominant presents the sign 
as `naturalized', possessing a transcendent, eternal character which represses 
difference. " Thus the monologic is applied to the dominant, and opposed by 
the dialogic, represented later by Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque in 
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Rabelais. 3° Unfortunately, Bakhtin also uses the terms in his literary criticism, 
by invoking the rather simplistic notion of the novel as inherently `dialogical', 
as opposed to the `inferior' `monological' earlier literary genres, such as 
poetry or epic, which inevitably suppresses the original idea of all utterances 
as inherently dialogic. " 
If then, dialogism is an inherent feature of all language, every 
utterance, it is also important to note that Volosinov wants to consider, not 
the individual elements that make up an utterance, but the utterance in its 
entirety. A complete utterance may be as brief as a one-word warning, or as 
long as Crime and Punishment. What is important, for Volosinov, is the 
completeness of the utterance as the object of study. But even in its entirety, 
as word or book, it is not to be seen in isolation, but as part of a continuous 
stream of discourse, within which the individual utterance can have its 
boundaries defined. 32 The utterance is filled, not with meaning, but with 
meanings; this basic idea will underpin the work of the Bakhtin school right 
through to Bakhtin's own death in 1975. Dialogism represents a dialectical 
relationship between the word now, and the whole history of that word's use; 
as well as between each word and every other part of the utterance. Each 
utterance is inherently `new' and `used' at the same time. 
Despite some of the problems I have drawn attention to above, it is 
reasonable to suggest that Volosinov's dialogic language theory is both 
inventive and illuminating, and he supports his arguments with some striking 
examples of language activity. For instance, he gives an elegant example of 
the subtleties of dialogism, in recounting an anecdote given by Dostoevsky in 
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Diary of a Writer. Here, Volosinov is able to indicate how, even within a 
relatively small speech community, intonation can have radical effects of 
meaning. In this particular example (one, it has to be said, which looks very 
`literary'), Dostoevsky overhears a `conversation' between `six tipsy 
artisans', which consists in the repetition, six times, of a single `widely used 
obscenity' (unspecified). This repetitive, and minimalist debate, produces the 
following meanings: 
1. An utterly disdainful denial of some point recently in general contention. 
2. Doubt about the veracity of the first denial. 
3. As a form of pejorative abuse. 
4. Complaint about being interrupted. 
5. In the sense of discovery of something previously looked for. 
6. A warning that the shouting by (5) would lead to physical damage. 
Dostoevsky, summarizing the occasion, writes: `And so, without having 
uttered one other word, they repeated just this one, but obviously beloved, 
little word of theirs six times in a row, one after the other, and they 
understood each other perfectly'. 33 Volosinov uses the term `theme' here, to 
indicate a special property of the whole utterance: `the theme of an utterance 
[... ] is individual and unreproducible. [It] is the expression of the concrete, 
historical situation that engendered the utterance'. 34 Volosinov is suggesting 
that the sort of `performance' witnessed by Dostoevsky says something 
important about how language appears to escape the limits of its own 
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`system' in actual use. What he needs, in order further to understand this, and 
to differentiate properly between the different `performances' of the artisans, 
is a theory of speech acts (such as JL Austin's), which would for instance 
allow him to differentiate between locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts. 35 In Dostoevsky's example then, what is witnessed is a 
range of different speech acts or `performances', which nevertheless consist 
of a single word. In effect, that word is `accented' in a number of different 
ways which displays the (power) relationship existing between the six 
artisans. Bakhtin has also attempted to formulate a theory of `speech genres', 
which describes localised discursive practices with their own micro-rules of 
usage which are distinct from the wider `systemic' rules of language 
(grammar, syntax etc. ). 36 Here is how some of the ideas developed above 
transfer into Bakhtin's work on the novel: 
[T]here are no `neutral' words and forms - words and forms that can 
belong to `no-one'; language has been completely taken over, shot 
through with intentions and accents. For any individual consciousness 
living in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but 
rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have 
the `taste' of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular 
work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and 
hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has 
lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by 
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intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic) 
are inevitable in the word. 37 
Even right at the end of his life, Bakhtin maintained this position. Linguistics 
(as traditionally defined), can only deal with the relationship of sign to sign, 
not with the relationship of utterance to reality; what matters is the utterance, 
as a semantic whole; utterance never simply reflects an already given (passive 
representation of the system); words do not `belong' to any one person, who 
therefore (like Humpty Dumpty), maintains strict control over them: 
The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker. The author 
(speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener 
also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word 
before the author comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there 
are no words that belong to no one). The word is a drama in which 
three characters participate (it is not a duet but a trio). It is performed 
outside the author, and it cannot be introjected into the author. 38 
Bakhtin's `trans-linguistics', allows him to develop a theory of language 
which avoids the reductionism implicit in a more structural approach, and, at 
the same time therefore, opens up the opportunity for a version of literary 
analysis which goes beyond the formalist pursuit of `literariness'. Williams, 
writing from the perspective of one deeply committed to a radical challenge 
to the hegemony of `Literature', and (as will be developed later), deeply 
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sensitive to the commodification of telecommunications, the technology of 
language, looks to Volosinov and Bakhtin as the way to underpin his own 
cultural theory. 
4. Keywords and Crises 
In Williams's work in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the issue of 
language starts to be one of prime importance; and this places him squarely 
within a general critical development in Anglo-American criticism, where the 
dissemination of European theory, centred on versions of structuralism and 
poststructuralism, had begun to produce a series of critical (positive and 
negative) reactions. We may, in shorthand, sum up the position in the title of 
Williams's 1983 essay `Crisis in English Studies'. 39 That `crisis' is a crisis of 
definition: the definition of what counts as `English studies', and the problem 
in defining language itself. And it is a crisis in the more overt sense, of a clash 
between a traditional attitude to literary work, and the new `European' 
invasion of English, exemplified in the `MacCabe affair' in Cambridge, in 
January 1981. It is here that the issue of `language' impinges directly on 
Williams's activity as a Cambridge don; here too, in his support for MacCabe, 
we can witness not his `resistance' to theory (a common criticism) but, on the 
contrary, his deep awareness of `theory' in general, alongside his own 
commitment to a specific theoretical position, which swerves past the move 
into a structuralism founded on Saussure's theory of the sign, and points 
towards a more open form of cultural criticism, today perhaps the norm rather 
than the exception. However, as I suggested at the start of the chapter, 
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Williams's appropriation of VolosinovBakhtin rather than Saussure, will also 
result in his ignoring the more radical implications of Saussure's sign theory, 
just that aspect, indeed, so familiar at the time to colleagues like MacCabe. 
Williams may have missed out on the specifics of MacCabe's Marxist 
linguistics, but at least he seems to have been aware of MacCabe's work, 
which was not true of some of his colleagues. For it was MacCabe's 
insistence on the study of linguistics as a grounding for (but not substitute 
for) literary studies, together with his desire to open up the courses, allowing 
limited work on film and T. V., rather than his apparent adherence to 
structuralism (a severe distortion of his actual allegiance), which seems to 
have sparked off the `structuralist controversy' which ended with the 
Faculty's denial of tenure to MacCabe, and the removal of Williams (and 
interestingly, Frank Kermode), from the appointments committee. 4° Williams, 
entering the debate in The Guardian in January 1981, and following Fredric 
Jameson's advice (surely his too), to `always historicize', starts by describing 
a group of `youngish men' designing a course in Cambridge called 
`Literature, Life and Thought'. But these young men are not MacCabe, 
Stephen Heath and Co., not `a band of structuralists, semioticians [and] 
marxists', but an earlier group, who also had to face up to a language `crisis', 
names familiar from earlier chapters, `Richards, Empson, Leavis, Willey 
[and] Knights'. Now, once again, writes Williams: 
[R]ecognition [of the language crisis] coincided with the vigorous 
development of new kinds of work, notably the new school of mainly 
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Marxist historians of English culture and society, and the wide 
international development of new phases of Marxist thought, rejecting 
the older formula of `base and superstructure' and analysing, in 
diverse ways, the relations between literary forms - that neglected 
area, in its essential combination of aesthetic and historical practice - 
and social traditions and formations. 4' 
`Crisis in English Studies' picks up on some of these issues, and 
continues the debate begun earlier in Marxism and Literature and the first 
edition of Keywords. Keywords is, in many ways, an exemplary version of a 
desire on Williams's part to concentrate on historical analysis rather than 
engage in a synchronic, system-based debate on language. But it is much 
more than that, more that is than a sort of cultural O. E. D., although in many 
ways it is that too. More too, than a late appendix to Culture and Society, 
although, as the subtitle suggests, it is a vocabulary to culture and society. 
More, because it concentrates not only on its manifestly abecedarian 
investigation into Williams's personal selection of `difficult' words, but 
because it is an open text. Keywords relies for its power on Williams's ability 
to see important connections between his keywords, without organizing them 
into a formal `generic' structure, which would itself restrict the opportunity to 
forge new connections. Keywords, as a vocabulary, tries to go beyond the 
constraints of works such as the O. E. D. (Williams of course recognizes its 
great contribution nevertheless), which, because of their volume, restrict the 
opportunity for frequent updating; so that, despite the O. E. D. 's concentration 
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on semantic shift, it has to offer `today's' definition, which tends to be reified. 
Keywords, argues Williams, almost cries out for response and amendment. It 
ends with blank pages `as a sign that the inquiry remains open', because `in 
the use of our common language, in so important an area, this is the only 
spirit in which this work can be properly done'. 42 
In the Introduction to Keywords, Williams addresses some of the 
issues that formed the `crisis' of 1981, once again stressing how important he 
sees the recent work within semiotics and linguistics, but confirming also that 
his own work is in some sense oppositional to this dominant trend. Stressing 
that `the most active problems of meaning are always primarily embedded in 
actual relationships', he goes on to indicate his dependence on a form of 
`historical semantics', which pays attention not just to the past, or the present, 
but rather to a continuing social process, and further, to an activity which is 
deeply engaged with relationships of continuity and discontinuity. 43 Most 
importantly, Williams rejects any idea of offering this study as the resolution 
over class disputes, as if any politically incorrect `faults' in the individual 
words can be amended to rectify society in some simple way. But that does 
not mean the study cannot be useful to a radical politics, which is why he is so 
keen to stress the very ideological nature of the entries: 
What can really be contributed is not resolution but perhaps, at times, 
just that extra edge of consciousness. In a social history in which 
many crucial meanings have been shaped by a dominant class, and by 
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particular professions operating to a large extent within its terms, the 
sense of edge is accurate. 44 
Williams sees the struggle for hegemony over language as an ongoing 
process, within which human beings make their own history. It is worth 
quoting in full an unusually intricate, and sinewy sentence which presses the 
point: 
[Keywords] is an exploration of the vocabulary of a crucial area of 
social and cultural discussion, which has been inherited within precise 
historical and social conditions and which has to be made at once 
conscious and critical - subject to change as well as to continuity - if 
the millions of people in whom it is active are to see it as active: not a 
tradition to be learned, nor a consensus to be accepted, nor a set of 
meanings which, because it is `our language', has a natural authority; 
but as a shaping and reshaping, in real circumstances and from 
profoundly different and important points of view: a vocabulary to 
use, to find our ways in, to change as we find it necessary to change it, 
as we go on making our own language and history. 45 
Nothing in Keywords makes reference to any specific theoretical position 
underlying the argument; although, in passages such as the above, and 
comments such as `verbal interaction is the basic reality of language', there is 
an indication that what is being relied upon is a Bakhtinian translinguistics, 
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rather than a Saussurean structural linguistics. And, in his response to 
questions in Politics and Letters on Keywords, he argues that the work there 
was produced in opposition both to the structuralist emphasis on language as 
the creation of arbitrary signs, and Leavis's insistence on a single heritage of 
meanings. 4' The influence is made explicit in `Crisis in English Studies' and 
Marxism and Literature, in both of which he opts for the approach of the 
Bakhtin school. 
`Crisis' develops its argument around considerations of literariness: 
Leavisite `moral and cultural discrimination', `committed' versus 
`uncommitted' social realism, literariness as a question of formal devices, etc. 
Marxism and Literature (understandably in a chapter called `Language'), 
offers instead a history of the conceptualization of language, from Plato to the 
present (`Literature' is the following chapter). In both cases, there is a very 
explicit concern with the relationship of language to consciousness and 
therefore social being. Indeed, Williams summarizes the entire history of 
language theory as an investigation into the relationship between language 
and reality. The debate, which in Marxism and Literature includes an 
extensive analysis of the problems Williams sees in Saussure's position, 
hinges on Williams's attempt to carve out a theoretical space where his 
conception of cultural materialism, which wants to redefine determination so 
that it embraces the positive idea of exerting pressure, as well as the negative 
one of setting limits (M&L, p. 87), can embrace a concept of language which 
avoids its `dematerialization' as purely superstructural (given Williams's 
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problematic assumption that the concept `superstructures' implies not 
`material' because functional and determined). 
Like Volosinov, Williams describes Saussure's linguistics as a type of 
objectivist sociology, founded on work on `specific past texts: finished 
monologic utterances' (M&L, p. 27, emphasis added). He sees the distinction 
between langue and parole as representing the bourgeois separation between 
society and the individual; and links this directly with the problems he senses 
between this structural linguistics, and the structural Marxism of Althusser 
and others from the middle of the twentieth century; in which history is 
radically excluded. `[H]istory', he writes, `in its most specific, active, and 
connecting senses, has disappeared (in one tendency has been theoretically 
excluded) from this account of so central a social activity as language' (M&L, 
p. 28). In Politics and Letters, he is challenged on this position, linked as it is 
to the concept of the arbitrariness of the sign. His interlocutors argue that the 
opposition between individual and society is fundamentally different from that 
between langue and parole. The first pair `coexist on the same plane - most 
typically, society provides the constraints in which the individual operates', 
whereas langue and parole are genuinely oppositional, because `langue is 
never realized - only parole is present', and therefore, `it is because there 
is 
langue that parole is communication'. 47 Once again, in his response to this 
reading, Williams emphasizes that what is at fault for him in the longue / 
parole opposition, is its hierarchical ordering, wherein parole is always 
determined by the pre-existing system (determined in the last instance, he 
might have said). Williams, like Volosinov, recognizes that in one sense there 
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has to be a system in place: without it, communication would be impossible. 
But what this leaves out is the acknowledgment that `systematic organization 
remains the social creation of real people in real relationships'. Further, he 
resists the charge that this merely makes the obvious point that languages 
have developed over time, by emphasizing that `the systematic character of 
language itself is the result, the always changing result, of the activities of real 
people in social relationships, including individuals not simply as products of 
the society but in a precise dialectical relation both producing and being 
produced by it'. 48 
S. Lacking positive terms: Saussure, differance and further crises 
It remains to see just how Williams adapts Volosinov's work to his 
own formulation of cultural materialism. In `Crisis', he argues strongly that 
the pioneering work in the U. S. A. and France in the 1950s and 60s was based 
primarily on the early formalists, rather than the more historically oriented 
work of the Bakhtin school. Whereas the early formalists searched for 
`literariness' within the work itself, Bakhtin and his colleagues opted for a 
theory which emphasized the open nature of production, and hence redefined 
the concept of the literary away from reification: 
The work of Bakhtin himself, especially in his study of Rabelais, had 
indicated the beginning of a certain new kind of literariness - and thus 
an historical literariness - by observing the interaction and the creative 
surpassing both of modes of folk literature, which had traditionally 
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been present, and of the polite literature which had come down within 
a more limited and conservative social tradition. It was precisely in the 
interaction of those received and different traditions that a new 
indication of what it was to be literary was formed. 49 
In Marxism and Literature, this analysis is extended. Here he writes of 
Volosinov's `usable sign', language as a multi-accentual dynamic fusion 
between `formal element' and `meaning'; which `is capable of modification 
and development', and which synchronic analysis `ignore[s] or reduce[s] to a 
secondary or accidental character' (M&L, p. 39). Even when not referring 
specifically to Volosinov, Williams adopts his terminology, describing the 
activity of traditional philology as the study of the `alien written word', a 
concentration on `finished monologic utterances' (M&L, pp. 26-27). Williams 
praises Volosinov for his distinction between the fixed `signal', and the active, 
historical `sign'. The mobile sign helps to deconstruct the opposition between 
individual and society by allowing both manifestly social interaction, and a 
form of internal, personal consciousness (M&L, p. 40). Thinking not just of 
Volosinov's work, but also of the explorations of Vygotsky, he argues that 
`we can add to the necessary definition of the biological faculty of language as 
constitutive an equally necessary definition of language development - at once 
individual and social - as historically and socially constituting (M&L, p. 43, 
emphasis in original). Williams extends this into understanding language in 
dialectical terms, and suggests that it will allow him later to offer a new 
understanding of `literature', in the process once again resisting the 
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base/superstructure model for what he sees as the `secondary' nature of 
superstructural activity: 
What we can then define is a dialectical process: the changing 
practical consciousness of human beings, in which both the 
evolutionary and the historical processes can be given full weight, but 
also within which they can be distinguished, in the complex variations 
of actual language use. It is from this theoretical foundation that we 
can go on to distinguish `literature', in a specific socio-historical 
development of writing, from the abstract retrospective concept, so 
common in orthodox Marxism, which reduces it, like language itself, 
to a function and then a (superstructural) by-product of collective 
labour (M&L, pp. 43-44). 
Inevitably though, all this is tempered somewhat by Volosinov's 
emphasis on the sign, the isolation of which is bound, ultimately, to be related 
in some way to a system, which will be `at best an analytical procedure, at 
worst an evasion' (M&L, p. 42). Surprisingly though, Williams's slight 
reservation here does not allow him to question in more detail Volosinov's 
arguments, and, in particular, to show how Volosinov's critique of Saussure's 
work itself ignores the radical implications of his `differential' system. Even 
when subject to his interviewers' questions in Politics and Letters, Williams 
restricts his comments on Saussure to the `ahistorical' distinction between 
langue and parole. S° He fails to confront the work of Derrida and others and 
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its relationship to Saussure, despite his own close involvement with MacCabe 
and those like him actively involved in the dissemination here of European 
theory in the early 1970s. 
What those theorists concentrate on (Derrida, Lacan, Barthes et al) is 
the implication of Saussure's argument, mentioned earlier, that `in language 
there are only differences without positive terms' (Course, p. 120, emphasis in 
original). As Derrida and others have noted, 5' any `system' without positive 
terms, is a very strange sort of system indeed, and its implications 
philosophically are enormous. In particular, it is a challenge to the 
`metaphysical' notion of `presence' (since this particular system appears to be 
only ever `absent'), and, even more significantly for the arguments of 
Volosinov and Williams, it emphasizes how meaning is the product of the 
syntagmatic relations between signifiers, no one of which is ever fully present 
to itself. In other words, Volosinov's insistence on a `contextual' analysis is 
at the expense of misunderstanding that Saussure's emphasis on the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic aspects of language indicates that he does not 
conceive of the signifying elements as a fixed `self-identical' form (as in the 
model of `abstract objectivism'). Further, the differential relationship of 
signifier to signifier stressed by Saussure allows Derrida to emphasize how 
Saussure's structure is a structure of `non-presence', of what he calls 
differance, whose `silent' a emphasizes the activity and passivity of `differing' 
and `deferring'. It is this sense, of meaning always being deferred, always 
differing from itself, this differance which will fuel Derrida's emphasis on 
difference as `play', Barthes'sjouissance, and Lacan's sliding of the signified 
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under the signifier. But as with Volosinov, this also undervalues Saussure's 
analysis. 
For Derrida, Saussure's (unrecognized) radical semiology represents 
nothing less than a deconstruction of the whole of Western metaphysics, and, 
as such demands more attention than Williams seems prepared to give it. If 
Williams had attempted a formal critique of Derrida's position, he would also 
have been able to identify a further move in Saussure (missing from Derrida's 
account), from `open' dfferance to a system of closure, generally ignored in 
the structuralist / poststructuralist accounts of Saussure. Saussure's just 
quoted comment on language as a system of differences without positive 
terms is given on the assumption that the signifier and signified are considered 
separately. In practice, as Saussure has already emphasized, the signifier and 
signified are always combined in the `sign', language is like a sheet of paper, 
with thought on one side and sound on the other (Course, p. 113). `When we 
consider the sign in its totality', he writes, `we have something that is positive 
in its own class. [... j Although both the signified and the signifier are purely 
differential and negative when considered separately, their combination is a 
positive fact' (Course, p. 120). It is this further amendment to Saussure's 
emphasis on difference and negativity which allows him to consider the sign 
itself as a positive term, and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the more 
`excessive' interpretations of Saussurian linguistics, which deny any stability 
of meaning (in the context of the relational system itself), rely on at best a 
partial reading of Saussure. This is true also of Derrida, whose work is 
conducted in terms of phonemic or morphemic `traces' rather than 
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Foucauldian `discursive events', even though he does not want to privilege 
absence over presence, but rather postulate his differance as a structure 
inconceivable within a system which opposes one to the other. 
Despite Williams's optimistic appraisal of Volosinov and the dialogic 
sign, its operation within cultural materialism must remain problematic. Much 
of Williams's later work takes up the sociological aspects of Volosinov's 
work, relating to language as a social activity, and the utterance as the real 
unit of human speech, without utilizing the developed literary discourse of 
the Bakhtin school: `heteroglossia', `dialogism', `multi-accentuality' and the 
rest. Thus, the later chapters in Marxism and Literature, where Williams puts 
his language theory to work on the category `literature', contains no mention 
of Bakhtin or Volosinov, even when he deals with a central Bakhtinian 
concern such as `genre'. Williams wants language, as a socio-cultural activity, 
to be the `social creation of meanings through the use of formal signs'. It 
must be a `practical material activity, [... ] literally, a means of production', 
but without the necessity to rely on some form of ultimate structural 
determination (M&L, p. 38). The argument in Marxism and Literature, relying 
on Volosinov's theories (refined somewhat by Vygotsky), cannot finally offer 
a secure base for Williams's concept of language, or its application to 
considerations of the aesthetic or `literariness'. 
Instead, he uses the work of Jan Mukarovsky, of the Prague school, 
which tries to redefine the `aesthetic' or the `literary' in terms of social 
`function' (M&L, pp. 152-54). Four years later, in his address to the 
Cambridge English faculty, Williams makes the claim, as ironic as it is 
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surprising, that `[c]ultural materialism is the analysis of all forms of 
signification, including quite centrally writing, within the actual means and 
conditions of their production!. 52 Cultural materialism, therefore, in its attitude 
to language, and, importantly to the paradigm `Literature', seeks, as does 
`radical semiotics', to `include the paradigm itself as a matter for analysis, 
rather than as a governing definition of the object of knowledge'. Indeed, 
Williams imagines a future where the then current practice of radical 
semiotics (presumably exemplified by the work of MacCabe), has become 
`fully historical', in which case it would be `very much the same thing as 
cultural materialism'. 53 He returns (briefly) to the work of Bakhtin (this time 
Bakhtin's study of Rabelais), arguing that Bakhtin helped to initiate an 
understanding of the category `literature' which went beyond the work of the 
early Russian formalists (Eichenbaum, Shklovsky etc. ), by positing the notion 
of an `historical literariness' 54. This work is then extended and radicalized by 
Mukarovsky, who redefines the aesthetic by suggesting that the aesthetic 
dimension (or `literariness') `is not even primarily produced within the work 
of art'. " Williams takes Mukarovsky's ideas into his `multiplicity of writing', 
arguing that `the aesthetic' has to be rejected `as a separate abstract 
dimension and as a separate abstract function' (M&L, p. 156). But this is not 
at all the same thing as suggesting that the `aesthetic' does not exist (as some 
postmodernists would like to suggest). Rather, it means that in all sorts of 
ways, notions of aesthetics or literariness have social meaning, but not that 
sense of `timelessness' or `transcendentalism' traditionally associated with 
them. This is devastating, and not just for cultural materialism. If this new 
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`cultural semiotics' is founded on a denial of the validity of the traditional 
categories of the `aesthetic', so that an aesthetic paradigm is no longer a 
suitable, canonical model against which standards of analysis can be 
measured, but rather an object to be tested itself (against what? ), then the 
work of (particularly) English departments needs to be redefined: this is the 
real `crisis in English studies', and will form the basis of a continuing and 
often acrimonious debate between `cultural materialists' and more 
`traditional' literary critics. Those differences will become more apparent in 
the next chapter, where I contrast some of these more `traditional' 
approaches to reading with Williams's own developed practice, and will form 
the basis of further discussion in the Conclusion, where I consider briefly 
more recent developments in the practice of cultural materialism since 
Williams's death in 1988. 
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6 
`All That Hospitalitie Doth Know': 
Literary Ideology in Penshurst 
A developed cultural materialism distinguishes itself from other ways 
of analysing culture (including cultural texts), by its insistence on recognising 
not just an historical dimension, but, more centrally, by paying serious 
attention to productive forces usually dismissed as irrelevant, except in 
Marxist criticism. The Country and the City, which Williams published in 
19731, can be seen to represent an interim statement of this fully-developed 
position. I want to demonstrate this by considering Williams's analysis of the 
`country-house' poetry of Ben Jonson and others (in particular Jonson's `To 
Penshurst'), showing how Williams's method differs from much of what has 
come before; but also comparing his work with some more recent 
approaches. In the final section of the chapter, I will try to develop the 
cultural materialist reading, to offer some further insights into the poetry. 
A `traditional' (Leavisian? ) reading of the poetry would have as one 
of its main aims a method of differentiating between the `literary' or 
`aesthetic' qualities of competing texts, or, more likely, different authors. The 
Williams of The Country and the City still thinks in this way - indeed, even 
later he is prepared to argue that `it is not difficult to distinguish between 
poems by Jonson and by Carew - the former are better written in a perfectly 
normal sense than the latter'. 2 This looks very like a sort of residual 
Leavisianism, but it also serves to remind us that the development of cultural 
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materialism does not necessarily include the abandonment of all of Leavis's 
ways of thinking. By arguing for the `normal sense' of his artistic judgement, 
Williams acknowledges that Carew is not as original or substantial a writer as 
Jonson, but does not also argue that his writing practice is `sloppy', or that he 
is an unpractised writer of verse. Effectively, Williams concurs with Leavis in 
Leavis's critical `shorthand', that it is reasonable as a working hypothesis to 
identify a `line of wit' emanating from Jonson (and Donne), as we saw in 
chapter two. Nevertheless, that `perfectly normal' also carries with it a 
suggestion that there is a consensus about `literariness', which one would 
expect cultural materialism to challenge. Despite this, the plan Williams 
followed in The Country and the City, the developing project of cultural 
materialism, can be differentiated from the sort of work he did in Reading and 
Criticism: 
My project, a very difficult one in which I am not sure I always 
succeeded, was quite different: it was to try to show simultaneously 
the literary conventions and the historical relations to which they were 
a response - to see together the means of the production [of the texts] 
and the conditions of the means of production. For the conditions of 
the means of production are quite crucial to any substantial 
understanding of the means of production themselves. 3 
I will investigate that project, both in its successes, and perceived 
weaknesses, as a method of identifying more closely just what constitutes the 
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practice of cultural materialism, its limits, and limitations. My main argument 
will be that Jonson's `To Penshurst' marks a peculiarly fertile, abundant, not 
to say overdetermined text, which needs to be examined in its fullest social, 
political and cultural formation, before proper recognition can be given to its 
significance. Further, none of the critics, Williams included, seems prepared to 
attempt anything like this totalizing perspective, in an attempt fully to 
appreciate just what ideological position(s) the poem helps to support or 
suppress (or even elaborate for the first time). As a first step, I will briefly 
introduce `To Penshurst' and the genre of country-house poetry, and then 
look at its critical reception before Williams went to work on it. 
1. Penshurst: Criticism before Williams 
As an identifiable genre, the country-house poem is predominantly a 
seventeenth-century phenomenon, although a recent anthology includes a few 
earlier examples. 4 The poems tend largely to be centred on the buildings of 
noblemen most involved in Court affairs under Elizabeth until her death in 
1603, and then James I; and distinguished from the generally less-ostentatious 
`piles' of the much more numerous `gentry'. Jonson's `To Penshurst' is 
somewhat atypical, in that the poem underplays the `ostentatious' aspects, 
stressing rather the house's modest aspect. 5 Ben Jonson wrote `To Penshurst' 
in homage to his patron Sir Robert Sidney, later Earl of Leicester. 
" Other 
country-house poems included in Fowler's anthology are `To Sir Robert 
Wroth', `The Praises of a Country Life' and `Lord Bacon's Birthday'. There 
are also examples from members of Jonson's `Tribe of Ben', and a number of 
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imitations and reworkings of Jonson. 7 Like `To Penshurst', Jonson's `To Sir 
Robert Wroth' was included in the 1616 folio of the poet's Works (as part of 
The Forest), and it too celebrates a member of Sidney's family, his son-in- 
law, married to his daughter, Mary. Indeed, Jonson wrote a number of poems 
in honour of the family, as well as dedicating plays like The Alchemist to 
them. 8 Penshurst had been the home of Robert's late brother, poet and author 
of the Arcadia, Sir Philip Sidney. The poem is addressed to the house, rather 
than directly to its owner, and includes within its content Jonson himself, and, 
towards the end, the king and his son, Prince Henry. I mention these specifics, 
because they will come to be of central importance in the cultural materialist 
reading, but not in some simplistic `Batesonian' contextual reading. Indeed, 
as we have already seen, such a method would be contrary to Williams's ideas 
about the relationship of texts to their history since the 1950s, although this 
will not stop recent critics like Thomas Marshall summarising the cultural 
materialist approach as merely one of mapping text onto suitable-looking 
context. 9 
Before Williams's work in The Country and the City, there was a 
general consensus about country-house poetry, and `To Penshurst' as a 
representative example. L. C. Knights's disconcerting certainty about the 
poem's message is typical: 
[B]ecause the great houses were an integral part of English rural life - 
not just holiday resorts for hunting and shooting - their owners were 
genuinely in touch with the activities and traditions of the countryside. 
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Ben Jonson was a shrewd and realistic observer of the life about him. 
[... ] [The poem offers] an idealized but not, I think, a misleading 
picture, and it gives a fair impression of what `housekeeping' meant 
for many great families of the time. It meant hospitality, and it meant 
sharing in the community life of the village in a fairly intimate fashion. 
It meant something altogether different from a condescending interest 
in `the villagers'. [... ] And since the country houses were still 
functional units in the rural economy of the time, I think they helped 
to foster that ultimate feeling for natural growth and the natural 
order. 10 
This short extract encapsulates much of the interest and difficulty of the 
poem, although none of it is a problem for Knights: what does it mean to say 
that the country-house owners were `genuinely in touch with the activities 
and traditions of the countryside'? How did they `share in the community life 
of the village in a fairly intimate fashion? In what sense were country houses 
`still functional units', and had that function changed, indeed, what were its 
`functions'? And finally (the relationship to my earlier discussion on Scrutiny 
is clear), just what is `natural growth' and `natural order'? Such questions 
would be reasonable ones to ask at any time; in the early years of the 
seventeenth century, only thirty years before the English Revolution, towards 
the end of a long `trarisitional' period between a feudalist and a capitalist 
mode of production (which needs further investigation), they become 
particularly significant, as we shall see. " 
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Another critic, Geoffrey Walton, goes beyond Knights to some extent, 
sensing in the poem a tension brought about by the shift from `older ideals of 
social justice and responsibility' towards a `nascent capitalism' despised by 
Jonson. 12 Nevertheless, Walton clearly shares Knights's view of country- 
house living in the early 1600s, arguing that Jonson `certainly wrote at a time 
when a highly cultivated society still kept in close contact with the community 
which supported it and still preserved traditions which encouraged it to 
maintain this kind of give and take, social, economic and cultural'. " Margaret 
Walters extends the analysis, recognizing the importance of Jonson's 
`persona' as a device within the poem, and also the very strong temptation to 
idealize a sort of Golden Age through the metaphor of the country house. '4 
Nevertheless, her critical rhetoric mirrors that of Knights and Walton when 
she recognizes `the expression of something in the nature of this civilization, 
at once close to the earth, yet profoundly ideal'. 15 Once again, what is seen is 
a `realistic' picture of rural harmony: a harmony which extends from the 
`friendliness of Nature' to `a sense of harmony and health in the whole rural 
community', in which `the country people freely and gladly bring gifts'. 
Relationships emphasize `rightness and naturalness' within a `way of life in 
which there is neither envy nor poverty, but where every station, King, 
Countryman, or Poet, takes its rightful place'. `Penshurst', writes Walters, `is 
built, not on oppression, but on love and a glad recognition of social 
responsibility'. 16 As before there is an insistence on a sense of order and 
rightfulness in the relative relations of the poem's characters. Part of the 
problem with this interpretation, I think, stems from a confusion between the 
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new `courtiers' like Robert Sidney (I consider this definition of Robert Sidney 
as a `new courtier' later in the analysis) and Saxham's Sir John Crofts; and 
the `country gentry' who kept themselves apart (or were forced to stay away 
from) court affairs, not opening their houses to royal visitations. " Walters 
argues that the country-house poets `share with Jonson the values of the 
conservative country gentry - opposed to the commercialities of Court and 
City, but firmly attached to King and Church'. 18 This could certainly represent 
a summary of the manifest message of `To Penshurst', but, as we shall see in 
more detail later, what it misses is the fact that Sidney, and for that matter 
Jonson, are just as much men of the Court as they are ostensibly attached to 
its opposite, which fact alone inevitably makes the poem a much more 
complex affair than it may at first appear. Some other problems, more directly 
related to Williams's own recurring concerns, may also now be obvious, in 
particular an over-confidence by these critics with the meaning of words like 
`nature', `natural', `culture', 'community' etc. which ignores their historicity. 
Words which have troubled and intrigued Williams throughout his career are 
here brought together in the complex relationship between `country', `city' 
and `community'. Indeed, in an appendix to The Country and the City, 
Williams teases out some of these movements, and finishes by arguing that the 
late sixteenth century was `the decisive period in the formation of the 
structure of meanings in the words which describe [his] main theme' (C&C, p. 
307). It is this, the relationship between representation and misrepresentation, 
which will form the basis of Raymond Williams's analysis of country-house 
poetry in The Country and the City. 
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2. The Country and the City 
Writing about his method in The Country and the City some years 
later, Williams distinguishes between what he describes as the `dominant 
literary paradigm' and its alternative, cultural materialism, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. The `dominant literary paradigm' would include much of 
Williams's work before The Country and the City, consisting for the most 
part of `work which may be approaching the analysis and judgement of 
literature with an exceptionally strong consciousness of the social 
determinants upon it, but in which `the centre of literary attention is still 
there, and the procedures are judgement, explanation, verification in terms of 
historical explanation, and so on'. '9 Williams insists that this `traditional' 
method is not the one used in The Country and the City: 
One work, however, of which this cannot be true is The Country and 
the City, [... ] because it sets out to identify certain characteristic forms 
of writing about the country and the city, and then insists on placing 
them not only in their historical background - which is within the 
paradigm - but within an active, conflicting historical process in which 
the very forms are created by social relations which are sometimes 
evident and sometimes occluded. 20 
Note in passing that by considering the `occlusion' of social relations, 
Williams is considering those relations as structurally necessary 
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misrepresentation, in other words he effectively adopts a Marxist theory of 
ideology, despite the rejection of `ideology' we saw in chapter four. This shift 
in critical understanding represents for Williams one symptom of the `crisis' in 
English studies, which has resulted in a rapid reorganization of the work of 
English departments, as well as the development of new departments 
dedicated to a range of cultural formations once disparaged as `merely 
popular'. The `very form' of The Country and the City includes within it an 
admission of Williams's own subjective position, a sense of `personal pressure 
and commitment' (C&C, p. 3). 
Before confronting the specific examples of the country-house poems, 
Williams tackles the issue of the `Golden Age', which appears to underpin the 
history of writing on rural issues. In a later chapter, I will have to confront 
criticism of Williams, accusing him of the occasional lapse into `village 
nostalgia' (a nostalgia suggested in the very opening of The Country and the 
City, in terms of his upbringing in the shadow of the Black Mountains, but 
then mediated by reflections on his alternative `city' life). Williams perceives 
within `country' literature a continuous lament for a better past - once again 
we are taken into the domain of George Sturt and the organic community as 
read by Leavis and Thompson in Culture and Environment. But as Williams 
thinks about these ideas something takes over: it is the image of an escalator 
taking him and his readers back in time. Within a few paragraphs we are 
guided through a condensed literary history: through Hardy and George Eliot; 
via Cobbett and Clare; stretching back through the centuries; back beyond 
Thomas More's Utopia (1516), and Langland's Piers Plowman (0370-85). 
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At each stage of this `nostalgic' trip into the past, the various writers sense 
their recent belatedness, the Golden Age has always just been left behind. 
From here, it is only a short excursion through the Domesday Book, the Celts 
etc., before we arrive (but do not necessarily end), at the Garden of Eden, the 
Bible offering then just one more `golden age', the ultimate Western, 
Christian, literary `version of pastoral' (C&C, pp. 9-12). And it is pastoral to 
which Williams then attends, offering a further historical analysis which seeks 
to challenge some received notions of the term. But not before he has 
recognized, in this brief, almost satiric account of the continuing yearning for 
a past golden age, that this too is a term which is historical: 
[W]hat seemed a single escalator, a perpetual recession into history, 
turns out, on reflection, to be a more complicated movement: Old 
England, settlement, the rural virtues - all these, in fact, mean different 
things at different times, and quite different values are being brought 
to question (C&C, p. 12). 
In the tradition of pastoral poetry, exemplified by, but not starting 
with, the writings of Virgil, the golden age is at once a memory and an 
expectation. For Williams, Virgil's work is characterized by a contrast 
between what he sees as Virgil's close attention to what is still a `working 
country life', and this idea of `a restoration, a second coming' (C&C, p. 17). 
The specific example Williams gives, from the fourth Eclogue, will find its 
echo in `To Penshurst': 
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Goats shall walk home, their udders taut with milk, and nobody 
Herding them; the ox will have no fear of the lion ... 
Then shall grapes hang wild and reddening on thorn trees 
And honey sweat like dew from the hard bark of oaks ... 
The soil will need no harrowing, the vine no pruning-knife 
And the tough plowman may at last unyoke his oxen (C&C, p. 18). 
This example is interesting for two reasons. The first is how such imagery 
finds its complement in the `neo-pastoral' of the country-house poems. Here 
we are offered a Utopian vision of the `second coming', a future `golden age' 
when the flora and fauna will reproduce for us by themselves the easy 
abundance of the Garden of Eden. But poems like `To Penshurst' celebrate 
the coming into existence of such a utopia, and they do it by employing very 
similar devices. Thus, in Aemilia Lanyer's `The Description of Cooke-Ham', 
we have lines like: `The trees with leaves, with fruits, with flowers clad / 
Embraced each other, seeming to be glad, / Turning themselves to beauteous 
canopies / To shade the bright sun from your brighter eyes' (lines 23-26). 
Carew does something similar in `To Saxham', utilising this time specific 
Biblical imagery to emphasize nature's willingness to give itself up to 
Saxham's use: 
The Pheasant, Partridge, and the Larke, 
Flew to thy house, as to the Arke. 
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The willing Oxe, of himselfe came 
Home to the slaughter, with the Lambe, 
And every beast did thither bring 
Himselfe, to be an offering. 
(lines 21-26) 
This message is also central to `To Penshurst', and now nature is shown as 
being in the same sort of relationship to the manor as the villagers are to its 
owner: 
The painted partrich lyes in every field, 
And, for thy messe, is willing to be kiff'd. 
And if the high-swolne Medway faile thy dish, 
Thou hast thy ponds, that pay thee tribute fish, 
Fat, aged carps, that runne into thy net. 
And pikes, now weary their own kinde to eat, 
As loth, the second draught, or cast to stay, 
Officiously, at first, themselves betray. 
Bright eeles, that emulate them, and leape on land, 
Before the fisher, or into his hand. 
(lines 29-38) 
Williams reads these lines as evocation of `what is now sometimes called a 
natural order, with metaphysical sanctions' (C&C, p. 29). This reminds us of 
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the criticism of Knights, Walton and Walters, but, as Williams stresses, it is a 
`natural order' which is really the result of applying a literary convention. We 
have seen this same convention used in Virgil's fourth Eclogue sixteen 
hundred years earlier, and Williams presses the point that `natural' can often 
look particularly `unnatural': `this natural order is simply and decisively on its 
way to table' (C&C, p. 30). 
This brings us to the second reason why considering the Virgil is 
useful as part of the analysis of the country-house poetry, since it is a 
reminder that there is a tendency within traditional literary criticism not just to 
canonize specific authors, but also to insist on the authority of particular 
conventions, selected versions of history which seek to exclude oppositional 
tendencies. The pastoral tradition, like all traditions, is selective21, and tends 
to turn away from materialist readings of cultural formations, in favour of the 
invented `golden age': 
We must not look, with Crabbe and others, at what the country was 
really like: that is a utilitarian or materialist, perhaps even a peasant 
response. Let us remember, instead, that [a particular] poem is based 
on Horace, Epode II or Virgil, Eclogue IV; that among the high far 
names are Theocritus and Hesiod: the Golden Age in another sense 
(C&C, p. 18). 
This additional perspective, that the golden age extends not just to a 
nostalgia for a perceived lost past, or expectation of perfection to come, but 
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crosses into the very formation of the canon itself, a literary golden age which 
will help to enshrine literature as a paradigm immune from question, will 
become important later in the analysis. For now, Williams extends his 
historical investigation of pastoral and its derivatives, via the poetry of the 
medieval period, into its transformation early in the seventeenth century into 
the `neo-pastoral' country-house poetry. 
Williams makes the point that we are dealing here not just with the 
`internal transformation' of a mode of writing, but with such a transformation 
`in the interest of a new kind of society: that of a developing agrarian 
capitalism' (C&C, p. 22). Typically, he offers this significant insight without 
bothering to develop it, or even support it with any evidence. I will want to 
argue later that most of the critics have failed to offer an adequate reading of 
the poetry partly because they have not paid enough (if any) attention to the 
relations of production within the `courtly' manors around 1600, for which 
(particularly in the case of Sidney's Penshurst) we have access to a 
considerable volume of historical evidence, from personal letters to estate 
accounts. By paying attention to this, and at the same time considering the 
work of Marxist historians on the `transition' from feudalism to capitalism, as 
well as more general studies on Elizabethan and Jacobean aristocratic families 
like the Sidneys, it will be possible to go `beyond' Williams and try to extend 
the cultural materialist reading. But, for now, I must attend more directly with 
Williams's own analysis, alongside some more contemporary readings. 
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3. Williams and Contemporary Criticism 
For Williams, poems such as `To Penshurst', `To Sir Robert Wroth' 
and `To Saxham', `use a particular version of country life as a way of 
expressing, in the form of a compliment to a house or its owner, certain social 
and moral values' (C&C, p. 27). As Williams analyses `To Penshurst' in 
detail, we are immediately forced to realize how complicit Knights and the 
other critics mentioned earlier were with the dominant ideology expressed in 
the poems. However, what also has to be acknowledged is that since 
Williams's work there has been a new batch of critical readings, partly 
influenced by him, but often taking issue with his views as they too offer 
versions of ideological critique. The critics, old and new, tend to focus on two 
main aspects of the poem: the relationship of the house (metonymically 
standing in for Robert Sidney) to the local people; and the abundance of 
nature, linked to an harmonious connection between that nature and the 
activity of the house. The first lines to elicit comment are these: 
And though thy walls be of the countrey stone, 
They are rear'd with no mans ruine, no mans gone, 
There's none, that dwell about them, wish them downe; 
But all come in, the farmer, and the clowne; 
(lines 45-48) 
Knights had read these lines as an example of Jonson's `shrewd and realistic' 
observation; Walton judges Penshurst as `an active centre of a patriarchal 
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community', yet one in which `all classes [... ] live in close personal contact'; 
in Margaret Walters' curious phrasing, the lines support `the beauty of a way 
of life in which there is neither envy nor poverty'. 22 Against these readings, 
Williams's response offers a sharp contrast. Accepting that Jonson's 
Penshurst, like Carew's Little Saxham (in which similar description is used), 
may be `lucky exceptions' from the norm (quite a concession in itself, and not 
necessarily supported from other evidence, as I shall show), nevertheless, 
even if `such houses and such men' existed, `they were at best the gentle 
exercise of a power that was elsewhere, on their own evidence, mean and 
brutal' (C&C, p. 29). 
Writing in 1993, Thomas Marshall's reaction to Williams's reading is 
itself astonishing: `Apparently, Williams reads this as a denial that anyone 
built Penshurst's walls, rather than an assertion about the nature of working 
relations on the estate'. ' Marshall offers this criticism without directly 
quoting Williams, but must presumably be thinking of the lines given above. It 
is obviously a wilful misreading of Williams: it may be a reasonable 
interpretation of the poem's manifest content to suggest that the poem offers 
walls building themselves, just as it later has `fat, aged carps' willingly 
running into nets (line 33). But Williams clearly reads the suggestion of a lack 
of labour as part of the linking of a social order to a `natural order, with 
metaphysical sanctions' (C&C, p. 29). Marshall, offering a reading based on 
the idea of `decorum' as the central controlling motif within the poem, argues 
for the exceptional qualities of Penshurst, compared with other country 
houses (and, as he notes, so does Williams). But his insistence that Jonson's 
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lines are evidence that `the well-being and affections of the tenantry matter'24 
seems as inadequate a reading of the poem as Knights and the other earlier 
critics. For, of course, the question is not what the lines say, which is certainly 
that everything in this particular country garden is sweetness and light, but 
rather how can the poem be read `against the grain' or `ideologically'. 
Williams would presumably accept the desirability of gaining the affections of 
the tenants, and looking after their well-being, but with the proviso that these 
descriptions are offered from the point of view of the Lord of the manor. 
Marshall's decorum then becomes the ideological mask which seeks to 
convince the reader (the reader of course being Robert Sidney), that what is 
offered as the content of the poem is an honest assessment both of the actual 
conditions existing at the time, and Jonson's reliance on and belief in them. 
In Marshall's reading, any suggestion of aggression or potential class 
conflict is diluted by a sense of decorum which relies on a shared sense of 
responsibility. This is exemplified by the lines closely following those already 
given: 
And no one empty-handed, to salute 
Thy lord, and lady, though they have no sute. 
Some bring a capon, some a rurall cake, 
Some nuts, some apples, some that thinke they make 
The better cheeses, bring hem; or else send 
By their ripe daughters, whom they would commend 
This way to husbands; and whose baskets beare 
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An embleme of themselves, in plum or peace. 
(lines 49-56) 
Knights writes that this `gives a fair impression of what "housekeeping" 
meant for many great families of the time', turning Jonson's poem into a piece 
of realist reportage. Walters, more circumspectly, detects an air of `unreality' 
but argues that it is saved by `the tone of kindly comedy, and by the precision 
of the writing'. " Williams does not refer to these lines specifically, but this 
does not stop Marshall from asserting that Williams misreads them. Marshall 
summarises their meaning as offering `something inhering in order, regularity, 
and reciprocal responsibility'. He appears to endorse such qualities as much 
as Jonson, since he goes on to write that they are `with a little luck, within the 
range of human capability to obtain'. 26 
By insisting on his idea of decorum, Marshall has to refuse anything 
apart from the most obvious interpretation of these lines. Yet this reading is 
immediately called into question by the next few lines of the poem, which he 
does not quote: 
But what can this (more than express their love) 
Adde to thy free provisions, farre above 
The neede of such? whose liberal! boord doth flow, 
With all, that hospitalitie doth know! 
(lines 57-60) 
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Presumably, what Jonson is describing is some sort of formalised ritual (akin 
perhaps to the harvest festival), where the tenants offer tribute. But it seems 
likely that the capons and the rest represent a significant contribution for the 
tenants, coming as they must from what is at best a small surplus. It will need 
more analysis than Marshall is willing to give the poem to consider any 
further what it really means to describe Penshurst's produce as `free' or 
Sidney's generosity `überall'. Williams does just this, emphasizing (without 
using such language) the figure of ideological inversion in the poem. The true 
facts of the `curse' of productive labour are occulted, and instead we are `fed' 
images of easy consumption and lordly generosity through a `magical 
recreation of what can be seen as a natural bounty and then a willing charity': 
[T]his magical extraction of the curse of labour is in fact achieved by a 
simple extraction of the existence of labourers. The actual men and 
women who rear the animals and drive them to the house and kill 
them and prepare them for meat; who trap the pheasants and 
partridges and catch the fish; who plant and manure and prune and 
harvest the fruit trees: these are not present; their work is all done for 
them by a natural order. When they do at last appear, it is merely as 
the `rout of rurall folke' or, more simply, as `much poore', and what 
we are then shown is the charity and lack of condescension with which 
they are given what, now and somehow, not they but the natural order 
has given for food, into the lord's hands. 
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The poem suggests that Sidney's cellars and kitchens are overflowing, 
allowing large `hospitalitie'. But, as I will show later, this too is likely to be a 
misrepresentation - at the time the poem was written Sidney was deep in debt, 
and watching his manorial finances closely. Although such debt could of 
course be the result of such generous `hospitalitie', maintaining a medieval 
tradition, it is much more likely to be the result of over-spending at the 
Court. 27 Marshall, maintaining his insistence on seriousness and decorum 
within the poem, then misreads this section of the poem, as indicating `open 
access to hearth and table'. 28 However, although the poem continues by 
asserting that all guests are allowed to eat at the master's table, and share his 
meat etc. (lines 61-64), it is clear that the tenants queuing up outside are not 
`guests' (as Jonson himself would like to be). 29 The difference between guest 
and worker is represented later by the imagined waiter, who will dine below 
on the leftovers of the banquet. If, as I have suggested, they are rather 
invitees to an annual, stage-managed, ritualistic `celebration' of abundance 
and hospitality, then presumably such generosity will be short-lived. This is 
certainly more like Williams's own reading. He offers, as comparison, a poem 
written by peasant-poet Stephen Duck, in the late 1720s. In this alternative 
understanding of `hospitality', the enjoyment of plentiful food and ale gives 
way, the following morning, to a realization that it is merely a `cheat', which 
will only be repeated after another year's heavy toil (C&C, p. 32). 
I mentioned above the notion that `hospitalitie' may refer back to a set 
of relationships more appropriate to the middle ages than the 1600s, and it is 
possible to pursue this idea briefly, by looking at Chaucer's General Prologue 
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to the Canterbury Tales. Such a shift of emphasis may be justified first, 
because Robert Sidney's brother Philip singled out Chaucer for particular 
praise, arguing, in An Apology for Poetry (originally `A Defence of Poetry', 
1579-80) that there had been a'sad decline in English poetry since Chaucer's 
time, and that this was a very serious state of affairs, given his belief that it is 
from poetry that all other `human learning' is derived, and that its effects are 
`so good as to teach goodness and to delight the learners'. 30 In Chaucer's 
General Prologue we meet the `frankeleyn', a substantial landowner, and 
previously a `shirreve' and a `contour' (auditor). 31 As in `To Penshurst', the 
description of the frankeleyn is given in terms of conspicuous consumption 
and surplus. The frankeleyn is described as `Epicurus owne sone' (line 336), 
and `Seint Julian' (line 340). As Jill Mann has pointed out, by combining 
these two `strangely assorted personalities' into the character of the 
frankeleyn, Chaucer is able to emphasize his love of food, while avoiding the 
`selfish materialism' usually equated with Epicurus, since `Seint Julian' was 
the patron saint of hospitality. 32 The frankeleyn thus strangely combines both 
the persona of Jonson in `To Penshurst' (emphasising his own `gluttony', 
while making it clear that such excess is acceptable [line 68]), and Sir 
Robert's hospitality (the frankeleyn's table is always ready: `His table 
dormant in his halle alway / Stood redy covered al the longe day' [lines 353- 
54]). 
When we come to the description of the frankeleyn's table, the 
imagery once again relies on an intimate relationship between nature and 
culture, nature willingly giving itself up for human consumption: 
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His breed, his ale, was always after oon; 
A bettre envyned man was nowher noon. 
Withoute bake mete was nevere his hous 
Of fissh and flessh, and that so plentevous, 
It snewed in his hous of mete and drynke, 
Of alle deyntees that men koude thynke. 
After the sondry sesons of the yeer, 
So chaunged he his mete and his soper. 
Ful many a fat partrich hadde he in muwe, 
And many a breem and many a luce in stuwe. 
Wo was his cook but if his sauce were 
Poynaunt and sharp, and redy al his geere. 
His table dormant in his halle alway 
Stood redy al the longe day. 
(lines 341-54) 
Mann mentions that `birds and fish are especially prized by the bons viveurs in 
satire on gluttony"', and little seems to have changed between the fourteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. Just as in `To Penshurst' the partrich and the pike 
(`luce') are among the particular delicacies. But whereas in the later poem a 
sensitivity to nature and the seasons is emphasized: `fig, grape, and quince, 
each in his time doth come' ('To Penshurst', line 43); here the frankeleyn 
pragmatically adjusts his diet in accordance with the `sondry sesons of the 
yeer' (line 347). Once again, this excess is offered without the intervention of 
human labour, here even bad weather contributes to the all-year-round 
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abundance, in a quasi-miraculous materialization of food out of the 
surrounding air ('it snewed in his hous of mete and drynke' [line 345]). 
It is worth noting also, the description given of the frankeleyn - he is 
not a knight (like say Gawain), but a `knyght of the shire' (line 356), in other 
words, a member of Parliament. He offers no liege-service to a lord, but 
instead, like Sidney, is assumed to have a straightforward `capitalist' 
ownership of the land free from feudal obligations. But, within the poem, this 
version of `non-military' authority is given in the language of romance and 
heraldry: his kitchen utensils become his `geere' (line 351), and his table is 
`dormant' (line 353)34; to complete the knightly imagery, a two-edged dagger 
('anlass', line 357) hangs from his belt. Obviously, Chaucer, like Jonson, 
relies on a community of understanding to see that this is an extended joke, 
but it also reminds us that there was a gradual demilitarization of the noble 
class, starting in the late medieval period. Perry Anderson notes that `in 1500, 
every English peer bore arms; by Elizabeth's time, it has been calculated, only 
half the aristocracy had any fighting experience'. 33 He also makes the point 
that this shift away from the military coincided with the loosening of old ties 
between vassals and liege-lords, and its substitution by the adoption of new 
noble ranks which tended to divide out the `peerage' from the rest of its 
former class. 36 Lawrence Stone sees this trend as leading to a `loss of nerve' 
on the part of the nobility, and argues that they substituted `a romantic and 
artificial revival of the chivalric ideal, expressed in literature by Malory's 
Arthurian legends'. 37 This `loss of nerve', and weakening of the medieval ties 
between lord and `dependants' is likely to be even more severe by the time 
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`To Penshurst' comes to be written. The significant changes we can see here 
reflected in the literature represent the literary interpretation of that complex, 
`transitional' shift from a fully-feudalist to a modem capitalist mode of 
production, that significant `long revolution' still not complete in the early 
1600s, and hinted at in the poetry of Chaucer by the description of the 
frankeleyn's travelling companion, the `Sergeant of the Lawe' (line 309), one 
of the new breed of non-noble landowners, not troubled by `loss of nerve', 
and relying on an understanding of the legal ways open to the new 
entrepreneur to gain property and keep it in the family ('al was fee symple to 
hym in effect' [line 320]). By 1600, the descendants of the `Sergeant of the 
Lawe' will have transformed themselves, via the newly emergent trading 
opportunities, into that `gentry' class busily accumulating the land shed by 
Court and courtiers alike to pay for extravagance at home and abroad, and, at 
the same time, rapidly becoming the dominant force in the House of 
Commons. 38 
Like Marshall, Don E. Wayne, in a book-length study of `To 
Penshurst', insists on a steady tone of seriousness. 39 It would seem that only 
Walters, sensing the comedy within Jonson's diction, begins to understand the 
true complexity of the relationship between the `persona' of Jonson and the 
direction of patronage, something I will want to return to as part of the 
attempt to unravel the interlocking set of relationships between Jonson, the 
poem, Sidney, the Court, and the manor. Wayne attempts to map out the 
`ideological domain' of the poem, but finds no space therein for anything but 
seriousness, since `what [Jonson's] poem refers to is not intentionally 
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fantastic'. 40 But if we are to accept, almost as a matter of faith, that `To 
Penshurst' is firmly within the paradigm of `Literature' (and, therefore, by 
extension, Jonson is a talented poet), what are we to make of those lines 
quoted earlier, full of `painted partrich[es]', `fat, aged carps' and `bright 
eeles' all willingly giving up their lives for Sidney's table? If we do not read 
them as `intentionally fantastic' what then? - are they instead unintentionally 
fantastic, or not fantastic at all? As I have already shown, the poetry actually 
adopts a particular literary convention, one which in this case relies on a 
shared understanding of `intentional fantasy'. 
Unlike Wayne, and more akin to Walters, Williams reads these lines as 
wit ('the most ardent traditionalist will hardly claim it for observation' [C&C, 
p. 29]), a wit which works, he goes on to argue, by relying on `a shared and 
conscious point of view towards nature' (C&C, p. 30). This emphasis is 
revealing and significant: the shared viewpoint is between the poet and the 
intended reader (Sidney), without such congruence the wit would fail and 
Wayne would be correct in denying a level of intentional fantasy. As Williams 
explains, Jonson's offering works by relying on a very conventional set of 
literary devices which transform what he wants to call the `natural order' into 
a neo-pastoral within which nature and culture (i. e. tenants as much as eels), 
pay homage ('tribute') to the estate not through coercion but because they 
are happy to conform to their appointed place in God's world. What then 
remains `natural' is not a real relationship, but rather the naturalization of a 
set of cultural conventions: as Williams comments, this is actually an 
extremely unnatural order: `this natural order is simply and decisively on its 
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way to table' (C&C, p. 30). This naturalization works in part by rewriting a 
version of pastoral fit for the Jacobean age, and reinforces its historical 
validity by appealing, within the poem, to a golden age in which Pan and 
Bacchus can feast beneath the trees of Penshurst (just as Jonson hopes to). 
4. The Penshurst Papers 
I have indicated at various points earlier, how interpretations of the 
poem (including Williams's own), are incomplete or deficient in some way 
because little or no attention has been paid to the actual social conditions 
pertaining at its date of composition, sometime around the year 1610 (the 
exact date is still unknown). 41 What is needed then, is an approach which pays 
attention to the general conditions existing at the time (in other words 
clarification about the mode of production), as well as more specific historical 
evidence relating to the organization of the Penshurst estate, and, most 
importantly, the relations of production operating in that manor. This is 
obviously crucial, since we are dealing with a poem which as I have shown 
has been interpreted as giving a fair representation of those relations (albeit by 
adopting a set of self-conscious literary stylizations). For the second of these, 
there is the advantage of the existence of a substantial archive of material 
relating to Penshurst, stretching back to the middle ages, and belonging to the 
present Viscount De L'Isle. 42 This valuable resource seems to have attracted 
only limited attention from economic historians, although the material 
included in MSS, 77 has been the subject of a useful essay by J. C. A. 
Rathmell. 43 
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Considering first then the general conditions existing in England at the 
period, probably the least controversial comment to make would be that it is 
almost impossible to say with any real confidence either that there still existed 
a feudal mode of production, or that it had finally been replaced by capitalism. 
It is convenient, though far from conclusive, to mark the English Revolution 
of the 1640s as the decisive moment of full transference from one to the 
other, but, obviously, this leaves open the real possibility that for a significant 
time before (perhaps a couple of centuries), features of both modes appeared 
to exist together. 44 It has been conventional, for instance, to identify feudalism 
or capitalism by looking at whether rent is paid in money, rather than in kind 
or through labour. But, as Maurice Dobb has pointed out, following Marx, 
this is a mistake; there is no simple correlation between a decline in labour 
rent (by commutation to a money rent), and a decline in feudalism. " Indeed, 
as Rodney Hilton points out, feudal rent tended to be extracted in various 
means - `mostly in labour, partly in kind, to an insignificant extent in 
money'. What is relevant, rather, is not how the surplus is paid over, but 
how it is extracted, in other words, what sort of coercion is used, what are 
the relations of production between producer and overlord? In a fully- 
feudalist economy the main basis of calculation of rent is not economic but 
political, a measure of the success of non-economic forms of compulsion. 47 
However, it is also clear that following the increase of peasant unrest in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries48 the `petty producers' tended to 
emancipate themselves from `feudal exploitation', and this emancipation 
included the transition from labour rent to money rent, increasing the 
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possibility for them to retain more of the surplus product for themselves. 49 It 
is hard not to sympathise with the `conclusion' of Eric Hobsbawm: `nobody 
has seriously maintained that capitalism prevailed before the sixteenth century 
or that feudalism prevailed after the late eighteenth. However, nobody can 
doubt that for all or most of the last 1000 years before 1800 economic 
evolution consistently took place in the same direction'. 50 
If this brief investigation into the `transitional' mode is less than fully 
satisfactory, it will be more helpful to consider the history of the aristocracy in 
the decades just before and after 1600, since this will then impact more 
directly on Penshurst and its owner, Robert Sidney. Lawrence Stone argues 
that the four most significant preconditions for the English Revolution were: 
the failure of the Crown to acquire `a standing army and a paid, reliable local 
bureaucracy'; the `decline of the aristocracy, and the corresponding rise of 
the gentry' (a rise both of wealth and political power); a `diffuse Puritanism, 
whose most important political consequence was to create a burning sense of 
the need for change in the Church and eventually in the State'; and a general 
`crisis of confidence in the integrity and moral worth of the holders of high 
administrative office, whether courtiers or nobles or bishops or judges or even 
kings', " All of these may be relevant here, though obviously the second, the 
`decline of the aristocracy', and the last, a lessening of the feudal ties of 
responsibility and respect, would seem most pertinent to this study. But these 
`cultural' changes have to be considered in terms of more directly `economic' 
adjustments. In another work, Stone analyses in detail how a combination of 
economic measures, including enclosure of lands, a shift towards economic 
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`rack' rents in the early seventeenth century, the disposal of land to finance 
debt by the nobility in favour of the gentry, and the general move towards 
`absenteeism' in the last years of Elizabeth's reign and the first years of 
James's, as more of the `country-house' nobles devoted considerable periods 
to attendance at Court, conspired to weaken them both socially and 
economically, undermining the loyalty of tenants as it drained away inherited 
wealth. 52 
Most of the readers of `To Penshurst' have relied on a specific set of 
beliefs about the estate, about Jonson, and about Sidney and his family, all 
based firmly in the information available in the poem: Penshurst is small 
compared with equivalent Elizabethan `piles', and its relative modesty is a 
measure of the sort of man Sidney was ('thou art not, PENSHLJRST, built to 
envious show' [line 1])53; Jonson was a close confidant of the whole family 
(evidenced by the number of poems and other writings he dedicated to them); 
and Sidney and his wife Barbara Gamage were an unusually loving and 
affectionate couple, who maintained at Penshurst a sort of paternalistic 
benevolence quite exceptional for the time, which included very close 
attention to the running of the estate and the needs of its tenants and wage- 
labourers. The records of the De L'Isle manuscripts, together with the 
detailed work of historians like Lawrence Stone, may make it possible at least 
partly to revise this generous portrayal, and, at the same time think further 
about Jonson's own relationship to Penshurst, King and Court. 
Along with most of the other nobles attendant upon the Court in the 
last years of Elizabeth's reign, Robert Sidney was desperate for elevation to 
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the peerage, but, although Elizabeth recognised Sidney's value, like many 
others, he was passed over. 54 The succession of James I in 1603 produced a 
rapid change, and, along with a large number of others, Sidney soon had titles 
conferred on him, ultimately being made Earl of Leicester. " This potential 
increase in power and influence was not necessarily matched by an improved 
financial position. Many of the courtiers were riddled with debt, spending 
huge amounts on costly property improvements, Court attendance, and 
entertaining the king and his retinue at their houses, while at the same time 
shifts in the relations of production were tending to make it more difficult to 
collect and retain commercial rents, and the amount of land subject to rent 
was itself declining. The records of Robert Sidney and his estate remind us 
that British capital has always sacrificed long-term improvement for short- 
term gain, and that capitalism demands accelerating competitive reinvestment. 
Against this general trend, there was always the possibility that funds 
could pass out from the Court into the hands of the nobles, and Sidney was 
the recipient of monies from the grant of old debts, and was also compensated 
when the `Cautionary Towns' were returned to the Dutch in 1616, although 
such compensation may not have covered his previous earnings as Governor 
of Flushing. 56 Nevertheless, the last few years of the sixteenth century, and 
the first decade of the seventeenth, saw Sidney and other family members 
constantly in financial difficulties. Besides a high level of expenditure on the 
noble cause of pursuing claims to land and title through the courts37, Sidney 
felt he had to maintain a reasonably ornate standard of dress because of his 
position at Court: `The bill for the outfit of Lord Sydney for the Christmas 
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Masque in 1603 came to £220, and a few years later a single suit for a court 
occasion - admittedly smothered in pearls - cost him £250'. 58 To put this in 
some sort of perspective, his Estate surplus at Lady Day, 1612 was just over 
£150, and he was paying landless day-labourers eleven pence a day based on a 
six-day week, equivalent to around £14 per annum. 59 
Far from being exceptional, this life-style is shown by Stone to be 
typical - Sidney was obviously living beyond his means, and the considerable 
periods spent away from Penshurst (approximately twenty-eight months in 
total between July 1609 and September 1612 based on the De L'Isle 
catalogue index) meant he could not devote proper, personal attention to his 
estate accounts. Like many nobles at this period, he had not taken the 
opportunity to upgrade his accounting system to adopt the new `double- 
entry' system, or to consolidate his estate accounts, information being kept in 
discreet `parcels', and maintained under the archaic `charge and discharge' 
system which made it all but impossible to decide whether the estate was 
running a surplus or deficit. So serious were these shortcomings, that Sidney, 
like many others, spent the first few decades of the seventeenth century 
desperately increasing the amount of estate paperwork, hoping to produce 
enough information both to allow him to understand how he was managing, 
and to dissuade his servants from poor work, or even from robbing him. 
Despite the attempt of the poem to offer a picture of mutual respect and trust 
('there's none, that dwell about them, wish them downe' [line 47]), the estate 
papers show cooks behaving `mallipertly' towards Lady Lisle, pages and 
footmen who are `very chargeable', and `unusefull servaunts'. 60 
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The inevitable result of all this financial ineptitude was serious debt - 
by 1626 the Earl of Leicester had debts running into thousands of pounds61, 
and, again like many of his fellow courtiers, he had recourse to moneylenders 
drawn from the newly-wealthy gentry class of City traders - along with a 
couple of lords and an earl, Sidney borrowed from the draper, John 
Langley62; and he even on occasion had to rely on the generosity of one of his 
stewards. 63 Other members of the family were similarly plagued with money 
problems: following the death of her husband, Sir Robert Wroth, in 1614, 
Sidney's eldest daughter Lady Mary was `beset with financial difficulties' and 
her influence at court 'declined' . 
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All of these worries, combined with Sidney's long absences from 
Penshurst, must have had their effect on his marriage to Barbara Gamage. 
Despite being an arranged marriage, and a very quickly `arranged' one at that, 
following the sudden death of her father in 1584, their relationship is generally 
considered to have been very good65, and most critics quote approvingly the 
lines: `what praise was heap'd / On thy good lady, then! who, therein, reap'd / 
The just reward of her high huswifery' (lines 83-85). J. C. A. Rathmell is astute 
enough to realise that she had little choice but to be a good `huswife': `in the 
absence of her husband at court, the main responsibility for looking after 
Penshurst rested with her'. 66 It is fair to say that many of Sidney's letters to 
his wife show a high degree of affection, particularly before 1600, and he 
frequently mentions gifts he is sending to her: one letter mentions wine, 
blankets and various pictures which have `cost [... ] a good deale of money'. 
Like the poet, Sidney also appeals to her skills in management: `I hope you 
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play the good houswyfe in my garden and see my Siccamor trees set as I gave 
order. Farewel sweethart and make much of yourself and kiss all our children 
from me'. 67 
But, increasingly, the letters become generally shorter, and 
concentrate more on financial matters, until, in an extraordinary sequence 
between October 1608 and May 1610 they consist almost entirely of very 
abrupt requests for money to be sent, or accounts to be settled. 68 Indeed, 
there is the suggestion that Lady Lisle had to control the manor's budget even 
when Sidney was at home. One note from her to the steward Golding in 1607 
acknowledges receipt of £150 and asks him to bring the money for servants' 
wages; this at a time when it is clear from other correspondence that Robert 
Sidney is at home. 69 
If, as I want to suggest, all of this points to a man sadly out of touch 
with some of the realities of Penshurst, and an aristocratic family as much in 
`crisis' as any other in the early years of James I's reign, in contradistinction 
to the prevailing critical opinion, it might be supported by the distorted 
picture Jonson offers of the family and its activities. Jonson, as his biographer 
David Riggs points out, `consistently portrays the Sidneys [... ] as members of 
a self-contained aristocratic community that is answerable only to its own 
ancestral traditions'. 70 This is stressed at the very beginning of `To 
Penshurst', where the poet comments that the house is not `built to envious 
show' (line 1), like equivalent courtiers' buildings (Sackville's Knole for 
instance, or Burghley's Theobalds), but then adds that it `stand'st an ancient 
pile' (line 5), substituting tradition and heritage for conspicuous expenditure. 
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The real antiquity of the building (erected around the time of Chaucer's 
birth), is thus metonymically linked to the presumed ancient lineage of the 
Sidney family, but this is in fact a sham, as Riggs indicates: 
By emphasizing the antiquity of Penshurst [... ] and the purity of its 
gothic style, Jonson associates Lisle's manor house with the chivalric 
past. Yet the Sidneys did not, in fact, belong to the `old' nobility. 
Lisle's father had bribed the heralds to fake a genealogy for them in 
1568; they had acquired Penshurst from King Edward VI just sixty 
years before and they did not maintain an authentic tradition. " 
Like the `anlass' hanging from the frankeleyn's belt, Penshurst's crenellations 
are the signs of tradition and unbroken descent, rather then the real thing. 
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The real tradition Robert Sidney has inherited, rather than the invented one of 
his family's ancient lineage, is the tradition of bribery and corruption. Sir John 
Fleming, writing to him in 1614, remarks on the likely high costs of the 
imminent marriage of one of Sidney's daughters, and offers not to press for 
early return of a £200 loan falling due. He continues: `What place I am to 
hold in the martial courts of Flushing you may decide as you please, and your 
will shall be a commandment', a few weeks later, he has been appointed 
Sergeant Major. 73 
Rather than assume, as the poem suggests, that it is Sidney's inherent 
modesty and private nature which persuades him not to make Penshurst as 
ostentatious as some of its neighbours, it may be much more to do with his 
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own financial limitations, and the good sense of those around him. Rathmell 
mentions the intriguing letter from Thomas Golding to Sidney of 1611, in 
which the steward is very un-deferential in warning Sidney about his debts, 
and tries to persuade him not to extend his deer-park. 74 In fact, if Lawrence 
Stone is right, Sidney is rather acting against the grain in even considering 
such a project, given the cost of development and inevitable loss of rents. 
Stone argues that the first decade of the seventeenth century saw `park after 
park, even that around the great house', cleared to make way for valuable 
pasture or arable land as the desperate `quest for profit' grew. 75 Here we have 
the tension between two competing sets of social relations made manifest: 
Sidney needs to improve his estate to gain royal favour, but must do so 
without the benefit of feudal patronage, instead relying on `agri-business' and 
the primitive phase of the accumulation of capital. It is clear from other 
documents that this was not the only time Sidney tried to make Penshurst 
`built to envious show', but was constrained by a lack of capital. In 1612 
another steward, Robert Kyrwin, advises him to forestall new building work, 
so that the money can be used to finish a wall `for the workmen desire to be 
payd every fortnight for thinges are very deeare'. 76 Indeed, the control of 
workmen, and tenants, is more of a problem than is suggested by the poem. 
Although rents are still being paid under the feudal mix of kind and labour", 
this does not mean that the extraction of the surplus is a straightforward 
matter of coercion. At one time, the sort of building work contemplated by 
Sidney could have been accomplished cheaply, relying on the tenants to 
supply free labour. But by 1611 this is not so likely to be the case, as Golding 
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advises Sidney. 78 Instead, the steward has to pursue the outside builders to 
provide full estimates of the cost of supplying labourers and masons. 79 Once 
again the old feudal formation has to make way for an emergent capitalism, 
here indicated by the development of a labour market and the settlement of 
wage levels by competition. Further, there is a new degree of mobility, men 
who had previously worked on the Penshurst demesne `have taken bargains 
of the Earl of Clanrickard', who is building a house and paying out `forty 
markes a week'. 80 Similarly, the collection of rents has become much less 
straightforward. Many letters bear witness to the problems of collection, and 
the amount of arrears. Sidney's lands at Otford appear to be a particular 
problem: in 1607 Golding writes that, although once `so well esteemed [it] is 
brought almost into contempt [... ] by extorting and bribing from tenants'. 81 
Four years later, Golding has to admit that it has become almost impossible to 
collect all the rents due, and that traditional methods of `persuasion' are not 
working: `[I]f some tenants are backward, Hayward neither distrains nor 
reports their names. The last time he was with me I willed him to distrain. He 
told me that was what they desired. For then they would give up their 
lands'. 82 
5. Jonson, The Sidneys, and the Court 
One of the reasons that so much of `To Penshurst' is confidently 
assumed to offer a fair representation of the Sidneys and the estate, is because 
Jonson is seen as having a particularly close relationship with the family. It is 
quite true, as Rathmell argues, that Jonson had `many connections' with the 
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family83, for instance through the staging of court masques84, but it is less 
clear that his relationship with them was particularly intimate. Rathmell argues 
in favour of close ties, particularly in relation to another poem included in The 
Forest, `Ode: To Sir William Sidney on His Birthday'. Rathmell reads this as 
indicating that Jonson was present at the birthday celebrations, and argues 
that Jonson appears to have had `a particularly close relationship' with 
Sidney's son. 8S He quotes a letter written in July 1611 from Sidney to his 
wife, in which Sidney writes: `If [Will Sydney] list he may do himself much 
good with Mr. Johnson and he cannot in any way please me better'. 86 
Rathmell is cautious about assuming absolutely that this is Ben Jonson, but 
nevertheless writes of a `quasi-tutorial relationship' suggested in the poem, 
for which the letter provides support. 87 Robert Evans, discussing the poem 
and citing Rathmell, suggests that `the work may have grown out of Jonson's 
service to the Sidneys in a more official capacity than poet'. 88 This sense of 
Jonson as academic / moral adviser is then used to validate the poet's 
separateness from the festivities as the poem opens, only offering himself to 
William when `all the noyse / Of these forc'd joyes / Are fled and gone' (lines 
17-19). 89 A simpler explanation may be that he was never there in the first 
place, so that he brings in to the poem a genuine sense of displacement, and 
can only offer the bare essentials of any such festive occasion. Jonson's 
`intimacy' with the family may have been overestimated: there are only two 
references to Ben Jonson in the HMC catalogue - one a letter to the second 
Earl of Leicester in 1637 which mentions the poet's death90, the other a brief 
footnote to correspondence in 1614, concerning Jonson's travels in France 
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with the young Walter Raleigh. 91 As for `Mr. Johnson' the tutor, mentioned 
by Rathmell, the HMC index lists this as `Robert Johnson, of Magdalen 
College [Oxford], afterwards one of the King's chaplains, tutor to William 
Sidney'. 2 As Rathmell himself points out93, Will Sidney was at Oxford, 
although his mother was reluctant to let him return on time at the start of each 
term, and his academic progress appears to have been unspectacular, so that 
the appointment of a personal tutor `on site' and one obviously with some ties 
with the court, must have looked a good idea. The archivist of Magdalen 
College has confirmed that Robert Johnson graduated in 1598, and received 
the MA in 1601, eventually becoming chaplain to James I, although there is 
no information about his relationship to Will Sidney. 94 
The doubt over Jonson's real relationship with the Sidney family is 
increased by the information that he was a tutor to Wat Raleigh. David Riggs 
dates the start of this relationship in the spring of 1612, just a few months 
after the presumed date of Will Sidney's twenty-first birthday in November 
1611, for which the poem was written. 95 This relationship entailed a 
significant amount of time accompanying Wat on the `Grand Tour', so any 
`quasi-tutorial relationship' between Jonson and Will Sidney must have 
quickly changed into a form of `distance learning' at best. But Jonson's 
`adoption' of Raleigh's son may give a final clue to a revised interpretation of 
`To Penshurst' and Jonson's other work ostensibly connected to the Sidney 
family. David Riggs points out that Jonson was making some attempt to 
develop a relationship with James I's son, Prince Henry - dedicating the 1609 
quarto of The Masque of Queens to him, and, by 1612, preparing annotated 
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quartos of The Speeches at Prince Henry's Barriers and Oberon. 9 His 
attachment to Wat Raleigh therefore, `the son of Henry's chief mentor'97 
cannot have harmed his image. However, the potential cost of this pursuit of 
Royal patronage was the possible adverse effect on Jonson's relationship with 
the king, in almost every respect the opposite of his son's warlike, 
Francophile, abstemious inclinations. Jonson therefore needed to maintain at 
all cost evidence of a strong attachment to the father, while hoping to gain 
favour also with the son, and therefore improve his overall chances of 
patronage. At the same time, it would obviously be advantageous to develop 
other patrons, particularly where these also inter-related with the Court, and it 
is here that the Sidneys are so useful to Jonson. Unlike say Thomas Carew, 
who clearly built up a strong personal relationship to Sir John Crofts and his 
family, even accompanying one of his sons on his trip to France in 1619, I 
would suggest that the Sidneys may be only part of the structure of 
relationships adopted by Jonson to improve his own chances at Court. Thus, 
by pursuing a family like the Sidneys, Jonson would gain access also to the 
king, and in a sense replicate the nobles' own relationship to the court. Riggs 
makes this important point, adding that it was courtiers (like the Sidneys) 
who appeared in the masques written by Jonson (Lady Mary Wroth, for 
instance, appeared in Queen Anne's first masque, The Masque of Blackness, 
on Twelfth Night, 1605)98, but it was James who `paid. in whole or in part, 
for most of the court masques, and he was the one who ultimately had to be 
pleased'. 99 
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Jonathan Goldberg has noted that Jonson very frequently brought in 
references to the king when addressing others, a king `that rules by example 
more than sway. 100 This observation gives some force to an interpretation of 
`To Penshurst' which gives more importance, perhaps, to the inclusion of the 
king, than the absent Robert Sidney. Jonson, in a few lines near to the climax 
of the poem, neatly equates himself with Sidney and the king, reinforcing the 
close relationship through the rhyme scheme: 
As if thou, then wert mine, or I raign'd here; 
There's nothing I can wish, for which I stay. 
That found King JAMES, when hunting late, this way, 
With his brave sonne, the Prince, they saw thy fires 
(lines 74-77). 
Indeed, the patterning of the poem suggests that the art of poetry itself is as 
important a message as anything else - Jonson only enters the poem towards 
its close, as does the king, but the oblique reference to Robert's poet-brother 
Philip in lines 13 and 14 (`That taller tree, which of a nut was set, / At his 
great birth, where all the Muses met'), produces a poem in which the poet 
himself has a significant part to play - in this case the memory of Philip Sidney 
and The Arcadia is a convenient device which at once praises Sidney's family, 
the art and importance of poetry, and panders to the king's aesthetic leanings, 
and does it by reproducing suitable pastoral figures (Pan, Bacchus etc. ), 
mixing them up into this new `invented tradition' of the neo-pastoral country- 
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house poem, which is as much about show and the pretence of heritage and 
tradition, as the fake battlements of Penshurst itself 
The only problem with arguing in this way for the poetry being in a 
sense at least as much a `tribute' to the king (and his son) as to Robert Sidney 
and his family, is that Jonson frequently tends to play down both Sidney's and 
his own relationship to the court, arguing in favour of country `hospitalitie' 
and in opposition to the excesses and abuses of the seat of power. This 
displacement is even more obvious in `To Sir Robert Wroth', where the 
directness of the address (to the man, rather than the house) is matched by a 
very full argument in favour of country-life and opposed to city and court. 
This complicated, and potentially precarious, balancing act that Jonson plays 
between court and country finds its equivalent in the representation of Philip 
Sidney in the poem. Like Jonson at Will Sidney's party, Philip Sidney is left 
rather `outside' the proceedings at Penshurst, but Alan Sinfield has suggested 
that this is explained perhaps because `as a writer who was also a nobleman 
he threatens to disrupt the poem's ethos of mutual deference between 
professional authorship and social power'. '°1 Jonson is not a `nobleman' but 
would like to be, and he recognizes that such a position includes an 
acknowledgement that court and country are not in simple opposition - at 
least, if `country' is defined as consisting of those already favoured by the 
court with titles. For it is of course these houses, and not the houses of the 
`gentry', that Elizabeth and James visited, and on their lands that James liked 
to hunt. A few decades before the English Revolution, Jonson is still very 
much an absolutist. 102 And he is politically astute enough to realize that he 
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does not have to produce simple kingly praise to stay in favour: after all, he 
was able to stage a `seditious' play like Sejanus, and have it performed by the 
`King's Men', without it causing serious injury to his reputation. 103 The 
country-house poetry therefore is used as an opportunity to show how 
country and court can be brought together through the king's own allegiance 
to a particular version of `country' (a particularly `exclusive' one), and 
Jonathan Goldberg points to a small, neat example of this opposition being 
deconstructed, as Jonson, in `To Sir Robert Wroth', uses the phrase 
`courteous shade' 104 (although the fact that it is a serpent which seeks out the 
`courteous shade' would appear further to complicate the representation). '°5 
Jonson himself was always in a particularly complex relationship to 
the means of literary production, frequently trying to negotiate a set of 
competing positions, between `independent' (capitalist) maker and producer 
of stage plays, and writer of poems and masques seeking patronage, and this 
often led him into difficulties. '06 His self-representation in `To Penshurst' is 
particularly interesting, because he explicitly emphasizes his role of greedy 
guest ('A waiter, doth my gluttony envy', line 68), but is only implicitly 
figured as poet or maker of judgements. As we have seen already in his `Ode: 
to Sir William Sidney on His Birthday', his more typical strategy is to 
emphasize his own activity of poet, as well as his close personal relationship 
to the subject matter of the poem, which inevitably brings along with it 
problems about his own actual position amidst the various competing court 
factions. 107 Poetry which can be seen to undermine the opposition between 
court/city and country should appeal to Williams's `border-crossing' desires. 
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As he had told the Cambridge English faculty: `the very forms [of writing] are 
created which are sometimes evident and sometimes occluded'. 108 Perhaps 
this should act as a warning even to Williams himself against too-willingly 
giving Penshurst the benefit of the doubt: not wanting to `refuse Jonson [... ] 
the courtesy of [his] lucky exception' (C&C, p. 29). The evidence, both about 
the poetry and the poet, and the house and its owner, tends to suggest that 
such refusal may be the most sensible decision. 
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7 
Against the New Conformists: Williams, Jameson 
and the Challenge of Postmodernity 
In this final chapter, before I look forward in the conclusion to the 
`future' of cultural materialism, I want to investigate in some detail the 
relationship of Williams's theories to what has become known as the 
`postmodern condition'. ' For some critics of Williams, such a decision will be 
seen as arcane, even absurd. The consensus attitude towards Williams has 
been,, pe t that he has remained immune from the postmodern, but unaware of 
it as a phenomenon. Not only that, but further, that he rejects the claims of 
modernism as well, remaining more content within a Lukäcsian realm of 
classic realism. Only Tony Pinkney, concentrating on the novels, has felt it 
sensible to link Williams to the postmodern, and his own suave reading of 
those sadly neglected texts tends to be somewhat over-reaching: Williams not 
only exhibits the signs of postmodern writing, but becomes a `postmodern 
novelist'. 2 It is as if Pinkney's obvious interest in the postmodern forces him 
to read into the novels a level of compliance with the `postmodern condition' 
which over-rides the fact that, as a group, they look decidedly `realist'. But 
this difficulty of definition is useful as a reminder that one of the problems in 
discussing postmodern culture is that the terms used frequently seem more 
applicable to accounts of modernism, and thus lose their critical force. In 
other words, just as this thesis as a whole has had to keep trying to define 
cultural materialism in terms of a set of specifying characteristics which are 
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themselves subject to historical change, so any discussion of the postmodern 
has to acknowledge the very real problems of definition which have to be 
confronted almost before discussion can properly begin. 
This problem of definition starts with `postmodern' itself, since the 
terms `postmodernity' and `postmodernism' are frequently used as if they 
were synonymous, and the same has been true for `modernity' and 
4modernism'. 3 I want, as far as is possible, to keep these terms apart, 
particularly because it will be my argument that although it is reasonable to 
consider some culture as `postmodernist' (in other words in some ways 
significantly different from `modernist' or `realist'), this does not mean that I 
accept that we have moved out of `modernity' and into `postmodernity'. 
What follows, specifically Jameson's argument that we have moved into a 
third `stage' of capital, and that this is marked by a new type of culture, also 
accepts that all of these stages exist within the continuing project of 
modernity. Further, and this is crucial to the trajectory of the thesis as a 
whole, the sorts of changes in `cultural production' discussed by Jameson and 
others have not (pace Williams) fundamentally changed the relationship of 
such superstructural activities to the economic base. That is, `post-Fordism' 
has seen an enormous acceleration in the integration of cultural production 
into commodity production, but this is not at all the same as suggesting that 
we have therefore left Modernity behind, and with it all those `grand 
narratives' (Marxism included) with which we attempted to make sense of the 
world. 
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This chapter attempts to define the limits of Raymond Williams's 
cultural materialism, as reflected in his late writings, and to argue that Fredric 
Jameson effectively extends Williams's theories into his own assessment of 
the condition of the postmodern, despite the obvious significant cultural and 
historical differences between Williams and Jameson. It will be necessary 
therefore, having indicated where their theoretical positions overlap, and 
having further tried to define what the postmodern means for Jameson, to 
indicate various ways in which they confront and engage with the problems of 
the postmodern, and begin to offer solutions to it. Finally, the essay looks 
beyond the present, to indicate what (for Jameson) seems to be the way to 
proceed `out' of the postmodern in the future. 
1. The Expansion of Culture, and 'Late' Capitalism 
Both Williams and Jameson share at once a fundamental desire to hold 
on to the specificities of Marxism, and an understanding of the very real 
changes evident in the way `culture' operates today, compared with the 
historical period of Marx. Effectively, they each reject the argument that the 
mode of production has a simple deterministic relationship to 
`superstructural' activity (as we saw for Williams in chapter four), yet at the 
same time refuse to succumb to the reductionism of a purely culturalist 
model, which denies any notion of economic determinacy. In his reassessment 
of Theodor Adorno, Jameson makes his own position explicit, arguing that 
base and superstructure should be viewed not as a `full-fledged theory in its 
own right, but rather as the name for a problem, whose solution is always a 
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unique, ad hoc invention'. 4 For Adorno, this effectively means treating culture 
as a he or an illusion; but, paradoxically, a useful one (in that we have to 
denounce it at the same time as we perpetuate it). For Jameson, the same is 
true of superstructures in general, since `the stigmatizing term of 
superstructure needs to be retained in order to remind us of a gap that has to 
be overcome in some more adequate way than forgetting about it'. 5 
Their shared model is based not just on a recognition of the long 
history of debate over the validity of the original formulation of the base/ 
superstructure paradigm but, more importantly for this study, on their 
sensitivity to some significant alteration within culture itself. This adjustment, 
for Jameson, is the transition, at the level of culture, from modernism to 
postmodernism, and is intimately linked, in ways in which we must now 
explore, to a more fundamental change in capitalism itself, into what he will 
term, following Ernest Mandel, `late capitalism' (Williams, at one point, 
acknowledges the change, but parodies it as `very late capitalism'). 6 
Jameson's use of Mandel's model extends back before he confronts directly 
the subject of postmodernism, at least as far back as his essay from 1975/76, 
`The Ideology of the Text'. ' Mandel describes the development of capitalism 
in terms of a progression, which he calls the `long-waves'. ' Fundamentally, he 
recognizes a series of structural changes, as capitalism moves from its 
`classical' definition in Marx ('market capital'), through Lenin's `imperialism' 
('monopoly capital'), into its most recent form, multinational `late' capitalism, 
in which there has been an unprecedented penetration of capitalism into 
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previously uncommodified areas. This is how Jameson summarises Mandel's 
argument: 
These three moments can be enumerated as the classical or national 
market capitalism known to Marx, the moment of monopoly capital or 
the stage of imperialism (theorized by Lenin), and the permutation, 
finally, after World War H, into a global form of `multinational' 
capitalism which has as yet [1975/6] received no adequate designation 
in its own right. " 
It is this model which Jameson uses in `The Ideology of the Text', and 
extends in `Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism'. '0 
Following Mandel, Jameson maps on to this tripartite model, three 
`revolutions' in technology, and this will become of central importance when 
we make comparisons with Williams's approach. Mandel refers specifically to 
the production of machines by machines, emphasising therefore (following 
Marx), the dependency of technology itself on the mode of production: 
The fundamental revolutions in power technology - the technology of 
the production of motive machines by machines - thus appears as the 
determinant moment in revolutions of technology as a whole. Machine 
production of steam-driven motors since 1848; machine production of 
electric and combustion motors since the 90's of the 19th century; 
machine production of electronic and nuclear-powered apparatuses 
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since the 40's of the 20th century - these are the three general 
revolutions in technology engendered by the capitalist mode of 
production since the `original' industrial revolution of the later 18th 
century. " 
Thus Mandel relates significant technological advances to his three 
fundamental shifts in capital. In his essay, Jameson makes a further 
refinement, arguing that this schema can also have mapped on to it a `cultural 
periodization' (realism, modernism, postmodernism), such that changes in 
culture, like technology, are dependent on alterations to the mode of 
production itself 12 Before proceeding, it is worth emphasising how Jameson 
uses this `periodizing hypothesis', since, at first sight, it looks rather like a 
Lukacsian formulation, with all its attendant problems of historical rigidity. It 
is to avoid such criticism, that Jameson prefers to describe his three moments 
not as `styles', but rather as `cultural dominants' (`Postmodernism', p. 56). In 
the earlier essay, he had described these `cultural dominants' as informing `a 
whole range of social and existential phenomena'. 13 This allows him to 
acknowledge the presence, within the `postmodern', of alternative cultural 
formations ('residual' in Williams's terms, as I discuss later in the chapter) 
which resemble rather the eras of realism or modernism (and similarly, some 
very `postmodern' looking productions in previous periods). Jameson stresses 
though, that, whatever the appearance of any particular cultural product 
today, overall we are in an entirely different formation: 
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[E]ven if all the constitutive features of postmodernism were identical 
and continuous with those of an older modernism -a position I feel to 
be demonstrably erroneous but which only an even lengthier analysis 
of modernism proper could dispel - the two phenomena would still 
remain utterly distinct in their meaning and social function, owing to 
the very different positioning of postmodernism in the economic 
system of late capital, and beyond that, to the transformation of the 
very sphere of culture in contemporary society. 
(`Postmodernism', p. 57) 
Having reached this stage, we need now to understand just what, for 
Jameson, the `constitutive features of postmodernism' are, and here, for the 
purposes particularly of the comparison with Williams, it will be appropriate 
to use Jameson's own summary of those distinguishing marks: 
[A] new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in 
contemporary `theory' and in a whole new culture of the image or the 
simulacrum; a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our 
relationship to public History and in the new forms of our private 
temporality, whose `schizophrenic' structure (following Lacan) will 
determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic relationships in the 
more temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional ground tone - 
what I will call `intensities' - which can best be grasped by a return to 
older theories of the sublime; the deep constitutive relationships of all 
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this to a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole 
new economic world system (`Postmodernism', p. 58). 
I want to take up and consider some of these features via Jameson's 
redefinition of the sublime; in particular, the notion of a certain 
`depthlessness' within the postmodern, linked to ideas about image culture 
and the `simulacrum'; and the significant change both in technology, and, 
more importantly, in our relationship to it. But it will be helpful first, to 
consider also how Jameson sees that lack of `depth' finding its corollary in a 
certain failure of postmodernist art to act as radical critique of society, in the 
ways that such critique might be recognised in the historical moments of 
realism and modernism. This is linked to what Jameson calls a `winner loses' 
logic, in which the efforts of the theorist to explain `an increasingly closed and 
terrifying machine' are confounded by that very same construction `since the 
critical capacity of his work is thereby paralysed, and the impulses of negation 
and revolt, not to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly 
perceived as vain and trivial in the face of the model itself' (`Postmodernism', 
pp. 56-57). I suppose we have to credit Jameson with a level of intentional 
irony in arguing for the impossibility of just what he is doing. In a similar way, 
as Jameson himself notes in his Introduction to The Postmodern Condition, 
Lyotard continuously emphasizes the need for `narrative analysis' within a 
discourse where narrative itself (including those grand narratives like 
Marxism and Freudianism) is deemed an impossibility. 14 Lyotard's `solution' 
is curious: re-using the ideology of modernism as aesthetic and applying it to 
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science. The model as formulated obviously calls for something very different 
at the levels of both `theory' and artistic `practice' from what is available to 
date. Or, perhaps there is something, as yet untheorized, within the 
postmodern itself, which will begin to confront such fears. I want now to 
examine some of these ideas, but it will be a useful first step to expand 
Mandel's `definition' of late capitalism by paying attention to the work of the 
`postmodern geographer' David Harvey on `time-space compression'. " 
2. Time, space, and social power 
Harvey, starting from the position of `Fordism' as the typical capitalist 
formation of the early twentieth-century, based on a relatively rigid set of 
doctrines in respect of labour processes, markets, products etc., argues that 
recent history has been marked by an abandonment of this model in favour of 
`flexible accumulation' (Harvey, p. 147). The earlier `Fordist' formation is 
marked by the `typical' drive of capitalism towards technological advance, 
itself the direct result of `the coercive laws of competition and the conditions 
of class struggle endemic to capitalism' (Harvey, p. 105). What this inevitably 
leads to is a sense of time `accelerating' or being `compressed' as the drive 
towards technological improvement leads to a regular reduction in 
productive time. Similarly, the desperate search for new markets, again in 
order effectively to maintain a position at least better than `average', tends 
towards an invasion and distortion of space, in which historical boundaries are 
transcended or ignored, and the globe itself appears to shrink down. 
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For Harvey, (like Mandel), this set of characteristics typical of 
capitalism may have entered a new phase of acceleration in `late capitalism', 
and, in a similar way to Jameson, he maps these developments of time-space 
compression onto cultural shifts (realism-modernism-postmodernism). 
Effectively, he sees time and space as `sources of social power', so that one 
crucial job for the Marxist analyst is to analyse `the relations between money, 
space, and time as interlocking sources of social power' (Harvey, p. 227). 
Later, I will want to examine further these ideas, and particularly to 
differentiate more carefully the relationship between `space', and its localized 
equivalent `place' (so significant a term for Williams). Harvey offers a `simple 
rule' concerning the relationship between the two, arguing that `those who 
command space can always control the politics of place even though, and this 
is a vital corollary, it takes control of some place to command space in the 
first instance' (Harvey, p. 234). 16 
Relating these ideas specifically to culture, Harvey goes on to argue 
that these transitions in the experience of space and time had the effect of 
making the realist text inappropriate as a vehicle for exploring the modem 
world, since its narrative structures relied on a degree of linearity at odds with 
an increasing `spatial simultaneity' (Harvey, p. 265). He goes on to suggest 
that such a shift was directly related to the move from realism to modernism, 
and that this leaves open at least the possibility for a similar shift into the 
postmodern: 
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The changing experience of space and time had much to do with the 
birth of modernism and its confused wanderings from this to that side 
of the spatial-temporal relation. If this is indeed the case, then the 
proposition that postmodernism is some kind of response to a new set 
of experiences of space and time, a new round of `time-space 
compression', is well worth exploring (Harvey, p. 283, emphasis in 
original). 
Having reached this stage, Harvey goes on to investigate this `proposition', 
by relating the latest round of time-space compression directly to the 
postmodern condition (Harvey, chapter 17). He argues that among all the 
developments noticeable in the `arena of consumption' recently, two stand 
out as being most significant for the debate: first, the `mobilization of fashion 
in mass (as opposed to elite) markets', which `provided a means to accelerate 
the pace of consumption not only in clothing, ornament, and decoration but 
also across a wide swathe of life styles and recreational activities'; second `a 
shift away from the consumption of goods and into the consumption of 
services', which tend to be shorter-lived than the goods they have come to 
replace, therefore increasing acceleration (Harvey, p. 285). 
Drawing on his own expertise, Harvey then notes a new `spatial 
irony': as the world appears to shrink down, so localized control of (`new') 
space becomes more important (he cites a number of examples such as 
`Silicon Valley'): `the story in each case is different, making it appear as if the 
uniqueness of this or that geographical circumstance matters more than ever 
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before. Yet it does so, ironically, only because of the collapse of spatial 
barriers' (Harvey, p. 294). Later in this chapter, I will want to show how 
Jameson starts to confront some of these `ironies' in his work on `Critical 
Regionalism'. Harvey, like Jameson, emphasises an inherent paradox: `the 
less important the spatial barriers, the greater the sensitivity of capital to the 
variations of place within space, and the greater the incentive for places to be 
differentiated in ways attractive to capital' (Harvey, pp. 295-96). Thus, time- 
space compression exposes a new contradiction at the heart of `late' 
capitalism: `the production of fragmentation, insecurity, and ephemeral 
uneven development within a highly unified global space economy of capital 
flows' (Harvey, p. 296). All of this results in a new type of society, one 
dominated by spectacle, and by images and representations which are actually 
`simulacra', bringing together `different worlds (of commodities) in the same 
space and time'. And these simulacra are able to `conceal almost perfectly any 
trace of origin, of the labour processes that produced them, or of the social 
relations implicated in their production' (Harvey, p. 300). For further 
consideration of the role and meaning of the `simulacrum', I turn now to 
Jameson and Williams. 
3. Jameson's simulacrum, Williams's facsimile 
One of the ways Jameson will want to designate the characteristics of 
postmodernism is in terms of a radical shift away from the temporal and 
towards the spatial. This is likely to cause difficulties for Marxist theory, 
concerned so centrally with the temporality of history itself. The work of 
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`postmodern geographers' like David Harvey and Doreen Massey has started 
to challenge what they see as a downgrading of `space' compared with `time', 
summarised by Massey thus: `[I]t is Time which is conceived of as in the 
position of "A", and space which is "not-A". Over and over again, time is 
defined by such things as change, movement, history, dynamism: while space, 
rather lamely by comparison, is simply the absence of these things'. "'As 
space, particularly the global space of late capitalism, becomes such a 
constitutive feature, only a re-evaluated understanding of the relationship of 
space to time will suffice. This new `image culture', in which history always 
appears to be subject to imminent effacement (most famously in Fukuyama's 
`End of History'), is given definition by the concept of the `simulacrum', 
summarised by Jameson, following Plato, as `the identical copy for which no 
original has ever existed' (`Postmodernism', p. 66). The simulacrum therefore 
lacks `depth', `history', `time'. Elsewhere, Jameson argues that it 
`characterizes the commodity production of consumer capitalism and marks 
our object world with an unreality and a free-floating absence of "the 
referent"'. " We will need later to extend Jameson's theory of the simulacrum 
into the debate over technology. For now though, I want to indicate how this 
apparently debilitating flight from history can be rethought, in terms of what I 
will want to call, following Williams, a `politics of hope', because, as I will 
&A 
argue, both Williams and Jameson hold on determinabto a Utopian impulse, 
despite what Jameson has summarised as the dehistoricization of the 
postmodern. 
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To understand Williams's notion of the `facsimile', and its relationship 
to Jameson's `simulacrum' we have first to consider briefly Williams's 
analysis of different cultural and social formations: which he designates as the 
`dominant', the `residual' and the `emergent'. Briefly, while acknowledging 
the `conventional' Marxist view, that we are generally subject to a specific 
`hegemonic' cultural formation, Williams argues, in Marxism and Literature, 
that alongside this dominant mode, there are traces of previous (in this case 
pre-capitalist) formations - the `residual', and new formations - the 
`emergent' (the most significant example being presumably the formation of a 
new class). The dominant then is in a permanent state of `evaluation' towards 
these alternative, and therefore potentially oppositional forms. Its first impulse 
will be to incorporate them, therefore draining them of critical distance, 
although, in certain cases, particularly with respect to very old residual 
formations, elements may be left unincorporated (rural formations being one 
example). It would then appear, within late capitalism, that the emergence of 
radical new forms, as well as the continuation of older `residual' formations, 
is likely to be more difficult, and their incorporation much more likely. This 
rapid incorporation of the emergent is already evident in the earlier 
`modernist' phase (think of all those `isms' of the avant-garde). In the case of 
the residual, we can look for instance at regions which have not yet passed 
from `feudal' into `capitalist' states, and expect these to offer the potential for 
a form of opposition. But the global penetration of late capitalism has rapidly 
transformed many of these regions, and the political price to pay by those 
seeking the assistance of the `advanced' countries is the rapid initiation into 
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the structure (if not necessarily the benefits) of that already developed 
capitalist model. 
In cultural terms, as Williams argues, it is the invention of `tradition' 
which works as `the most powerful practical means of incorporation', 
whereby a particularly `selective' tradition effectively writes out history, or 
rather, writes in only a very selective version. 19 In this sense, again as Williams 
himself stresses, what is being offered is actually the past as best fits the 
contemporary dominance of a specific class; and we can therefore see how 
such a strategy is likely to be transformed in `postmodernity', where history 
itself is put under erasure, so that only the `present' is available, and tradition 
itself becomes just another cultural artefact. This radical attempt at historical 
effacement then effectively threatens to destroy both the residual and the 
emergent, so that, in artistic terms, the only `shock' of the `new', is that there 
is no shock, because there is no `new'. This new era of what Jameson would 
want to call `depthlessness', is then exemplified by his notion of the 
simulacrum, which we will need soon to refine in the light of his own 
reworking of Baudrillard's theories. For now, though, we can compare it with 
what Williams calls the `facsimile'. Like Jameson, Williams's politics of hope 
includes a recognition that, despite the appearance of the postmodern, there 
are still in fact activities which are not within the dominant. This is so, 
because what dominance actually means (as indicated by the selective 
tradition) is the inclusion and emphasising of what matches the `ruling 
definition of the social', at the expense of excluding what for Williams often 
represents our most human, or metaphysical regions of existence. 20 Using an 
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extended stress rare in Williams, and, at the same time, confirming his 
continued allegiance to a Marxist model, he argues that `no mode of 
production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no 
dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, 
human energy, and human intention'. 21 
If this is correct, then it has to be assumed that there is, on the part of 
the dominant, a failure perhaps always to recognize, and deal with oppositions 
effectively. We can then pick up on the notion of the `facsimile' to offer the 
potential for dis-simulation, rather than the simulation of the simulacrum. 
Acknowledging that today, `[t]he area of effective penetration of the 
dominant order into the whole social and cultural process is thus now 
significantly greater', Williams nevertheless holds to the position that, 
whatever the difficulties, emergence can still happen: 
Elements of emergence may indeed be incorporated, but just as often 
the incorporated forms are merely facsimiles of the genuinely 
emergent cultural practice. Any significant emergence, beyond or 
against a dominant mode, is very difficult under these conditions; in 
itself and in its repeated confusion with the facsimiles and novelties of 
the incorporated phase. Yet, in our own period as in others, the fact of 
emergent cultural practice is still undeniable, and together with the 
fact of actively residual practice is a necessary complication of the 
22 would-be dominant culture. 
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Thus Williams offers the utopian notion of the emergent form deceiving the 
dominant into accepting a facsimile of itself, which satisfies the dominant, 
allowing the emergent to escape incorporation. 
Having offered at least a tentative alternative to the negativity of the 
postmodern simulacrum, we must now re-examine Jameson's own 
formulation. 
4. The Electric Ant, The Hysterical Sublime 
So far, we have relied on that limited, if paradoxical, definition of the 
simulacrum given by Jameson in his essay - Plato's identical copy for which 
no original has ever existed. This finds its architectural correlative in David 
Harvey's analysis of Quinlan Terry's `Richmond Riverside Panorama', a 
simulacrum of a never-existing eighteenth-century classical building, almost 
indistinguishable from a well-restored original (Harvey, p. 84). In terms of the 
work of Jean Baudrillard, it would conform to what he calls a `second-order' 
simulation, in that there is still a gap, albeit a very small one, between original 
and copy, a difference which can still be recognized. 23 For Baudrillard, this is 
the era of the robot. Where previously, we constructed automata, which 
played the game of resemblance and difference by offering something as like 
as possible to the human but still somehow different; so, with the industrial 
robot, there is no attempt at copying, the robot `is no longer turned towards a 
resemblance with man, to whom furthermore it no longer bears 
comparison'. 24 Like the commodity it has become, the robot resembles only 
itself, proliferating like signs which are always only self-referential. But this 
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collapse of difference still maintains that more significant difference, between 
machine and man, which itself is threatened by Baudrillard's `third order', the 
postmodern order of signs and models. 
Since these images of automata and robotics are so potent, it helps 
that they form the subject matter of two of Jameson's favourite cultural 
examples, Ridley Scott's film Blade Runner and Philip K. Dick's short story 
An Electric Ant. In Blade Runner, the hero's job consists of tracking down 
`replicants', robots who are almost impossible to differentiate from humans 
(and are therefore, in Baudrillard's terms `automata'). They give themselves 
away, ironically, by relying for their personal `history' on an implanted set of 
instructions, backed up by sets of photographs which actually belong to the 
`real' family history of their inventor. But the subject of Dick's Electric Ant is 
rather different, and effectively, I want to argue, jumps from the first order 
simulacrum of the automaton, to the third order simulacrum of a world made 
up only of models. As Jameson summarises the story, `the corporation man 
finds out that he's one of the robots the corporation makes' . 
25 This then raises 
the possibility that there are in fact only robots, simulations without an 
original. But in offering this example, I want also to emphasise how Jameson 
uses it to discuss our relationship to technology, since this then allows us to 
make that connection between postmodernism, technology and the `sublime', 
which in turn opens out on to a whole other debate about consciousness, and 
our ability to orient ourselves within the mystifications of late capitalism. 
Jameson mentions An Electric Ant in answer to a question raised 
about his use of the sublime in postmodern theory. Returning briefly to 
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Romantic ideology, we can identify the sublime, as defined by Edmund 
Burke, as that moment when the human being, confronting the enormity of 
Nature, experiences a strange mix of terror, power, vastness, infinity and 
magnificence, in the emotion called by Burke `Astonishment'; an emotion so 
overwhelming that it excludes the possibility of any other, including even 
reasoning about the experience itself. 26 If Jameson is right, and that `other' 
reality is now, not nature, but multinational capitalism, then we have to ask 
ourselves whether any equivalent to the `classical' notion of the sublime still 
has meaning. For Jameson, invoking instead the concept of an `hysterical 
sublime', that other, an `enormous properly human and anti-natural power of 
dead human labour stored up in our machinery', is indeed late capitalism 
itself, but disguised, hidden by the simulacrum that is technology 
(`Postmodernism', p. 77). 
This returns us to An Electric Ant, because Jameson asks the 
question: `[W]ould it be sublime to find out you're a robot? '. 27 In the case of 
the `hero' of the story, `he' undergoes a version of the hysterical sublime, a 
moment of overwhelming `astonishment', but astonishment not at 
confrontation with the real of Nature, but the postmodern equivalent, the 
hysterical sublime of technology and its ability to mask the reality of the mode 
of production (although, as Jameson points out, since we are actually dealing 
with something which lacks human self-consciousness, any `reaction' is itself 
merely a simulacrum). What we have then, is something altogether new, a 
relationship between the human and the machine which seems significantly 
different from anything that has come before, and it is for this reason that 
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Mandel's `periodizing hypothesis', mapping technological change onto 
alterations within capitalism itself, is so important for Jameson. He mentions, 
for instance, the very powerful positive images of the technological which 
were a feature of modernism, whether in the revolutionary impulses of a 
Diego Rivera, or the very different futurism of a Marinetti. There certainly 
seems to be something different between the machinery of the `electric' age, 
and our own `electronic' culture (Baudrillard's `digital' culture of codes and 
binary oppositions). There is a new sense of disorientation, that hysterical or 
technological sublime, which comes from our inability to deal with the 
unrepresentability of a machine age based on electronic data transmission and 
the `inert' appearance of the computer, a machine almost completely devoid 
of visibly moving parts. For Jameson, it is a question of representation: he 
contrasts, for instance, the railroad train, which `represents' speed even when 
turned into a stationary work of art, with the computer, `whose outer shell 
has no emblematic or visual power', and with the television, `which 
articulates nothing but rather implodes, carrying its flattened image surface 
within itself ('Postmodernism', p. 79). 
For Jameson, this new sublime relationship with technology is one of 
faulty representations: we are mesmerised and fascinated by the `astonishing' 
power of the newer machines, centred on activities of communication and 
information processing, where code itself becomes commodity. This 
relationship `seems to offer some privileged representational shorthand for 
grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds 
and imaginations to grasp - namely the whole new global network of the third 
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stage of capital itself ('Postmodernism', pp. 79-80). Jameson's attempts at 
`solutions' to this new development of capital will include the effort to 
discover utopian evidence of collectivity within the brutalised image culture of 
postmodernism, and what he will want to call, following the work of Kevin 
Lynch and others, `cognitive mapping'. 28 1 will investigate some of these 
ideas further, after seeing how Raymond Williams tackles some of the same 
problems. 
5. The New Conformists 
The title of this chapter is taken from the sub-title to Raymond 
Williams's The Politics of Modernism, a collection put together from his own 
schema, after his death in 1988.29 `Against the New Conformists' was to have 
been the last chapter, but was never completed. I have taken it to refer to 
what Williams calls in `Culture and Technology' (a chapter included in the 
volume, and previously in Towards 2000) the `technological determinists' and 
`cultural pessimists'. These designations then align themselves precisely with 
the cultural relationship to new technologies outlined by Fredric Jameson 
above, privileging technology at the expense of ignoring more fundamental 
structures. We can therefore start to sketch out Williams's own analysis of 
Jameson's `hysterical sublime', and some of his responses to the thrust of late 
capitalism, at the same time recognizing, from Jameson's perspective, 
potential problems with Williams's model. 
Sublimely observing the inexorable rise in technological innovation 
through what Williams calls `paranational hypercapitalism', and believing that 
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this technology somehow `emerges' into society, and then changes it, the 
cultural pessimists hang on desperately to past cultures, ultimately opting for 
corporate sponsorship through advertising - what Franco Moretti has called 
the ultimate modem myth. 30 The cultural pessimists therefore grasp at the 
opportunity for `free' money, but Williams reminds us what once Marx 
taught, that there is no such thing: 
There is no free money. It is all spent for calculated and usually 
acknowledged purposes: in immediate trading, but also to substitute a 
healthy for an unhealthy association (as in tobacco sponsorships of 
sports), or to reassure what are called `opinion-formers', or to 
enhance, as it is slyly put, a `public image' (POM, p. 128). 
Money suppresses difference through exchange value. Indeed, as Jameson 
puts it: `the minute commodities begin to speak [... ] they have already 
become exchange values'. 3' Advertising sponsorship, for Williams, is 
`paranational manna' emanating from the `true paranational godfathers' 
(POM, p. 128). It succeeds in disguising its true purposes behind a mask of 
disinterested respectability. But it is always `interested' in shoring up the 
dominant ideology, and will, if pressed, change the sponsorship relationship to 
reassert the correct power relationship: 
Many [... ] kinds of artistic enterprise, confident in the seriousness and 
validity of their projects, have joined the queues outside the offices of 
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the corporations, for sponsorship money. None of this can go on for 
long - indeed in some ways none of it can even start - unless deeper 
adaptations have already been made. What is treated as mere `support 
money' never stays like that. Production itself becomes steadily more 
homogeneous with the sponsoring and directing institutions (POM, p. 
129). 32 
Effectively, this leads to a form of nostalgia which Williams sees as 
starting to saturate the minority arts. Those very images and representations 
used to legitimate the most tawdry and undesirable aspects of the modem - 
our `glorious past' (the `selective tradition'), the heritage industry, indeed, 
that whole simulacrum of what there once was (or rather never was) - are 
reinvented by a contemporary, postmodern culture finally at ease with 
corporate sponsorship. And that corporatism becomes the postmodern 
unnameable, `the enemy which could not be named because its money was 
being taken' (POM, p. 132). 
One way past this postmodern aporia, for Williams, would be 
imaginative, a utopian looking fotward, towards more communitarian models 
of collectivity. Rather like Jameson, who agonises over the dissolution of 
`Brecht' into `Brecht-Industrie', Williams recognizes the incorporation of 
modernist forms, which `lent themselves to cultural competition and the 
commercial interplay of obsolescence, with its shifts of schools, styles and 
fashion so essential to the market' (POM, p. 35). This is from the 
Introduction to The Politics of Modernism. What were once seen as 
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exemplary versions of the avant-garde, become in the postmodern `the merely 
technical modes of advertising and the commercial cinema'. Like Jameson, he 
identifies the onslaught of a `new international capitalism' with the seeming 
impossibility for critical distance. But, also like Jameson, he refuses to put up 
his hands in despair: 
These heartless formulae sharply remind us that the innovations of 
what is called Modernism have become the new but fixed forms of our 
present moment. If we are to break out of the non-historical fixity of 
post-modernism, then we must search out and counterpose an 
alternative tradition taken from the neglected works left in the wide 
margin of the century, a tradition which may address itself not to this 
by now exploitable because quite inhuman rewriting of the past but, 
for all our sakes, to a modern future in which community may be 
imagined again (POM, p. 35, emphasis in original). 
Williams's attempts at solutions to these overwhelming problems can range 
from the truly global to the intensely personal. At times, he is almost 
Bakhtinian in his continuing belief in the possibilities for localized, 
carnivalesque disruptions to the dominant order. Almost village nostalgia this, 
with its emphasis on `jokes and gossip, [... ] everyday singing and dancing, 
[... ] occasional dressing up and extravagant outbursts of colour' (POM, p. 
134). Almost, but not quite: these activities do still go on, from the trades 
union march to the pit brass band; from the continuously changing popular 
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music, always one step ahead of the market, to the exuberance of the Notting 
Hill Carnival. And, despite continuing attempts at incorporation (or 
suppression), they remain a tangible, oppositional force: 
They are irrepressible because in the generality of their impulses, and 
in their intransigent attachments to human diversity and recreation, 
they survive, under any pressures and through whatever forms, while 
life itself survives, and while so many people - real if not always 
connected majorities - keep living and looking to live beyond the 
routines which attempt to control and reduce them (POM, p. 134). 
The emphasis on community, while conforming to Jameson's stress on the 
need for collectivity to re-assert itself, risks the accusation that Williams is 
yearning for the nostalgia of small, self-sufficient, basically non-urban 
organizations (the ultimate simulacrum perhaps). Indeed, while 
acknowledging Williams's importance to his own thinking, Jameson himself 
alludes to a lingering `village nostalgia' in Williams's emphasis on place rather 
than space. 33 But, as Williams emphasizes in Politics and Letters, `village 
nostalgia' is one means socialists have of representing the unrepresentable 
(and thus thinking through the postmodern sublime). As Williams and others 
have stressed, the utopian future will be more, rather than less complex than 
now, as subjectivity is given new opportunities outside the constraints of a 
dominant capitalism. 34 Thus we have to have recourse to past models as the 
only way of figuring this future, without losing sight of their inevitable 
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limitations. In the field of electronic communication, for instance, he 
envisages an appropriation, such that `the kinds of democracy previously 
imagined only for very small communities [... ] become quite normally 
available for larger communities'. " Further, the increasing acceleration of 
time-space compression has not in fact led to `place' becoming less 
important, as might be assumed. As Harvey noted above, one of the effects 
of the collapse of spatial barriers has been a greater `sensitivity of capital to 
the variations of place within space, and the greater the incentive for places to 
be differentiated in ways attractive to capital' (Harvey, p. 296). 
Williams's utopian impulse, though often emphasising local 
opposition, is neither nostalgic nor unrealistic. Rather, it transfers images of 
village nostalgia into a tool for confronting the global village. Refusing to 
succumb to either technological determinism or cultural pessimism, he seeks 
instead for what David Harvey calls the `cracks in the mirror' within the 
superficially unbroken image culture of the postmodern (Harvey, chapter 27). 
Grasping the means of production, the crucial moment of class consciousness, 
is translated by Williams into the immediate need to expropriate the potential 
for change locked into the new technologies. For instance, he insists on 
rethinking the activity of broadcasting, to encourage independent producers; 
operating a form of exchange network across national divides; development 
of an extensive electronic catalogue backed up by a reference and archive 
network, releasing information at present tied up in various forms of public 
trust (POM, p. 135). Williams effectively extends the parameters of his 
cultural materialism, seizing aspects of the postmodern to release moments of 
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choice previously occluded or even actively suppressed by the same system. 
`Nothing', he writes, `is determined by the new technology, but it is an 
important feature of the new systems that they offer opportunities for new 
cultural relationships, which the older systems could not' (POM, p. 135). 
There are no easy solutions to the difficulties caused in the 
postmodern by the extensive advance of new communication systems, and the 
commodification of knowledge itself. The power of new global systems is 
supported by an ever more dominant economic and political order, which 
recognizes in these forms the opportunity for ever greater global penetration 
and homogenization, relying not on the totalitarian regimes which figure so 
prominently within modernism, but far subtler binary systems of hegemonic 
`negotiation' and `reconciliation'. Already (in 1983), as Williams notes, the 
development of cable television is `systematically exclud[ing] rural 
populations and the poorer towns and city areas' (POM, p. 136). We could 
extend this analysis today to include the development of the Internet, a form 
of interaction which appears to have escaped from its initiating control within 
weapons technology, and yet increasingly seems subject to the will of a small 
handful of multinational companies for its organization and `improvement'. 36 
What is needed then, is increased access, but access accompanied by 
new production, not reproduction from within the dominant order. Looking 
outside to research in other fields, Williams offers as an example the opinion 
poll, arguing that the canvassers tend `to deploy [their] agenda of questions 
on the assumption of an existing competence to answer them in the selected 
terms' (POM, p. 137). This conforms to another of Jameson's anxieties, that 
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everything may be rigged in advance, including our own actions. Yet, as 
Williams stresses, some work has already indicated that alternative 
procedures are possible, in which initial replies lead to the amendment of 
questions, resulting perhaps in a genuine exchange of developing viewpoints. 
Like Williams, Jameson too often has recourse to a form of 
`micropolitics', as he searches within the constraints of late capitalism for 
those `moments of truth' which point forward to a utopian solution. 
Frequently, such `moments' will appear aberrant and undesirable. Jameson 
argues, in Signatures of the Visible, that `the works of mass culture cannot be 
ideological without at one and the same time being implicitly or explicitly 
Utopian as well'. 37 Two examples from American popular culture help to 
explain what Jameson means by this strange assertion. In the first, the 
television cop show (exemplified say by Hill Street Blues), he argues that the 
ideological `message' of the drama occludes a sort of Williams' like knowable 
community of collective activity: 
You very clearly have two kinds of operation going on here. You 
have a whole horrible law-and-order ideology at work there, in order 
to train the United States in internal urban matters and in external 
foreign affairs matters. And then I think that underneath one also has 
the image of a team and of a certain kind of collective work which is 
relatively utopian; and it's in that sense that I think these kinds of texts 
carry that attempt to recover some utopian dimension. 38 
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The other example Jameson uses is Coppola's The Godfather, and in a 
typically exuberant reading of the first two parts, he opens up these narratives 
of violence and corruption to a utopian emphasis on family and collectivity. 
He introduces the topic by `historicizing' the genre of gangster film, positing 
the Mafia portrayal of The Godfather as having a very particular narrative 
content not seen earlier: `a kind of saga or family material analogous to that 
of the medieval "chansons de geste", with its recurrent episodes and 
legendary figures returning again and again in different perspectives and 
contexts'. 39 Setting aside the question of unconscious desire, in Jameson's 
urge to weld the older history of medieval Europe on to North America's 
more recent one, it is his stress on the family (here without the inevitable 
Mafia pun) which distinguishes The Godfather from earlier gangster movies, 
which concentrated rather on the individuality of action. Rather than what he 
considers to be its ideological function: displacing the `crime' of corporate 
capital onto an ethical debate about organized crime at the more local level, it 
is here that Jameson recognizes the potential for utopian fantasy: 
At a time when the disintegration of the dominant communities is 
persistently `explained' in the (profoundly ideological) terms of a 
deterioration of the family, the growth of permissiveness, and the loss 
of authority of the father, the ethnic group can seem to project an 
image of social reintegration by way of the patriarchal and 
authoritarian family of the past. 4° 
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This straightforward representation of `family' is deconstructed from both the 
ideological and Utopian perspectives in Godfather H. Here, the work of the 
Mafia, in the first a substitute for business, turns into its actuality, as the 
family strains for corporate credibility, revealing its ideological constraints. At 
the same time, the origins of `family' are revealed in the `pre-capitalist social 
formation of a backward and feudal Sicily' (which presumably explains the 
rather anti-utopian formulation of the patriarchal family). In a final twist, the 
film reaches its historical conclusion in the failure of the new corporate Mafia 
to overcome the dynamism of the nascent Cuban revolution. "' Jameson 
summarises his analysis thus: 
[T]hese two narrative impulses as it were reverse each other: the 
ideological myth of the Mafia ends up generating the authentically 
Utopian vision of revolutionary liberation; while the degraded Utopian 
content of the family paradigm ultimately unmasks itself as the 
survival of more archaic forms of repression and sexism and 
violence. 42 
Jameson's belief that, however degraded our culture might be, it can be 
opened up to a form, however `fantastic', of utopian critique, still leaves open 
the problem of that initial sense of disorientation with respect to the 
postmodern, exacerbated by what Jameson perceives as an inevitable closing 
down of the possibilities for critique. Indeed, the development of his work 
indicates an ever-increasing sense of such closure, as he provides more and 
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more totalizing models, which continue to emphasize what we have seen 
earlier as the `winner-loses' logic of postmodern culture. I would argue that 
this is a continuing feature of Jameson's work, right through to The Seeds of 
Time, where he at once anguishes over the skill of late capital in offering 
`simulacra' of apparently localized new building projects, while at the same 
time he writes with some enthusiasm about one specific example of such 
development, known as `critical regionalism' . 
43 
Arguing, in a similar manner to the above, that `the most powerful 
arguments against Utopia are in reality Utopian ones' (SOT, p. 54), Jameson 
uses the example of `critical regionalism' (taking the term from the architect 
Kenneth Frampton) as a paradoxical form which appears both to share 
postmodernism's rejection of modernism's grand narratives, while at the same 
time seeking to `negate a whole series of postmodern negations of 
modernism as well' (SOT, p. 190). Far from representing a sort of 'avant- 
gardist' modernist desire for the new, which is now the staple diet of a 
consumerist postmodem appropriation ('Brecht becomes Brecht-Industrie') it 
instead promotes itself as formed out of a `certain deeper historical logic' 
which is at odds with the `end of history' and the `repudiation of historical 
teleology' (SOT, pp. 190-91). 44 
In attempting to explain how Frampton's notion of critical regionalism 
is put into architectural practice, Jameson replays some of the ideas we have 
already investigated. In particular, Frampton attempts to oppose the current 
doxa of the `primacy of representation in contemporary architecture', and 
does so by privileging instead those parts of the building which are not 
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normally visible (in particular the internal joints, SOT, p. 197). This new 
aesthetic (Frampton divides it into a tripartite schema - the `tactile', the 
`tectonic' and the `telluric') attempts to `frame the notion of space in such a 
way that it turns back slowly into a conception of place once again' (SOT, p. 
197). But if this critical regionalism then has the effect of disengaging from 
the `space' of global capital in favour of a more localized sensitivity to place, 
it appears to do so both by failing to pay attention to the technological aspect 
of modern architecture, and by reverting to yet another version of `village 
nostalgia'. 
In a sense, both of these issues relate to Williams's notion of the 
`residual' (as Jameson acknowledges, SOT, p. 199). From necessity, as the 
opportunities for genuine `emergence' recede, critical regionalism is `built' on 
residual elements, so that its problem is to do so while at the same time 
offering a form of progressive intervention. In fact, as Jameson shows 
through a number of specific examples, critical regionalism does embrace 
modern technological advances in building design and construction. It holds 
out the possibility `of inventing some new relationship to the technological 
beyond nostalgic repudiation or mindless corporate celebration' (SOT, p. 
201). Similarly, the re-emphasis on place is attempted while refusing to 
succumb to an earlier attitude, which invested existing forms with inherent 
political, even revolutionary potential. Critical regionalism aims to identify 
spatial difference and attend to it by producing structures which are place- 
specific. 
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The trouble is, and it is with this that Jameson ends his essay, the 
providers of such `difference' will tend to be just those multinational 
companies who embrace postmodernism and represent late capitalism. Thus, 
while apparently `respecting' the values of a local community, this advanced 
form of post-Fordism `inserts the corporations into the very heart of local and 
regional culture' so that assumptions about authenticity (remember Harvey's 
simulacrum, the Quinlan Terry building) become intensely problematic (SOT, 
p. 204). What we must end with then, is a consideration of Jameson's more 
ambitious `solution' to such problems, together with a brief look forwards to 
the future for cultural materialism and utopian thinking. 
Cognitive mapping, and a new 'Negative Dialectics' 
Both Williams and Jameson have challenged the positions of the 
cultural pessimists and technological determinists, denying the privileging of 
the technological over the economic; arguing against notions of the `end of 
history' or the `post-industrial' age. The trouble is, as Jameson notes towards 
the end of `Postmodernism', there is a very real political issue at stake here, 
since it seems that large numbers of intelligent people really do believe such 
things (`Postmodernism', p. 91). For Jameson, these faulty representations 
need to be challenged by a new version of reorientation, which acknowledges 
the postmodern, and tries to see beyond it, what he calls `cognitive mapping'. 
It has to be said straight away that this remains an idea rather than a thought 
out system. Jameson bases his notion on a reworking of the geographic 
analysis of city mapping, which indicates how people are increasingly unable 
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to `place' themselves in the modern city. They therefore are required to 
produce their own `internal' maps, which allow improved relationships with 
the very contours of the city, and thus benefit their being. This is then 
extrapolated by Jameson `to the realm of social structure, that is to say, in our 
historical moment, to the totality of class relations on a global [... ] scale'. 45 
Jameson argues that it is the new global space itself which is the moment of 
truth of postmodernism, so that aspects of that space need to be grasped by 
the subject in order for there to be a re-orientation. `Cognitive mapping' is 
then posited as `a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the 
individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global 
system'. If successful, such a strategy would achieve: 
`a breakthrough to some as yet unimaginable new mode of 
representing [multinational capital], in which we may again begin to 
grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a 
capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our 
spatial as well as our social confusion' (`Postmodernism', p. 92). 
Effectively, Jameson `takes on' the totality of late capitalism with a 
similarly totalizing form of critique which tries to go `beyond' the purely 
ideological in search of the Utopian, as in the earlier analysis of The 
Godfather. This is the gist of his argument in The Political Unconscious, 
where he investigates once more `the Frankfurt school's conception of strong 
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memory as the trace of gratification, of the revolutionary power of that 
promesse de bonheur most immediately inscribed in the aesthetic text 5, . 
46 
But it is precisely this which will form the basis of Terry Eagleton's 
anxiety, expressed through his reading of the above in The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic. Quoting Jürgen Habermas, that `[t]he truth of statements [... ] is 
linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and the true life', 
Eagleton comments: `[t]o claim to detect a promesse de bonheur in an 
exchange of obscene insults would seem either ridiculously gullible or faintly 
perverse - akin, perhaps, to Fredric Jameson's startling claim to discern a 
proleptic image of utopia in any human collectivity whatsoever, which would 
presumably encompass racist rallies'. 47 Astute as this comment is, it fails to 
confront something even more `startling' just a few pages later in The 
Political Unconscious, where Jameson reminds us that in Adorno's and 
Horkheimer's classic Dialectic of Enlightenment they also discern elements 
of Utopia in something as obscene as a racist rally, that is `one of the ugliest 
of all human passions, antisemitism'. 48 Further, for Jameson, these notions of 
repressed utopian impulse are allegorical: 
The achieved collectivity or organic group of whatever kind - 
oppressors fully as much as oppressed - is Utopian not in itself, 
but 
only insofar as all such collectives are themselves figures for the 
ultimate concrete collective life of an achieved Utopian or classless 
society. 49 
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It is for this reason that Jameson, while approving of Walter Benjamin's 
famous maxim, that `there is no document of civilization which is not at the 
same time a document of barbarism', wants to reverse the terms, so that 
within even the most barbaric, one can discern at least the figure of a new 
civilizing force. S° And it is for this reason, no less `startling' in its way, that 
Jameson makes the turn to Adorno's negative dialectics, rather than Ernst 
Bloch's ideal of utopian hope or Bakhtin's carnivalesque disruption of the 
hegemonic. 
Q. 
If we are to confront postmodernism, dependent ultimately on the 
much more complex totalizing system of capitalism itself, a global `totality' 
which survives because it depends not on the barbarities of totalitarianism, but 
on the increasingly digital networks and `negotiations' of late capitalism's 
success at hegemonic dominance, then what is needed perhaps is indeed a 
return to a negative dialectic. As Jameson explains in his interview in News 
from Nowhere, his `hope' is that Adorno could provide the `vehicle for 
demystifying what offers itself as rich and abundant and consumable about the 
postmodern, a way of unmasking it as a negative system of closure"', but 
(unlike the Adorno of The Dialectic of Enlightenment), this time with the 
result of leading not to that `withdrawal and quietism' so familiar to his 
readers, but rather towards a sense of the limits of the system, and the 
beginning of a way of thinking past them. 52 Rather like Benjamin's excavation 
of past ruins, Jameson recommends digging within `the insubstantial 
bottomless realm of cultural and collective fantasy' to recover the invaluable, 
almost lost category of class consciousness. 53 Perhaps, as Williams suggests, 
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and Jameson implies, we are all `after, stuck in the post' (POM, p. 35; 
emphasis in original). In that case, we need a developed cultural materialism, 
perhaps in the form of a `cognitive mapping' which can at least point the way 
out of this `sticky' end, so that at last, the apparent complexities of the 
postmodem appear empty and uninteresting against the far greater 
diversification of a new society. 
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Conclusion: The Future of Cultural Materialism 
The last chapter suggested a possible future for cultural materialism 
after the death of Raymond Williams. To conclude, I want to consider in 
more detail what cultural materialism has meant since 1988, particularly in 
relation to Shakespeare studies, and where it might go from here. First 
though, it is worth emphasizing that cultural materialism as understood and 
practised by Williams has come in for some criticism from those on the Left, 
and not just for the theoretical reasons raised earlier by Terry Eagleton. A 
number of critics, while praising Williams for his insights, particularly in the 
area of class politics, have noticed that considerations of gender or race are 
by contrast almost completely absent. In practice, of course, there is no 
possibility of simply separating out these issues, as if they inhabited different 
regions, but it is reasonable to accept that differing emphasis can be made, 
and that, for Williams, class has dominated. What started out though as 
straightforward criticism, has moved more recently into valuable attempts to 
move cultural materialism more directly into these other areas, so as to 
explore, in Williams's terms, a new vocabulary of culture and society, a set of 
keywords for one sort of future. ' 
In the body of the thesis we have seen Williams's cultural materialist 
approach used on culture ranging from an early-seventeenth century poem to 
a late-twentieth century feature film. Nevertheless, it is true that the area 
which has become the major focus of attention for those describing 
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themselves as cultural materialists is Renaissance studies, and specifically the 
drama of Shakespeare and his contemporaries. One effect of this 
concentration on Shakespeare has been a predictable challenge from more 
`traditional' Shakespeare scholars, resulting in a long, and often acrimonious 
set of exchanges, for example the so-called `Bardbiz' controversy which 
raged in the London Review of Books throughout most of 1990 and 1991.2 
Central to this debate was the publication in 1985 of Political 
Shakespeare, edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. 3 As Sinfield has 
pointed out, Political Shakespeare `caused a furore' by suggesting that 
Shakespeare's plays `are, and always have been, involved in politics'. 4 The 
reaction to all this was to attempt to re-instate a Coleridgean notion of 
Shakespeare transcending a narrow `politics' to speak to all men at all times 
in all places. This `academic' debate within University English departments 
spreads out, embracing not only crucial decisions about what schoolchildren 
should learn, so that the National Curriculum mirrors the approach of the 
Cambridge `Tripos' and Oxford `Schools' by making Shakespeare a special 
case (in the National Curriculum, the only compulsory author for English, in 
Oxford and Cambridge the only author taking up a complete paper), but also 
reflecting the very real cultural and political significance of `Shakespeare' 
generally. 3 Thus Warwickshire, as the signpost on the M 40 informs us, is 
`Shakespeare's county'. 6 But if Shakespeare can `appropriate' a county, 
everyone, it appears, wants to `appropriate' Shakespeare, from the Prince of 
Wales to a Government Minister.? As Sinfield has pointed out, the opponents 
of cultural materialism are of two distinct kinds. On the one hand, many 
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traditional critics refuse to acknowledge that anything as gross as a political 
idea could infect Shakespeare or his works. This would appear to be the 
stance taken up by the very properly `apolitical' heir to the throne, who reads 
Shakespeare in a particularly `transcendent' way, as Sinfield shows by 
considering a speech given in Stratford upon Avon in 1991: 
[Prince Charles] was complaining about `a general flight from our 
great literary heritage' - an odd idea, when you look around Stratford. 
But whose literary heritage? Shakespeare's `roots are ours, his 
language is ours, his culture ours', H. R. H. declared. Of course, this 
is true for only some British people. `His roots are ours': who are 
`we'? Well, Shakespeare's plays have lots of kings in them - perhaps 
he meant the royal `we'. 8 
But not all traditionalists are so resistant to politics and history: Nigel Lawson 
suggested in 1983 that Shakespeare was `a Tory, without any doubt'. 9 I am 
not sure whether Lawson counts as a `Shakespearean scholar', but Brian 
Vickers certainly does. His position is that there is a high degree of coherence 
in all Shakespeare's works, which reflects a strong allegiance to one specific 
('State') ideological position. Such is the theme of his Appropriating 
Shakespeare' °, in which Vickers takes on the cultural materialists and new 
historicists for what he sees as their superficial historical understanding, and 
desperate desire to turn everything towards the cause of contemporary 
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politics. His rejection of this political approach is nicely summarised in a 
review essay from 1994: 
Newer fashions of "historicism" [... ] really write about contemporary 
politics under the guise of historical commentary, indicting Western 
government and authority by aligning it with the victories or betrayals 
in Shakespeare. Gaultree Forest foreshadows My Lai, Agincourt is 
juxtaposed with the Falklands or Gulf War triumphs. Militarism, 
colonialism, Machiavellianism: for this school of critics, Shakespeare 
shares the guilt of LBJ or George Bush. ll 
Vickers is a formidable opponent, all the more so because he does not appear 
to reject the claims of cultural materialists completely. Indeed, in an earlier 
work, Returning to Shakespeare12 he specifically praises Williams for his 
insights into the failure of Cambridge to teach Shakespeare properly. And the 
text of Williams which comes in for this praise is none other than Williams's 
`Afterword' to Political Shakespeare. 13 Vickers neatly `appropriates' 
Williams for his own ends, using the `Afterword' to argue once again for a 
version of `close reading' which includes historical contextualization. 
14 In 
other words, he takes us right back to those debates about the meaning of 
`text' and `context' which formed much of the subject matter of chapter two, 
and the dispute between Bateson and Leavis, and it is undertaken in a way 
which ignores all those more recent theories which seek to challenge the 
simple opposition between `text' and 'context'. 15 But Vickers' strong support 
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of a `contextual' approach is as far removed from the cultural materialist 
perspective as possible - he argues that such work does not make us rethink 
the significance of Shakespeare, on the contrary: `such exercises in historical 
criticism, paradoxically enough, bring Shakespeare's reliance on, yet 
independence of, his social and intellectual context into much sharper focus. 
The increased clarity of vision makes the plays that much more individual, and 
immediate'. 16 In other words, the effort of doing historical research rewards 
us by making it clearer that Shakespeare was even greater than we first 
imagined. This is hardly the message of Political Shakespeare or Raymond 
Williams. Returning to Williams's `Afterword', what becomes clear is that, 
despite his plea for a more `historical' form of criticism, his own commitment 
to a cultural materialist reading has as one of its main targets just the kind of 
privileging of Shakespeare suggested by Vickers: 
I have always believed that the works of what has been defined, and 
often contained, as the mainstream simply have to go on being 
addressed: not only because of their own substantial importance, but 
also because their very formation into what has been called a canon, 
with implications for all the works and related forms which that 
significant term excludes and is at times designed to exclude, enforces, 
in any new analysis, direct and sustained attention to what can be 
known of these works both before and after this incorporating and 
often flattening process. '7 
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Williams continues by pointing to the content of the essays in Political 
Shakespeare, which combine `within the same covers, studies of particular 
plays and of the institutions, in education and theatre, which have been built 
around versions of them'. '$ This is a very different understanding of 
`contextualization' and one unlikely to gain Vickers' approval. Vickers' 
attempt to appropriate Williams is at best misguided, and he must realise that 
Williams's fundamental beliefs about culture are close to those who now call 
themselves cultural materialists: Sinfield points to a similar `faultline' in 
Appropriating Shakespeare, where Vickers argues that it was a direct result 
of his `traditional' approach to thinking about Shakespeare which allowed 
him to leave his childhood home, a miner's cottage in South Wales, and that 
therefore `Shakespeare transcends class-divisions'. 19 The very mention of 
Wales, and a suggestion of `border crossing' inevitably invokes in Sinfield the 
name of Williams: 
Raymond Williams's work could have helped Vickers to see that the 
co-option of bright individuals into middle-class Englishness does 
nothing for the Welsh working class, and may leave the escapees 
culturally rootless and bitter. 20 
Given Alan Sinfield's regular acknowledgements of Williams's 
influence, and Williams's own willingness to have his name connected with 
Political Shakespeare, it may be more reasonable for Sinfield to appropriate 
Williams than Vickers, but it leaves open the question of the relationship 
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between the formulation of cultural materialism revealed in the main body of 
the thesis, and the continuing activity of Sinfield and his colleagues. In 
particular, the problem raised in chapter four, about Williams's attempt to 
`materialize' cultural production, and the doubts expressed by Terry Eagleton 
about Williams's claim that his radical reformulation of the 
base/superstructure metaphor can still be considered `part of historical 
materialism can be seen to be of continuing significance. We saw in the 
chapter on `Penshurst' that despite Williams's rejection of ideology in favour 
of hegemony, his own analysis of the `Country-House' poems is still very 
much `ideological critique', in which forms of consciousness and 
representation are shown to be inverted and exclusionary with respect to the 
governing relations of production. This insistence on a Marxist theory of 
determination is problematized in the `Postmodern' chapter. There, certain 
theories of postmodernity insist on the end of `grand narratives', including 
Marxism, and suggest that it is meaningless even to think about the 
relationship between economic activity and `superstructural' formations and 
any `determining' relationship between them. Yet, as I have shown using the 
work of Fredric Jameson, it is possible to account for the sorts of cultural 
shifts designated by the term `postmodernism' by holding on to such a 
deterministic model, arguing instead that we have not entered some strange, 
new epoch of `postmodernity', but merely the latest stage in the development 
of capitalism. 
Whether or not we can consider Williams a 'Marxist 
M, his intention 
to carve out a specific theory, `cultural materialism' within historical 
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materialism is clear. This does not have to be true for those who have come 
after, particularly in the wake of 1989 and the continuing suggestion that we 
are now `post-Marxist' (just as we are `post' everything else). Thus, in 
Jonathan Dollimore's Introduction to the second edition of Radical Tragedy 
he argues that a central issue in recent Renaissance studies has been `a 
growing feeling that theory itself had reached a level of sophistication which 
required historical engagement as its next stage, meaning by this not just a 
rereading of past literature through theoretical lenses, but a historical 
exploration of theory - hence using history to `read' theory as well as vice 
versa'. 22 It may look as though one particular `theoretical' way of 
understanding the world, `historical materialism', fits Dollimore's idea rather 
well. But further reading in Radical Tragedy suggests rather that what he is 
thinking about is much closer to that earlier debate, between a `materialist' 
and an `idealist' philosophy, than the developed work of `late' Marx which 
starts out after this particular debate is at an end. When Dollimore invokes 
Marx, it is in terms of `the Marxist proposition that human consciousness is 
determined by social being' rather than the Marx of `base and 
superstructure'. 23 As Eagleton reminded us earlier, one does not have to be 
an historical materialist to accept the `ontological' thesis that social being 
determines consciousness. Further, while acknowledging that Marx `displaced 
man from the centre of history', Dollimore uses this as a way to deny 
teleology, relying instead on a Foucauldian/Nietzschean notion of 
4genealogies'24. But Marxism is committed absolutely to a `teleological' 
understanding of history (albeit one at present caught up in the circularity of 
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`pre-history'). What I mean by this statement is not that Marxists understand 
history as something to do with evident design, or purpose, or `final causes' 
or whatever, because they accept with Marx that `history' to date has been a 
self-repeating, circular affair of tragedy and farce. What I do mean is that it is 
premature to talk about the `end of history' and resign ourselves to the 
`delights' of late capitalism, because, as Terry Eagleton puts it : `The point 
for Marx is not to move us towards the telos of History, but to get out from 
under all this so that we may make a beginning - so that histories proper, in all 
their wealth of difference, might get off the ground. 25 
A rather more sophisticated analysis of cultural materialism, and the 
continuing relevance to it of Marxism, is undertaken by Alan Sinfield in 
Faultlines. 26 Setting his own project in direct antagonism to the sort of 
`coherence' theory of literary criticism argued for by Brian Vickers, Sinfield 
argues that: 
[c]ultural materialism calls for modes of knowledge that literary 
criticism scarcely possesses, or even knows how to discover - modes, 
indeed, that hitherto have been cultivated distinctively within that alien 
other of essentialist humanism, Marxism. 27 
Responding directly to the debates over base and superstructure, Sinfield 
points out that new historicism's tendency to replace a model of 
determination with a structure of homologies drains away any notion of class 
agency, and hence any real possibility for historical change. 28 For Sinfield, 
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new historicists tend to over-rely on the work of Foucault, while at the same 
time actually misreading it, assuming that his fundamental model is one of 
`entrapment' rather than `resistance' (or Sinfield's preferred term, 
`dissidence'). 2' Sinfield's insistence on the existence of `faultlines' within the 
Shakespearean text relies on a Marxist theory of ideology which denies the 
possibility of `a privileged vantage point outside the dominant', but also 
acknowledges that `the social order cannot but produce faultlines [i. e. 
`contradictions'] through which its own criteria of plausibility fall into contest 
and disarray. 30 To explain this theoretically, Sinfield quotes Stuart Hall: 
[T]he dominant culture of a complex society is never a homogeneous 
structure. It is layered, reflecting different interests within the 
dominant class (e. g. an aristocratic versus a bourgeois outlook), 
containing different traces from the past (e. g. religious ideas within a 
largely secular culture), as well as emergent elements in the present. 31 
It is not difficult to see how close Hall's formulation is to Williams's notion of 
`dominant, residual and emergent', and indeed Sinfield specifically recognizes 
the influence of these ideas. 32 This returns us once again to Williams's `Base 
and Superstructure' essay, the place where he first formally develops his ideas 
about dominant, residual and emergent cultural practices. Despite Sinfield's 
strong emphasis on the need for cultural materialism to keep close to a 
Marxist cultural theory and practice, his own work makes it clear that it is 
4 
Williams's use of Gramsci and his writing on `hegemony' and `organic 
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intellectuals' which he finds most useful, particularly in his later work on 
`subcultures'. 33 Effectively, this latest version of cultural materialism is one 
much closer to Dollimore's `cultural analysis', which I considered in the 
Introduction. It has allowed Sinfield, Dollimore, Hawkes and many others to 
open up `canonical' works and `EngLit' to a set of `dissident' readings which 
have transformed reading practices in many valuable ways. But this has been 
achieved by sacrificing in particular a Marxist understanding of 
determination, despite Williams's desire to retain it. His own commitment to 
discussing society in terms of inter-relating levels of activity34, in other words, 
means in effect that he is unable to retain the notion of determination, 
however much he intends to, and this is true also for those who have followed 
him. In their original `Foreword' to Political Shakespeare, Dollimore and 
Sinfield insist that `culture does not (cannot) transcend the material forces and 
relations of production', and they argue that cultural materialism `registers its 
commitment to the transformation of a social order which exploits people on 
grounds of race, gender and class. 35 If cultural materialism is to have any 
viable future, this is what it needs to remember. 
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